Delegated Bidding and the Allocative Effect of Accounting Rules
Published Online:15 Jun 2016https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2439
References
- (2009) Quasi-robust multiagent contracts. Management Sci. 55(5):752–762.Link, Google Scholar
- (2003) Delegated investment decisions and private benefits of control. Accounting Rev. 78(4):909–930.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2011) Capital structure, cost of capital, and voluntary disclosures. Accounting Rev. 86(3):857–886.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2000) Toeholds, bid jumps, and expected payoffs in takeovers. Rev. Financial Stud. 13(4):841–882.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1979) Imperfect information, dividend policy, and “the bird in the hand” fallacy. Bell J. Econom. 10(1):259–270.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1989) Auctions with resale markets: An exploratory model of treasury bill markets. Rev. Financial Stud. 2(3):311–339.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1999) Toeholds and takeovers. J. Political Econom. 107(3):427–454.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1995) Initial shareholdings and overbidding in takeover contests. J. Finance 50(5):1491–1515.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1929) Economics of Accountancy (Ronald Press, New York).Google Scholar
- (1956) Some observations on “Structure of accounting theory.” Accounting Rev. 31(4):584–592.Google Scholar
- (1988) Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions. Econometrica 56(6):1247–1257.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1929) The changing objectives of accounting. Accounting Rev. 4(2):94–110.Google Scholar
- (1987) Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium, Vol. 17 (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT).Google Scholar
- (1980) Information Analysis (Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA).Google Scholar
- (1999) Asset valuation and performance measurement in a dynamic agency setting. Rev. Accounting Stud. 4(3–4):235–258.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2002) Controlling investment decisions: Depreciation and capital charges. Rev. Accounting Stud. 7(2–3):253–281.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2005) Accrual accounting for performance evaluation. Rev. Accounting Stud. 10(4):527–552.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1998) Investor sophistication and voluntary disclosures. Rev. Accounting Stud. 3(3):261–287.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2002) Classifications manipulation and Nash accounting standards. J. Accounting Res. 40(4):1125–1162.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1964) The Theory and Measurement of Business Income (University of California Press, Berkeley).Google Scholar
- Financial Accounting Standards Board (2006) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157: Fair value measurements. Report, FASB, Norwalk, CT. http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop_FAS157.pdf.Google Scholar
- Financial Accounting Standards Board (2007) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141: Business combinations. Report, FASB, Norwalk, CT. http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas141r.pdf.Google Scholar
- (1897) The role of capital in economic theory. Econom. J. 7(28):511–537.Google Scholar
- (1930) The Theory of Interest (A. M. Kelley, New York).Google Scholar
- (1989) Preemptive bidding and the role of the medium of exchange in acquisitions. J. Finance 44(1):41–57.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2008) Asymmetric auctions with resale. Amer. Econom. Rev. 98(1):87–112.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2003) Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities. J. Econom. Theory 108(1):72–110.Crossref, Google Scholar
- IFRS (2014) IAS 36 Impairment of assets. Technical summary, IFRS, London. http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/Documents/Technical-summaries-2014/IAS%2036.pdf.Google Scholar
- (1971) A defense for historical cost accounting. Sterling RR, ed. Asset Valuation and Income Determination (Scholars Book Co., Houston), 2–14.Google Scholar
- (1990) Performance pay and top-management incentives. J. Political Econom. 98(2):225–264.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2004) Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions. Managerial Decision Econom. 25(5):283–290.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1985) Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53(6):1315–1335.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1987) An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. J. Accounting Res. 25(Supplement):85–125.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1956) Choice among alternatives. Accounting Rev. 31(3):363–370.Google Scholar
- (2012) Takeover bidding with signaling incentives. Rev. Financial Stud. 25(2):522–556.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1910) The Depreciation of Factories and Their Valuation, 4th ed. (E. and F.N. Spon, London).Google Scholar
- (1997) Sequentially optimal auctions. Games Econom. Behav. 18(2):246–276.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2004) Putting Auction Theory to Work, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1963) On the Accuracy of Economic Observations, Vol. 2 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Google Scholar
- (1918/1976) The significance and treatment of appreciation in the accounts. Zeff SA, ed. Asset Appreciation, Business Income and Price-Level Accounting, 1918–1935 (Arno Press, New York), 35–49.Google Scholar
- (2008) Marking-to-market: Panacea or Pandora’s box. J. Accounting Res. 46(2):435–460.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2007) Strategic consequences of historical cost and fair value measurements. Contemporary Accounting Res. 24(2):557–584.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2007) Stochastic Orders (Springer, New York).Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1998) Takeover bidding with toeholds: The case of the owner’s curse. Rev. Financial Stud. 11(4):679–704.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1989) Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate behavior. Quart. J. Econom. 104(4):655–669.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (1991) Nondisclosure and adverse disclosure as signals of firm value. Rev. Financial Stud. 4(2):283–313.Crossref, Google Scholar

