Multitasking and Subjective Performance Evaluations: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in a Bank

References

• Al-Ubaydli O, Andersen S, Gneezy U, List JA (2015) Carrots that look like sticks: Toward an understanding of multitasking incentive schemes. Southern Econom. J. 81(3):538–561.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Angrist JD, Pischke JS (2008) Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baker G (2002) Distortion and risk in optimal incentive contracts. J. Human Resources 37(4):728–751.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baker G, Gibbons R, Murphy KJ (1994) Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts. Quart. J. Econom. 109(4):1125–1156.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bandiera O, Barankay I, Rasul I (2011) Field experiments with firms. J. Econom. Perspect. 25(3):63–82.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barankay I (2012) Rank incentives: evidence from a randomized workplace experiment. Working paper, Wharton School, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.Google Scholar
• Bénabou R, Tirole J (2006) Incentives and prosocial behavior. Amer. Econom. Rev. 96(5):1652–1678.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bentley MacLeod W (2003) Optimal contracting with subjective evaluation. Amer. Econom. Rev. 93(1):216–240.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Berger J, Harbring C, Sliwka D (2013) Performance appraisals and the impact of forced distribution: An experimental investigation. Management Sci. 59(1):54–68.Link, Google Scholar
• Bol JC (2011) The determinants and performance effects of managers’ performance evaluation biases. Accounting Rev. 86(5):1549–1575.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bordalo P, Gennaioli N, Shleifer A (2012) Salience theory of choice under risk. Quart. J. Econom. 127(3):1243–1285.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bretz RDJ, Milkovich GT, Read W (1992) The current state of performance appraisal research and practice: Concerns, directions, and implications. J. Management 18(2):321–352.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cunningham L (2015) Accenture CEO explains why he’s overhauling performance reviews. Washington Post (July 23), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2015/07/23/accenture-ceo-explains-the-reasons-why-hes-overhauling-performance-reviews/?utm_term=.f138031d6319.Google Scholar
• DeGroot M (1970) Optimal Statistical Decisions (McGraw-Hill, New York).Google Scholar
• Delfgaauw J, Souverijn M (2016) Biased supervision. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 130:107–125.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Engellandt A, Riphahn RT (2011) Evidence on incentive effects of subjective performance evaluations. Indust. Labor Relations Rev. 64(2):241–257.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Englmaier F, Roider A, Sunde U (2016) The role of communication of performance schemes: Evidence from a field experiment. Management Sci. 63(12):4061–4080.Link, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Schmidt KM (2004) Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal–agent model. Scandinavian J. Econom. 106(3):453–474.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Feltham G, Xie J (1994) Performance measure congruity and diversity in multi-task principal/agent relations. Accounting Rev. 69(3):429–453.Google Scholar
• Friebel G, Heinz M, Krüger M, Zubanov N (2017) Team incentives and performance: Evidence from a retail chain. Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(8):2168–2203.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gibbs M, Merchant KA, van der Stede WA, Vargus ME (2003) Determinants and effects of subjectivity in incentives. Account. Rev. 79(2):409–436.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Giebe T, Gürtler O (2012) Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors. J. Econom.Behav.Organ. 81(2):403–420.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Golman R, Bhatia S (2012) Performance evaluation inflation and compression. Account. Organ. Soc. 37(8):534–543.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holland K (2006) Performance reviews: Many need improvement. New York Times (September 10), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/business/yourmoney/10mgmt.html.Google Scholar
• Holmström B (1999) Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective. Rev. Econom. Stud. 66(1):169–182.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmström B, Milgrom P (1991) Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership and job design. J. Law Econom. Organ. 7(Special Issue):24–52.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hong F, Hossain T, List JA, Tanaka M (2018) Testing the theory of multitasking: Evidence from a natural field experiment in Chinese factories. Internat. Econom. Rev. 59(2):511–536.Google Scholar
• Kampkötter P, Sliwka D (2018) More dispersion, higher bonuses? On differentiation in subjective performance evaluations. J. Labor Econom. 36(2):511–549.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Keller G (2011) Brownian motion and normally distributed beliefs. Working paper, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.Google Scholar
• Kőszegi B, Szeidl A (2013) A model of focusing in economic choice. Quart. J. Econom. 128(1):53–104.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Larkin I (2014) The cost of high-powered incentives: Employee gaming in enterprise software sales. J. Labor Econom. 32(2):199–227.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levin J (2003) Relational incentive contracts. Amer. Econom. Rev. 93(3):835–857.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levitt SD, Neckermann S (2014) What field experiments have and have not taught us about managing workers. Oxford Rev. Econom. Policy 30(4):639–657.Crossref, Google Scholar
• List JA, Rasul I (2011) Field experiments in labor economics. Ashenfelter O, Card D, eds. Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 4a (Elsevier, New York), 104–228.Google Scholar
• List JA, Sadoff S, Wagner M (2011) So you want to run an experiment, now what? Some simple rules of thumb for optimal experimental design. Experiment. Econom. 14(4):439–457.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McGregor J (2014) Study finds that basically every single person hates performance reviews. Washington Post (January 27), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2014/01/27/study-finds-that-basically-every-single-person-hates-performance-reviews/?utm_term=.2c6bd6359e58.Google Scholar
• Murphy KR, Cleveland JN (1995) Understanding Performance Appraisal (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA).Google Scholar
• Murphy KR, Jako RA, Anhalt RL (1993) Nature and consequences of halo error: A critical analysis. J. Appl. Psych. 78(2):218–225.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ockenfels A, Sliwka D, Werner P (2014) Bonus payments and reference point violations. Management Sci. 61(7):1496–1513.Link, Google Scholar
• Oyer P (1998) Fiscal year ends and nonlinear incentive contracts: The effect on business seasonality. Quart. J. Econom. 113(1):149–185.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Peterson A (2013) Yahoo is ranking employees. When Microsoft did that, it was a disaster. Washington Post (November 12), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/11/12/yahoos-employee-ranking-system-sounds-suspiciously-like-the-one-blamed-for-microsofts-decline/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.eafe6d4459b5.Google Scholar
• Prendergast CJ (1999) The provision of incentives in firms. J. Econom. Lit. 37(1):7–63.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prendergast CJ (2002) Uncertainty and incentives. J. Labor Econom. 20(S2):S115–S137.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prendergast C, Topel R (1996) Favoritism in organizations. J. Political Econom. 104(5):958–978.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Schnedler W (2008) When is it foolish to reward for a while benefiting from b? J. Labor Econom. 26(4):595–619.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Takahashi S, Owan H, Tsuru T, Uehara K (2014) Multitasking incentives and biases in subjective performance evaluation. Technical report, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Kunitachi, Japan.Google Scholar
• Vara V (2015) The push against performance reviews. New Yorker (July 24), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-push-against-performance-reviews.Google Scholar
• Wolfstetter E (2002) Topics in Microeconomics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).Google Scholar
• Zabojnik J (2014) Subjective evaluations with performance feedback. RAND J. Econom. 45(2):341–369.Crossref, Google Scholar