Sharing the Revenues from Broadcasting Sport Events

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3313

References

  • Adams WJ, Yellen JL (1976) Commodity bundling and the burden of monopoly. Quart. J. Econom. 90(3):475–498.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Atkinson SE, Stanley LR, Tschirhart J (1988) Revenue sharing as an incentive in an agency problem: An example from the National Football League. RAND J. Econom. 19(1):27–43.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Aumann RJ, Maschler M (1985) Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. J. Econom. Theory 36(2):195–213.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Bergantiños G, Moreno-Ternero JD (2015) The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes. Games Econom. Behav. 89:78–92.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Csóka P, Herings PJJ (2018) Decentralized clearing in financial networks. Management Sci. 64(10):4471–4965.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • El Hodiri M, Quirk J (1971) An economic model of a professional sports league. J. Political Econom. 79(6):1302–1319.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Flores-Szwagrzak K, Treibich R (2019) Teamwork and individual productivity. Management Sci. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
  • Foley D (1967) Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Econom. Essays 7:45–98.Google Scholar
  • Ginsburgh V, Zang I (2003) The museum pass game and its value. Games Econom. Behav. 43(2):322–325.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Késenne S (2000) Revenue sharing and competitive balance in professional team sports. J. Sports Econom. 1(1):56–65.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Littlechild S, Owen G (1973) A simple expression for the Shapley value in a special case. Management Sci. 20(3):370–372.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Moreno-Ternero J, Roemer J (2006) Impartiality, priority and solidarity in the theory of justice. Econometrica 74(5):1419–1427.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Moreno-Ternero J, Roemer J (2012) A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism. Games Econom. Behav. 75(2):832–841.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • O’Neill B (1982) A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Math. Soc. Sci. 2(4):345–371.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Rottenberg S (1956) The baseball players’ labor market. J. Political Econom. 64(3):242–258.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Shapley L (1953) A value for n-person games. Kuhn HW, Tucker AW, eds. Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Annals of Mathematics Studies, vol. 28 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ), 307–317.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Shapley L (1971) Cores of convex games. Internat. J. Game Theory 1(1):11–26.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Thomson W (2003) Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: A survey. Math. Soc. Sci. 45(3):249–297.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Thomson W (2014) Fair Allocation (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Google Scholar
  • Thomson W (2015) Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update. Math. Soc. Sci. 74:41–59.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Thomson W (2019) How to divide when there isn’t enough: From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation. Econometric Soc. Monograph. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
  • van den Nouweland A, Borm P, van Golstein Brouwers W, Groot Bruinderink R, Tijs S (1996) A game theoretic approach to problems in telecommunication. Management Sci. 42(2):294–303.LinkGoogle Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.