Super Partes? Assessing the Effect of Judicial Independence on Entry

References

• Abadie A, Gardeazabal J (2003) The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the Basque Country. Amer. Econom. Rev. 93:113–132.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Abadie A, Diamond A, Hainmueller J (2010) Synthetic control methods for comparative case studies: Estimating the effect of California’s tobacco control program. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 105:493–505.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ades A, Di Tella R (1999) Rents, competition and corruption. Amer. Econom. Rev. 89(4):982–993.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Agarwal R, Audretsch D, Sarkar MB (2007) The process of creative construction: Knowledge spillovers, entrepreneurship, and economic growth. Strategic Entrepreneurship J. 1(3–4):263–286.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Aharony J, Liu C, Yawson A (2013) Corporate litigation and executive turnover. Working Paper 2/2013. Accessed December 2015, https://en-recanati.tau.ac.il/sites/nihul_en.tau.ac.il/files/WP_2-2013_%20Aharony.pdf.Google Scholar
• Aharony J, Liu C, Yawson A (2015) Corporate litigation and executive turnover. J. Corporate Finance 34(October):268–292.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ahuja G, Yayavaram S (2011) Explaining influence rents: The case for an institutions-based view of strategy. Organ. Sci. 22:1631–1652.Link, Google Scholar
• Alvarez SA, Barney JB (2010) Entrepreneurship and epistemology: The philosophical underpinnings of the study of entrepreneurial opportunities. Acad. Management Ann. 4:557–583.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Audretsch DB, Keilbach M (2007) The theory of knowledge spillover entrepreneurship. J. Management Stud. 44:1242–1254.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Becker D, Reddick M (2003) Judicial selection reform: Examples from six states. Amer. Judicature Soc., http://www.judicialselection.com/uploads/Documents/jsreform_1185395742450.pdf.Google Scholar
• Bertrand M, Duflo E, Mullainathan S (2004) How much should we trust difference-in-differences estimates? Quart. J. Econom. 119:249–75.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Billmeier A, Nannicini T (2013) Assessing economic liberalization episodes: A synthetic control approach. Rev. Econom. Statist. 95:983–1001.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bird RC, Knopf JD (2015) The impact of local knowledge on banking. J. Financial Services Res. 48(1):1–20.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bishara N (2011) Fifty ways to leave your employer: Relative enforcement of noncompete agreements, trends, and implications for employee mobility policy. Univ. Pennsylvania J. Bus. Law 13: 751–795.Google Scholar
• Bonardi JP, Holburn GLF, Vanden Bergh RG (2006) Nonmarket strategy performance: Evidence from U.S. electric utilities. Acad. Management J. 38:288–303.Google Scholar
• Brandenburg B (2014) Justice for sale: How elected judges became a threat to American democracy. Politico (September 1), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/elected-judges-110397.Google Scholar
• Brennen Center for Justice and Justice at Stake (2013) New pool: Vast majority of voters fear campaign cash skews judges' decisions. Press release, October 29, https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/new-poll-vast-majority-voters-fear-campaign-cash-skews-judges-decisions-cash-skews-judges-decisions.Google Scholar
• Cavallo E, Galiani S, Noy I, Pantano J (2013) Catastrophic natural disasters and economic growth. Rev. Econom. Statist. 95(5):1549–1561.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cheek K, Champagne A (2000) Money in Texas; supreme court elections, 1980–1998. Judicature 84(1):20–25.Google Scholar
• Corriher B (2012) Partisan Judicial Elections and the Distorting Influence of Campaign Cash, Accessed December 2015, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/NonpartisanElections-3.pdf.Google Scholar
• Dobbin F, Dowd T (1997) How policy shapes competition: Early railroad foundings in Massachusetts. Admin. Sci. Quart. 42:501–529.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Eakins KR (1999) Gate keeping in the Ohio Supreme Court. Mimeo, University of Central Oklahoma.Google Scholar
• Eberhart RN, Eesley CE, Eisenhardt KM (2017) Failure is an option: Institutional change, entrepreneurial risk, and new firm growth. Organ. Sci. 28(1):93–112.Link, Google Scholar
• Eesley C (2016) Institutional barriers to growth: Entrepreneurship, human capital and institutional change. Organ. Sci. 27(5):1290–1306.Link, Google Scholar
• Fremeth A, Holburn GLF, Richter BK (2016) Bridging qualitative and quantitative methods in organizational research: Applications of synthetic control methodology in the U.S. automobile industry. Organ. Sci. 27(2):462–482.Link, Google Scholar
