Anticipated Entry and Entry Deterrence: Evidence from the American Casino Industry

References

• Aghion P, Bolton P (1987) Contracts as a barrier to entry. Amer. Econom. Rev. 77(3):388–401.Google Scholar
• Ahern KR, Harford J (2014) The importance of industry links in merger waves. J. Finance 69(2):527–576.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Almond D, Doyle JJ (2011) After midnight: A regression discontinuity design in length of postpartum hospital stays. Amer. Econom. J. Econom. Policy 3(3):1–34.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anders GC (1999) Indian gaming: Financial and regulatory issues. Ann. Amer. Acad. Political Soc. Sci. 556(1):98–108.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anders GC, Siegel D, Yacoub M (1998) Does Indian casino gambling reduce state revenues? Evidence from Arizona. Contemporary Econom. Policy 16(3):347–355.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bain JS (1956) Barriers to New Competition (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barreca AI, Guldi M, Lindo JM, Waddell GR (2011) Saving babies? Revisiting the effect of very low birth weight classification. Quart. J. Econom. 126(4):2117–2123.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Benmelech E, Bergman N, Milanez A, Mukharlyamov V (2015) The agglomeration of bankruptcy. Working paper, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.Google Scholar
• Bernile G, Lyandres E (2010) Merger synergies along the supply chain. Working paper, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL.Google Scholar
• Bertrand M, Duflo E, Mullainathan S (2004) How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates? Quart. J. Econom. 119(1):249–275.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bourie S (2011) American Casino Guide: 2011 Edition (Casino Vacations, Dania, FL).Google Scholar
• Brander JA, Lewis TR (1986) Oligopoly and financial structure: The limited liability effect. Amer. Econom. Rev. 76(5):956–970.Google Scholar
• Bulow JI, Geanakoplos JD, Klemperer PD (1985) Multimarket oligopoly: Strategic substitutes and complements. J. Political Econom. 93(3):488–511.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cameron AC, Gelbach JB, Miller DL (2011) Robust inference with multiway clustering. J. Bus. Econom. Statist. 29(2):238–249.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Casino City Press (2012) Casino City’s Gaming Business Directory (Casino City Press, Newton, MA). http://www.gamingdirectory.com.Google Scholar
• Chevalier JA (1995) Do LBO supermarkets charge more? An empirical analysis of the effects of LBOs on supermarket pricing. J. Finance 50(4):1095–1112.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chevalier JA, Scharfstein D (1996) Capital-market imperfections and countercyclical markups: Theory and evidence. Amer. Econom. Rev. 86(4):703–725.Google Scholar
• Cookson JA (2010) Institutions and casinos: An empirical investigation of the location of Indian casinos. J. Law Econom. 53(4):651–687.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cookson JA (2017) Leverage and strategic preemption: Lessons from entry plans and incumbent investments. J. Financial Econom. 123(2):292–312.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dafny LS (2005) Games hospitals play: Entry deterrence in hospital procedure markets. J. Econom. Management Strategy 14(3):513–542.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dixit A (1979) A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers. Bell J. Econom. 10(1):20–32.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dixit A (1980) The role of investment in entry-deterrence. Econom. J. 90(357):95–106.Google Scholar
• Dougal C, Parsons CA, Titman S (2015) Urban vibrancy and corporate growth. J. Finance. 70(1):163–210.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ellison G, Ellison SF (2011) Strategic entry deterrence and the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 3(1):1–36.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Evans WN, Kim W (2008) The impact of local labor market conditions on the demand for education: Evidence from Indian casinos. Working paper, University of Maryland, College Park.Google Scholar
• Evans WN, Topoleski JH (2002) The social and economic impact of Native American casinos. NBER Working Paper 9198, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1984) The fat-cat effect, the puppy-dog ploy, and the lean and hungry look. Amer. Econom. Rev. Papers Proc. 74(2):361–366.Google Scholar
