Profit Sharing and Peer Reporting

References

• Abbink K, Irlenbusch B, Renner E (2000) The moonlighting game: An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 42(2):265–277.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Abbink K, Brandts J, Herrmann B, Orzen H (2010) Intergroup conflict and intragroup punishment in an experimental contest game. Amer. Econom. Rev. 100(1):420–447.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ahn TK, Isaac RM, Salmon T (2011) Rent seeking in groups. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 29:116–125.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Akerlof G, Kranton R (2005) Identity and the economics of organizations. J. Econom. Perspect. 19(1):9–32.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ambrus A, Greiner B (2012) Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment: An experimental study. Amer. Econom. Rev. 102(7):3317–3332.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson C, Putterman L (2006) Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism? Games Econom. Behav. 54(1):1–24.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bandiera O, Barankay I, Rasul I (2013) Team incentives: Evidence from a firm level experiment. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 11(5):1079–1114.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Banerjee A, Besley T, Guinnane T (1994) Thy neighbor’s keeper: The design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test. Quart. J. Econom. 109(2):491–515.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barr A, Serneels P (2009) Reciprocity in the workplace. Experiment. Econom. 12(1):99–112.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Benabou R, Tirole J (2003) Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Rev. Econom. Stud. 70(3):489–520.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Besley T, Coate S (1995) Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral. J. Development Econom. 46(1):1–18.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bhargava S (1994) Profit sharing and the financial performance of companies: Evidence from U.K. panel data. Econom. J. 104(426):1044–1056.Google Scholar
• Camerer C, Weber R (2012) Experimental organizational economics. Gibbons R, Roberts J, eds. The Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ), 213–62.Google Scholar
• Carpenter J (2007) The demand for punishment. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 62(4):522–542.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Carpenter J, Matthews P (2012) Norm enforcement: Anger, indignation, or reciprocity? J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 10(3):555–572.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Carpenter J, Bowles S, Gintis H, Hwang S-H (2009) Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 71(2):221–232.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Charness G, Kuhn P (2011) Lab labor: What can labor economists learn from the lab? Orley A, David C, eds. Handbook of Labor Economics (North-Holland, Amsterdam), 229–330.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chaudhuri A (2011) Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public good experiments: A selective survey of the literature. Experiment. Econom. 14(1):47–83.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Corgnet B (2012) Peer evaluations and team performance: When friends do worse than strangers. Econom. Inquiry 50(1):171–181.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Edwards M, Ewen A (1996) How to manage performance and pay with 360-degree feedback. Compensation Benefits Rev. 28(3):41–46.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fedor D, Bettenhausen K, Davis W (1999) Peer reviews: Employees’ dual roles as raters and recipients. Group Organ. Management 24(1):92–120.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Gächter S (2000) Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Amer. Econom. Rev. 90(4):980–994.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Kirchsteiger G, Riedl A (1993) Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation. Quart. J. Econom. 108(2):437–460.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Gächter S, Kirchsteiger G (1997) Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: Experimental evidence. Econometrica 65(4):833–860.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fischbacher U (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experiment. Econom. 10(2):171–178.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fischer S, Grechenig K, Meier N (2016) Monopolizing sanctioning power under noise eliminates perverse punishment but does not increase cooperation. Frontiers Behav. Neurosci. 10(180).Google Scholar
• Fréchette G (2012) Session-effects in the laboratory. Experiment. Econom. 5(3):485–498.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Freeman R, Kruse D, Blasi J (2010) Worker responses to shirking under shared capitalism. Kruse D, Freeman R, Blasi J, eds. Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain sharing, and Broad-Based Stock Options (University of Chicago Press, Chicago), 77–103.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Friebel G, Heinz M, Krüger M, Zubanov N (2015) Team incentives and performance: Evidence from a retail chain. IZA Discussion Paper 9316, Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany.Google Scholar
• Grechenig K, Nicklisch A, Thoni C (2010) Punishment despite reasonable doubt: A public goods experiment with sanctions under uncertainty. J. Empirical Legal Stud. 7(4):847–867.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grosse S, Putterman L, Rockenbach B (2011) Monitoring in teams: Using laboratory experiments to study a theory of the firm. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 9(4):785–816.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hamilton BH, Nickerson JA, Owan H (2003) Team incentives and worker heterogeneity: An empirical analysis of the impact of teams on productivity and participation. J. Political Econom. 111(3):465–497.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hansen D (1997) Worker performance and group incentives: A case study. Indust. Labour Relations Rev. 51(1):37–49.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmstrom B (1982) Moral hazard in teams. Bell J. Econom. 13(2):324–340.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kandel E, Lazear E (1992) Peer pressure and partnerships. J. Political Econom. 100(4):801–817.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Knez M, Simester D (2001) Firm-wide incentives and mutual monitoring as continental airlines. J. Labor Econom. 19(4):743–772.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kruse D (1992) Profit sharing and productivity: Microeconomic evidence from the United States. Econom. J. 102(410):24–36.Google Scholar
• Maximiano S, Sloof R, Sonnemans J (2007) Gift exchange in a multi-worker firm. Econom. J. 117(22):1025–1050.Google Scholar
• May G, Gueldenzoph L (2006) The effect of social style on peer evaluation ratings in project teams. J. Bus. Comm. 43(1):4–20.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Meidinger C, Rullière J-L, Villeval M-C (2003) Does team-based compensation give rise to problems when agents vary in their ability? Experiment. Econom. 6(3):253–272.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nalbantian H, Schotter A (1997) Productivity under group incentives: An experimental study. Amer. Econom. Rev. 87(3):314–341.Google Scholar
• Nikiforakis N, Normann H-T (2008) A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. Experiment. Econom. 11(4):358–369.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Offerman T (2002) Hurting hurts more than helping helps. Eur. Econom. Rev. 46(8):1423–1437.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Peiperl M (1999) Conditions for the success of peer evaluations. Internat. J. Human Resource Management 10(3):429–485.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rabin M (1993) Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. Amer. Econom. Rev. 83(5):1281–1302.Google Scholar
• Rotemberg JJ (1994) Human relations in the workplace. J. Political Econom. 102(4):684–717.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shapiro C, Stiglitz JE (1984) Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device. Amer. Econom. Rev. 74(3):433–444.Google Scholar
• van Dijk F, Sonnemans J, van Winden F (2001) Incentive systems in a real effort experiment. Eur. Econom. Rev. 45(2):187–214.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Weitzman M, Kruse D (1990) Profit sharing and productivity. Blinder A, ed. Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence (Brookings Institution, Washington, DC), 95–140.Google Scholar
• Welbourne T (1995) Gainshairing and mutual monitoring: A combined agency-organisational justice interpretation. Acad. Management J. 38(3):881–899.Crossref, Google Scholar