Failure-Aware Kidney Exchange

References

• Abraham D, Blum A, Sandholm T (2007) Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: Enabling nationwide kidney exchanges. Proc. 8th ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (ACM, New York), 295–304.Google Scholar
• Akbarpour M, Li S, Gharan SO (2014) Dynamic matching market design. Proc. Fifteenth ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (ACM, New York), 355–355.Google Scholar
• Anderson R (2014) Stochastic models and data driven simulations for healthcare operations. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge.Google Scholar
• Anderson R, Ashlagi I, Gamarnik D, Kanoria Y (2015a) A dynamic model of barter exchange. Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (ACM, New York), 1925–1933.Google Scholar
• Anderson R, Ashlagi I, Gamarnik D, Roth AE (2015b) Finding long chains in kidney exchange using the traveling salesman problem. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 112(3):663–668.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anshelevich E, Chhabra M, Das S, Gerrior M (2013) On the social welfare of mechanisms for repeated batch matching. Proc. Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conf. Artificial Intelligence (AAAI, Menlo Park, CA), 60–66.Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I, Roth AE (2014) Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange. Theoret. Econom. 9(3):817–863.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I, Jaillet P, Manshadi VH (2013) Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous pools. Proc. Fourteenth ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (ACM, New York), 25–26.Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I, Fischer F, Kash IA, Procaccia AD (2015) Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange. Games Econom. Behav. 91(May):284–296.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I, Gamarnik D, Rees M, Roth AE (2012) The need for (long) chains in kidney exchange. NBER Working Paper 18202, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I, Gilchrist DS, Roth AE, Rees M (2011) Nonsimultaneous chains and dominos in kidney-paired donation—Revisited. Amer. J. Transplantation 11(5):984–994.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Assadi S, Khanna S, Li Y (2016) The stochastic matching problem with (very) few queries. Proc. 2016 ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (ACM, New York), 43–60.Google Scholar
• Awasthi P, Sandholm T (2009) Online stochastic optimization in the large: Application to kidney exchange. Proc. 21st Internat. Joint Conf. Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), Pasadena, CA, 405–411.Google Scholar
• Barnhart C, Johnson EL, Nemhauser GL, Savelsbergh MWP, Vance PH (1998) Branch-and-price: Column generation for solving huge integer programs. Oper. Res. 46(3):316–329.Link, Google Scholar
• Bertsimas D, Farias VF, Trichakis N (2011) The price of fairness. Oper. Res. 59(1):17–31.Link, Google Scholar
• Bertsimas D, Farias VF, Trichakis N (2012) On the efficiency-fairness trade-off. Management Sci. 58(12):2234–2250.Link, Google Scholar
• Bertsimas D, Farias VF, Trichakis N (2013) Fairness, efficiency, and flexibility in organ allocation for kidney transplantation. Oper. Res. 61(1):73–87.Link, Google Scholar
• Biró P, Manlove DF, Rizzi R (2009) Maximum weight cycle packing in directed graphs, with application to kidney exchange programs. Discrete Math. Algorithms Appl. 1(4):499–517.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Blum A, Gupta A, Procaccia AD, Sharma A (2013) Harnessing the power of two crossmatches. Proc. Fourteenth ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (ACM, New York), 123–140.Google Scholar
• Blum A, Dickerson JP, Haghtalab N, Procaccia AD, Sandholm T, Sharma A (2015) Ignorance is almost bliss: Near-optimal stochastic matching with few queries. Proc. Sixteenth ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (ACM, New York), 325–342.Google Scholar
• Bray M, Wang W, Song PX-K, Leichtman AB, Rees MA, Ashby VB, Eikstadt R, Goulding A, Kalbfleisch JD (2015) Planning for uncertainty and fallbacks can increase the number of transplants in a kidney-paired donation program. Amer. J. Transplantation 15(10):2636–2645.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Caragiannis I, Kaklamanis C, Kanellopoulos P, Kyropoulou M (2012) The efficiency of fair division. Theory Comput. Systems 50(4):589–610.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen Y, Li Y, Kalbfleisch JD, Zhou Y, Leichtman A, Song PX-K (2012) Graph-based optimization algorithm and software on kidney exchanges. IEEE Trans. Biomedical Engrg. 59:1985–1991.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dickerson JP, Sandholm T (2014) Multi-organ exchange: The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Proc. Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conf. Artificial Intelligence (AAAI, Menlo Park, CA), 1412–1418.Google Scholar
