Partial Deregulation and Competition: Effects on Risky Mortgage Origination

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3060

References

  • Adelino M, Schoar A, Severino F (2012) Credit supply and house prices: Evidence from mortgage market segmentation. NBER Working Paper 17832, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
  • Adelino M, Schoar A, Severino F (2016) Loan originations and defaults in the mortgage crisis: The role of the middle class. Rev. Financial Stud. 29(7):1635–1670.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Agarwal S, Ben-David I (2012) Do loan officers’ incentives lead to lax lending standards? Working paper, National University of Singapore, Singapore.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Agarwal S, Evanoff DD (2016) Loan product steering in mortgage market. NBER Working Paper 22696, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MACrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Agarwal S, Song C, Yao VW (2016) Banking competition and shrouded attributes: Evidence from the US mortgage market. Working paper, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
  • Agarwal S, Benmelech E, Bergman N, Seru A (2012) Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) lead to risky lending? NBER Working Paper 18609, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Agarwal S, Lucca D, Seru A, Trebbi F (2014) Inconsistent regulators: Evidence from banking. Quart. J. Econom. 129(2):889–938.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Agarwal S, Amromin G, Ben-David I, Chomsisengphet S, Evanoff DD (2014a) The effectiveness of mandatory mortgage counseling: Can one dissuade borrowers from choosing risky mortgages? NBER Working Paper 19920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Agarwal S, Amromin G, Ben-David I, Chomsisengphet S, Evanoff DD (2014b) Predatory lending and the subprime crisis. J. Financial Econom. 113(1):29–52.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Amromin G, Kearns C (2014) Access to refinancing and mortgage interest rates: HARPing on the importance of competition. Working Paper 2014-25, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago.Google Scholar
  • Amromin G, Huang JC, Sialm C, Zhong E (2011) Complex mortgages. Rev. Finance 22(6):1975–2007.Google Scholar
  • Barlevy G, Fisher JD (2010) Mortgage choices and housing speculation. Working paper 2010-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago.Google Scholar
  • Bostic RW, Engel KC, McCoy PA, Pennington-Cross A, Wachter SM (2008) State and local anti-predatory lending laws: The effect of legal enforcement mechanisms. J. Econom. Bus. 60(1):47–66.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Bostic RW, Chomsisengphet S, Engel KC, McCoy PA, Pennington-Cross A, Wachter SM (2012) Mortgage product substitution and state anti-predatory lending laws: Better loans and better borrowers? Atlantic Econom. J. 40(3):273–294.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Campbell JY (2006) Household finance. J. Finance 61(4):1553–1604.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Chinco A, Mayer C (2015) Misinformed speculators and mispricing in the housing market. Rev. Financial Stud. 29(2):486–522.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Code of Federal Regulations, Title 12 (2002) Section 560.2, pages 155–156, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CFR-2002-title12-vol5/CFR-2002-title12-vol5-sec560-2/summary.Google Scholar
  • Di Maggio M, Kermani A (2017) Credit-induced boom and bust. Rev. Financial Stud. 30(11):3711–3758.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ding L, Quercia RG, Reid CK, White AM (2012) The impact of federal preemption of state antipredatory lending laws on the foreclosure crisis. J. Policy Anal. Management 31(2):367–387.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Elliehausen G, Staten ME, Steinbuks J (2006) The effects of state predatory lending laws on the availability of subprime mortgage credit Credit Research Center Monograph 38, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
  • Favara G, Imbs J (2015) Credit supply and the price of housing. Amer. Econom. Rev. 105(3):958–992.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Foa G, Gambacorta L, Guiso L, Mistrulli PE (2015) The supply side of household finance. Working Paper 1044, Bank of Italy,Rome.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Greenstone M, Mas A (2012) Do credit market shocks affect the real Economy? Quasi-experimental evidence from the great recession and “normal” economic times. NBER Working Paper w20704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Griffin JM, Maturana G (2015) Who facilitated misreporting in securitized loans? J. Finance 29(2):384–419.Google Scholar
  • Gurun UG, Matvos G, Seru A (2016) Advertising expensive mortgages. J. Finance 71(5):2371–2416.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Haughwout A, Lee D, Tracy J, der Klaauw V, Wilbert H (2011) Real estate investors, the leverage cycle, and the housing market crisis. Staff Report 514, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York.Google Scholar
  • Hirano K, Imbens GW, Ridder G (2003) Efficient estimation of average treatment effects using the estimated propensity score. Econometrica 71(4):1161–1189.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ho G, Pennington-Cross A (2006) The impact of local predatory lending laws on the flow of subprime credit. J. Urban Econom. 60(2):210–228.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ho G, Pennington-Cross A (2008) Predatory lending laws and the cost of credit. Real Estate Econom. 36(2):175–211.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Jayaratne J, Strahan PE (1996) The finance-growth nexus: Evidence from bank branch deregulation. Quart. J. Econom. 111(3):639–670.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Jiang W, Nelson AA, Vytlacil E (2014) Liar’s loan? Effects of origination channel and information falsification on mortgage delinquency. Rev. Econom. Statist. 96(1):1–18.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Keys BJ, Mukherjee T, Seru A, Vig V (2010) Did securitization lead to lax screening? Evidence from subprime loans. Quart. J. Econom. 125(1):307–362.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Mayer C, Piskorski T, Tchistyi A (2013) The inefficiency of refinancing: Why prepayment penalties are good for risky borrowers. J. Financial Econom. 107(3):694–714.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Mian A, Sufi A (2009) The consequences of mortgage credit expansion: Evidence from the U.S. mortgage default crisis. Quart. J. Econom. 124(4):1449–1496.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Nadauld TD, Sherlund SM (2013) The impact of securitization on the expansion of subprime credit. J. Financial Econom. 107(2):454–476.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • New Century (2005) SEC 10-K filing. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1287286/000119312505052506/d10k.htm.Google Scholar
  • Newey WK (1990) Semiparametric efficiency bounds. J. Appl. Econometrics 5(2):99–135.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (2004) Final rule on preemption of national banks from state laws, page 1904, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2004-01-13/html/04-586.htm.Google Scholar
  • Piskorski T, Seru A, Witkin J (2015) Asset quality misrepresentation by financial intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS market. J. Finance 70(6):2635–2678.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Purnanandam A (2011) Originate-to-distribute model and the subprime mortgage crisis. Rev. Financial Stud. 24(6):1881–1915.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Rajan U, Seru A, Vig V (2015) The failure of models that predict failure: Distance, incentives, and defaults. J. Financial Econom. 115(2):237–260.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Rezende M (2014) The effects of bank charter switching on supervisory ratings. Presentation, 73rd Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, January 4, San Diego.Google Scholar
  • Richard SF, Roll R (1989) Prepayments on fixed-rate mortgage-backed securities. J. Portfolio Management 15(3):73–82.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Robins JM, Mark SD, Newey WK (1992) Estimating exposure effects by modelling the expectation of exposure conditional on confounders. Biometrics 48(2):479–495.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Rosen R (2005) Switching primary federal regulators: Is it beneficial for US banks? Econom. Perspect. 29(3):16–23.Google Scholar
  • Rosenbaum PR, Rubin DB (1983) The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika 70(1):41–55.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.