• Gedge C, Roberts JW, Sweeting A (2014) A model of dynamic limit pricing with an application to the airline industry. NBER Working Paper 20293, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gilbert R, Vives X (1986) Entry deterrence and the free rider problem. Rev. Econom. Stud. 53(1):71–83.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goetz CF, Shapiro AH (2012) Strategic alliance as a response to the threat of entry: Evidence from airline codesharing. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 30(6):735–747.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goolsbee A, Syverson C (2008) How do incumbents respond to the threat of entry? Evidence from the major airlines. Quart. J. Econom. 123(4):1611–1633.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grinols EL, Mustard DB (2001) Management and information issues for industries with externalities: The case of casino gambling. J. Managerial Decision Econom. 22(1–3):1–3.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grinols EL, Mustard DB (2006) Casinos, crime, and community costs. Rev. Econom. Statist. 88(1):28–45.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hamilton BH, McManus B (2005) Technology diffusion and market structure: Evidence from infertility treatment markets. Working paper, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis.Google Scholar
• Hoberg G, Phillips G (2010) Real and financial industry booms and busts. J. Finance 65(1):45–86.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hoberg G, Phillips G (2016) Text-based network industries and endogenous product differentiation. J. Political Econom. 124(5):1423–1465.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Huisman KJ, Kort PM (2015) Strategic capacity investment under uncertainty. RAND J. Econom. 46(2):376–408.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Khanna N, Tice S (2000) Strategic responses of incumbents to new entry: The effect of ownership structure, capital structure, and focus. Rev. Financial Stud. 13(3):749–779.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Klemperer P (1987) Entry deterrence in markets with consumer switching costs. Econom. J. 97(Suppl.):99–117.Google Scholar
• Kosova R, Kumar P, Povel P, Sertsios G (2015) Boom and gloom. J. Finance 71(5):2287–2332.Google Scholar
• Kreps DM, Scheinkman JA (1983) Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes. Bell J. Econom. 14(2):326–337.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lieberman MB (1987) Excess capacity as a barrier to entry: An empirical appraisal. J. Indust. Econom. 35(4):607–627.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maskin ES (1999) Uncertainty and entry deterrence. Econom. Theory 14(2):429–437.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Milgrom P, Roberts J (1982) Limit pricing and entry under incomplete information: An equilibrium analysis. Econometrica 50(2):443–459.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Molnar A (2013) Congesting the commons: A test for strategic congestion externalities in the airline industry. Working paper, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.Google Scholar
• Oster E (2017) Unobservable selection and coefficient stability: Theory and evidence. J. Bus. Econom. Statist. ePub ahead of print June 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/07350015.2016.1227711.Google Scholar
• Parsons CA, Sulaeman J, Titman S (2015) The geography of financial misconduct. NBER Working Paper 20347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Petersen MA (2009) Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches. Rev. Financial Stud. 22(1):435–480.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prince JT, Simon DH (2015) Do incumbents improve service quality in response to entry? Evidence from airlines’ on-time performance. Management Sci. 61(2):372–390.Link, Google Scholar
• Savage SJ, Wirth M (2005) Price, programming, and potential competition in US cable television markets. J. Regulatory Econom. 27(1):25–46.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Seamans RC (2011) Fighting city hall: Entry deterrence and technology upgrades in cable TV markets. Management Sci. 58(3):461–475.Link, Google Scholar
• Snider C (2009) Predatory incentives and predation policy: The American Airlines case. Working paper, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles.Google Scholar
• Spence AM (1977) Entry, capacity, investment and oligopolistic pricing. Bell J. Econom. 8(2):534–544.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stigler GJ (1968) The Organization of Industry (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).Google Scholar
• Tan KM (2014) Legacy carriers’ use of regional airlines: Competition or entry deterrence. Working paper, Ohio State University, Columbus.Google Scholar
• Thalheimer R, Ali M (2003) The demand for casino gambling. Appl. Econom. 35(8):907–920.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tirole J (1988) The Theory of Industrial Organization (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Wallace DH (1936) Monopolistic competition and public policy. Amer. Econom. Rev. Papers Proc. 26(1, Suppl.):77–87.Google Scholar
• Whinston MD, Collins SC (1992) Entry and competitive structure in deregulated airline markets: An event study analysis of people express. RAND J. Econom. 23(4):445–462.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wilson R (1992) Strategic models of entry deterrence. Aumann RJ, Hart S, eds. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications Vol. 1 (Elsevier Science, Amsterdam), 305–329.Crossref, Google Scholar