• Dickerson JP, Sandholm T (2015) FutureMatch: Combining human value judgments and machine learning to match in dynamic environments. Proc. Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conf. Artificial Intelligence (AAAI, Menlo Park, CA), 622–628.Google Scholar
• Dickerson JP, Procaccia AD, Sandholm T (2012a) Dynamic matching via weighted myopia with application to kidney exchange. Proc. Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conf. Artificial Intelligence (AAAI, Menlo Park, CA), 1340–1346.Google Scholar
• Dickerson JP, Procaccia AD, Sandholm T (2012b) Optimizing kidney exchange with transplant chains: Theory and reality. Proc. 11th Internat. Conf. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS, Richland, SC), 711–718.Google Scholar
• Dickerson JP, Procaccia AD, Sandholm T (2013a) Failure-aware kidney exchange. Proc. Fourteenth ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (ACM, New York), 323–340.Google Scholar
• Dickerson JP, Procaccia AD, Sandholm T (2013b) Results about, and algorithms for, robust probabilistic kidney exchange matching. Amer. Transplant Congress (ATC). Poster abstract.Google Scholar
• Dickerson JP, Procaccia AD, Sandholm T (2014a) Empirical price of fairness in failure-aware kidney exchange. Towards Better and More Affordable Healthcare: Incentives, Game Theory, and Artificial Intelligence (HCAGT) Workshop at AAMAS-2014 (AAMAS, Richland, SC).Google Scholar
• Dickerson JP, Procaccia AD, Sandholm T (2014b) Price of fairness in kidney exchange. Proc. 2014 Internat. Conf. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS, Richland, SC), 1013–1020.Google Scholar
• Dickerson JP, Manlove DF, Plaut B, Sandholm T, Trimble J (2016) Position-indexed formulations for kidney exchange. Proc. 2016 ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (ACM, New York), 25–42.Google Scholar
• Edmonds J (1965) Maximum matching and a polyhedron with 0, 1 vertices. J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 69B(1–2):125–130.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Erdős P, Rényi A (1960) On the evolution of random graphs. Publications Math. Inst. Hungarian Acad. Sci. 5:17–61.Google Scholar
• Gentry SE, Segev DL (2011) The honeymoon phase and studies of nonsimultaneous chains in kidney-paired donation. Amer. J. Transplantation 11(12):2778–2779.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gentry SE, Montgomery RA, Swihart BJ, Segev DL (2009) The roles of dominos and nonsimultaneous chains in kidney paired donation. Amer. J. Transplantation 9(6):1330–1336.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Glorie KM (2012) Estimating the probability of positive crossmatch after negative virtual crossmatch. Technical report, Erasmus School of Economics, Rotterdam, Netherlands.Google Scholar
• Glorie KM, van de Klundert JJ, Wagelmans APM (2014) Kidney exchange with long chains: An efficient pricing algorithm for clearing barter exchanges with branch-and-price. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 16(4):498–512.Link, Google Scholar
• Goel G, Tripathi P (2012) Matching with our eyes closed. Sympos. Foundations Comput. Sci. (FOCS) (IEEE, New York), 718–727.Google Scholar
• Hooker JN, Williams HP (2012) Combining equity and utilitarianism in a mathematical programming model. Management Sci. 58(9):1682–1693.Link, Google Scholar
• IBM ILOG Inc. (2010) CPLEX 12.2 User’s Manual.Google Scholar
• Janson S, Luczak T, Rucinski A (2011) Random Graphs, Wiley Series in Discrete Mathematics and Optimization (John Wiley & Sons, New York).Google Scholar
• Kidney Paired Donation Work Group (2012) OPTN KPD pilot program cumulative match report (CMR) for KPD match runs: October 27, 2010–November 12, 2012.Google Scholar
• Kidney Paired Donation Work Group (2013) OPTN KPD pilot program cumulative match report (CMR) for KPD match runs: October 27, 2010–April 15, 2013.Google Scholar
• Leider S, Roth AE (2010) Kidneys for sale: Who disapproves, and why? Amer. J. Transplantation 10(5):1221–1227.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Leishman R, Formica R, Andreoni K, Friedewald J, Sleeman E, Monstello C, Stewart D, Sandholm T (2013) The organ procurement and transplantation network (OPTN) kidney paired donation pilot program (KPDPP): Review of current results. Amer. Transplant Congress (ATC). Talk abstract.Google Scholar
