Bargaining Process and Channel Efficiency

References

• Becker-Peth M, Katok E, Thonemann UW (2017) How to benefit from manufacturer-retailer negotiations: An example of the buyback contract. Working paper, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany.Google Scholar
• Biyalogorsky E, Koenigsberg O (2010) Ownership coordination in a channel: Incentives, returns, and negotiations. Quant. Marketing Econom. 8(4):461–490.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bolton GE, Karagözoğlu E (2016) On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: The importance of credible claims. Games Econom. Behav. 99(2016):164–179.Google Scholar
• Cachon GP (2003) Supply chain coordination with contracts. Supply Chain Management: Design, Coordination and Operation, Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, vol. 11 (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 227–339.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen KY, Wu Y (2018) Buyer-supplier interactions. Donohue K, Katok E, Leider S, eds. The Handbook of Behavioral Operations (Wiley, New York), 459–488.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cialdini RB, Goldstein NJ (2004) Social influence: Compliance and conformity. Annual Rev. Psych. 55:591–621.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cialdini RB, Vincent JE, Lewis SK, Catalan J, Wheeler D, Darby BL (1975) Reciprocal concessions procedure for inducing compliance: The door-in-the-face technique. J. Personality Soc. Psych. 31(2):206–2015.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Davis AM, Hyndman K (2018) Multidimensional bargaining and inventory risk in supply chains: An experimental study. Management Sci. 65(3):1286–1304.Google Scholar
• Davis AM, Leider SG (2018) Contracts and capacity investment in supply chains. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 20(3):403–421.Google Scholar
• De Bruyn A, Bolton GE (2008) Estimating the influence of fairness on bargaining behavior. Management Sci. 54(10):1774–1791.Link, Google Scholar
• Desai P, Koenigsberg O, Purohit D (2004) Strategic decentralization and channel coordination. Quant. Marketing Econom. 2(1):5–22.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fern EF, Monroe KB, Ramon AA (1986) Effectiveness of multiple request strategies: A synthesis of research results. J. Marketing Res. 23:144–152.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fischbacher U (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experiment. Econom. 10(2):171–178.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gneezy U, Haruvy E, Roth AE (2003) Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game. Games Econom. Behav. 45(2):347–368.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gode DK, Sunder S (1993) Allocative efficiency of markets with zero-intelligence traders: Market as a partial substitute for individual rationality. J. Political Econom. 101(1):119–137.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Güth W, Schmittberger R, Schwarze B (1982) An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 3(4):367–388.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hale JL, Laliker M (1999) Explaining the door-in-the-face: Is it really time to abandon reciprocal concessions? Comm. Stud. 50:203–210.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ho TH, Zhang J (2008) Designing pricing contracts for boundedly rational customers: Does the framing of the fixed fee matter? Management Sci. 54(4):686–700.Link, Google Scholar
• Iyer AV, Bergen ME (1997) Quick response in manufacturer-retailer channels. Management Sci. 43(4):559–570.Link, Google Scholar
• Iyer G, Villas-Boas MJ (2003) A bargaining theory of distribution channels. J. Marketing Res. 40:80–100.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Iyer G, Narasimhan C, Niraj R (2007) Information and inventory in a distribution channel. Management Sci. 53(10):1551–1561.Link, Google Scholar
• Kalkanci B, Chen K-Y, Erhun F (2011) Contract complexity and performance under asymmetric demand information: An experimental evaluation. Management Sci. 57(4):689–704.Link, Google Scholar
• Katok E, Pavlov V (2013) Fairness in supply chain contracts: A laboratory study. J. Oper. Management 31:129–137.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Katok E, Tan L (2017) Procurement in the presence of supply disruptions. Working paper, University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, Texas.Google Scholar
• Leider S, Lovejoy WS (2016) Bargaining in supply chains. Management Sci. 62(10):3039–3058.Link, Google Scholar
• Lim N, Ho T-H (2007) Designing price contracts for boundedly-rational customers: Does the number of blocks matter? Marketing Sci. 26(3):312–326.Link, Google Scholar
• Loch CH, Wu Y (2008) Social preferences and supply chain performance: An experimental study. Management Sci. 54(11):1835–1849.Link, Google Scholar
• Lovejoy WS (2010) Bargaining chains. Management Sci. 56(12):2282–2301.Link, Google Scholar
• McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR (1995) Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games Econom. Behav. 10(1):6–38.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ochs J, Roth AE (1989) An experimental study of sequential bargaining. Amer. Econom. Rev. 79(3):355–384.Google Scholar
• O’Keefe DJ, Hale SL (1998) The door-in-the-face influence strategy: A random-effects meta-analytic review. Roloff ME, ed. Communication Yearbook (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA), 1–33.Google Scholar
• Padmanabhan V, Png IPL (1997) Manufacturer’s return policies and retail competition. Marketing Sci. 16(1):81–94.Link, Google Scholar
• Roth AE (1995) Bargaining experiments. Kagel JH, Roth AE, eds. The Handbook of Experimental Economics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ), 253–348.Google Scholar
• Roth AE, Xing X (1994) Jumping the gun: Imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions. Amer. Econom. Rev. 84(September):992–1044.Google Scholar
• Rudi N, Kapur S, Pyke DF (2001) A two-location inventory with transshipment and a local decision making. Management 47(12):1668–1680.Abstract, Google Scholar
• Villa S, Katok E (2017) Negotiating transshipments prices for improving supply chain coordination. Working paper, University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas.Google Scholar
• Wilcox NT (2011) Stochastically more risk averse: A contextual theory of stochastic discrete choice under risk. J. Econom. 162(1):89–104.Crossref, Google Scholar