• Garmaise M (2011) Ties that truly blind: Non-competition agreements, executive compensation and firm investment. J. Law Econom. Organ. 27(2):376–425.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gilbert R (1989) Mobility barriers and the value of incumbency. Schmalensee R, Willig R, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 1 (North-Holland, Amsterdam), 475–535.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Glaeser EL, Pekkala Kerr S, Kerr WR (2015) Entrepreneurship and urban growth: An empirical assessment with historical mines. Rev. Econom. Statist. 97(2):498–520.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Glaeser EL, Kallal H, Scheinkman JA, Shleifer A (1992) Growth in cities. J. Political Econom. 100(6):1126–1152.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gurses K, Ozcan P (2015) Entrepreneurship in regulated markets: Framing contests and collective action to introduce pay TV in the U.S. Acad. Management J. 58(6):1709–1739.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hanssen FA (2004) Is there a politically optimal level of judicial independence? Amer. Econom. Rev. 94(3):712–729.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Henisz WJ, Zelner BA (2012) Strategy and competition in the market and nonmarket arenas. Acad. Management Perspect. 26(3):40–51.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hillman AJ, Zarkhoodi A, Bierman L (1999) Corporate political strategies and firm performance: Indications of firm-specific benefits from personal service in the U.S. government. Strategic Management J. 20:67–81.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hsu D, Roberts E, Eesley C (2007) Entrepreneurial ventures from technology-based universities: Evidence from MIT. Res. Policy 36:768–788.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jorgenson DW, Wilcoxen PJ (1990) Environmental regulation and U.S. economic growth. RAND J. Econom. 21(2):314–340.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kang M, Shepherd JM (2011) The partisan price of justice: An empirical analysis of campaign contributions and judicial decisions. New York Univ. Law Rev. 86:69–130.Google Scholar
• Kerr WR, Nanda R (2009) Democratizing entry: Banking deregulations, financing constraints, and entrepreneurship. J. Financial Econom. 94:124–149.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lanjouw JO, Lerner J (2001) Tilting the table? The use of preliminary injunctions. J. Law Econom. 44:573–603.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lattman P, Martin A (2011) A start-up takes on Procter & Gamble over a name. New York Times. http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/a-start-up-takes-on-procter-gamble-over-a-name.Google Scholar
• LeRoy MH (2010) Do partisan elections of judges produce unequal results? When courts review employment arbitrations. Iowa Law Rev. 95:1569–1620.Google Scholar
• Lim C (2013) Preferences and incentives of appointed and elected public officials: Evidence from state trial court judges. Amer. Econom. Rev. 103:1360–1397.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Liptak A, Roberts J (2006) Campaign cash mirrors a high court’s rulings. New York Times (October 1), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.Google Scholar
• Maskin E, Tirole J (2004) The politician and the judge: Accountability in government. Amer. Econom. Rev. 94(4):1034–1054.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Meek W, Pacheco D, York J (2010) The impact of social norms on entrepreneurial action: Evidence from the environmental entrepreneurship context. J. Bus. Venturing 25:493–509.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Moore C (2013) How disruptive start-ups can prepare for a lawsuit. Inc.com (May 14), http://www.inc.com/charley-moore/worth-the-fight_1.html.Google Scholar
• Png I (2012) Law and innovation: Evidence from state trade secrets laws. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1755284.Google Scholar
• Porter ME (1980) Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors (Free Press, New York).Google Scholar
• Sag M (2016) IP litigation in US District Courts: 1994–2014, 101 Iowa Law Rev. 1065.Google Scholar
• Samila S, Sorenson O (2011a) Noncompete covenants: Incentives to innovate or impediments to growth. Management Sci. 57(3):425–438.Link, Google Scholar
• Samila S, Sorenson O (2011b) Venture capital, entrepreneurship, and economic growth. Rev. Econom. Statist. 93:338–349.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Schotland R (1985) Elective judges' campaign financing: Are state judges' robes the emperor’s clothes of American democracy? Justice Law Politics 2:57–132.Google Scholar
• Schumpeter JA (1911) The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle. (Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ).Google Scholar
• Shepherd JM (2009) money, politics, and impartial justice. Duke Law J. 58:623–685.Google Scholar
• Sine WD, David R (2003) Environmental jolts, institutional change, and the creation of entrepreneurial opportunity in the U.S. electric power industry. Res. Policy 32(2):185–207.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sobel RS, Garrett TA (2002) On the measurement of rent seeking and its social opportunity cost. Public Choice 112(1–2):115–136.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stigler GJ (1968) The Organization of Industry (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).Google Scholar
• Tabarrok A, Helland E (1999) Court politics: The political economy of tort awards. J. Law Econom. 42(1):157–188.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williams G (2007) Starting a business—and not a legal battle. Entrepreneur (February 26), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/175142.Google Scholar
• Wooldridge JM (2003) Cluster-sample methods in applied econometrics. Amer. Econom. Rev. 93(2):133–138.Crossref, Google Scholar