• Li J, Liu Y, Huang L, Tang P (2014) Egalitarian pairwise kidney exchange: Fast algorithms via linear programming and parametric flow. Proc. 2014 Internat. Conf. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS, Richland, SC), 445–452.Google Scholar
• Li Y, Kalbfleisch J, Song PX, Zhou Y, Leichtman A, Rees M (2011) Optimization and simulation of an evolving kidney paired donation (KPD) program. Department of Biostatistics Working Paper 90, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.Google Scholar
• Liu Y, Tang P, Fang W (2014) Internally stable matchings and exchanges. Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conf. Artificial Intelligence (AAAI, Menlo Park, CA), 1433–1439.Google Scholar
• Manlove D, O’Malley G (2015) Paired and altruistic kidney donation in the UK: Algorithms and experimentation. ACM J. Experiment. Algorithmics 19(1).Google Scholar
• Molinaro M, Ravi R (2011) The query-commit problem, http://arxiv.org/abs/1110.0990.Google Scholar
• Montgomery R, Gentry S, Marks WH, Warren DS, Hiller J, Houp J, Zachary AAet al. (2006) Domino paired kidney donation: A strategy to make best use of live nondirected donation. The Lancet 368(9533):419–421.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Park K, Moon JI, Kim SI, Kim YS (1999) Exchange donor program in kidney transplantation. Transplantation 67(2):336–338.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rapaport FT (1986) The case for a living emotionally related international kidney donor exchange registry. Transplantation Proc. 18(3, suppl. 2):5–9.Google Scholar
• Rees M, Kopke J, Pelletier R, Segev D, Rutter M, Fabrega A, Rogers Jet al. (2009) A nonsimultaneous, extended, altruistic-donor chain. New England J. Medicine 360(11):1096–1101.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ross L, Rubin D, Siegler M, Josephson M, Thistlethwaite J, Woodle S (1997) Ethics of a paired-kidney-exchange program. New England J. Medicine 336(24):1752–1755.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A (2007) Repugnance as a constraint on markets. J. Econom. Perspect. 21(3):37–58.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A, Sönmez T, Ünver U (2004) Kidney exchange. Quart. J. Econom. 119(2):457–488.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A, Sönmez T, Ünver U (2005a) A kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England. Amer. Econom. Rev. 95(2):376–380.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A, Sönmez T, Ünver U (2005b) Pairwise kidney exchange. J. Econom. Theory 125(2):151–188.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A, Sönmez T, Ünver U (2007) Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of wants in a market with compatibility-based preferences. Amer. Econom. Rev. 97(3):828–851.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A, Sönmez T, Ünver U, Delmonico F, Saidman SL (2006) Utilizing list exchange and nondirected donation through “chain” paired kidney donations. Amer. J. Transplantation 6(11):2694–2705.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Saidman SL, Roth A, Sönmez T, Ünver U, Delmonico F (2006) Increasing the opportunity of live kidney donation by matching for two and three way exchanges. Transplantation 81(5):773–782.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sönmez T, Ünver MU (2013) Market design for kidney exchange. Vulkan N, Roth AE, Neeman Z, eds. The Handbook of Market Design (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK), 93–137.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sönmez T, Ünver MU (2014) Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange. J. Econom. Theory 152(1):105–129.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stewart D, Leishman R, Sleeman E, Monstello C, Lunsford G, Maghirang J, Sandholm Tet al. (2013) Tuning the OPTN’s KPD optimization algorithm to incentivize centers to enter their easy-to-match pairs. Amer. Transplant Congress (ATC). Talk abstract.Google Scholar
• Toulis P, Parkes DC (2015) Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs. Games Econom. Behav. 91(May):360–382.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ünver U (2010) Dynamic kidney exchange. Rev. Econom. Stud. 77(1):372–414.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yılmaz Ö (2011) Kidney exchange: An egalitarian mechanism. J. Econom. Theory 146(2):592–618.Crossref, Google Scholar