Green Technology Development and Adoption: Competition, Regulation, and Uncertainty—A Global Game Approach

References

• Alternative Fuels and Advanced Vehicle Data Center (2016) U.S. HEV sales by model (1999-2015). U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
• Angeletos G-M, Werning I (2006) Crises and prices: Information aggregation, multiplicity, and volatility. Amer. Econom. Rev. 96(5):1720–1736.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anton WRQ, Deltas G, Khanna M (2004) Incentives for environmental self-regulation and implications for environmental performance. J. Environ. Econom. Management 48(1):632–654.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Argenziano R (2008) Differentiated networks: Equilibrium and efficiency. RAND J. Econom. 39(3):747–769.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arora S, Gangopadhyay S (1995) Toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 28(3):289–309.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baker E, Shittu E (2006) Profit-maximizing R&D in response to a random carbon tax. Resource Energy Econom. 28(2):160–180.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Berman B (2007) When old things turn into new again. New York Times (October 24), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/24/automobiles/autospecial/24history.html.Google Scholar
• Carlsson H, van Damme E (1993) Global games and equilibrium selection. Econometrica 61(5):989–1018.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Carrión-Flores CE, Innes R, Sam AG (2013) Do voluntary pollution reduction programs (VPRs) spur or deter environmental innovation? Evidence from 33/50. J. Environ. Econom. Management 66(3):444–459.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen Y-J, Tang C (2015) The economic value of market information for farmers in developing economies. Production Oper. Management 24(9):1441–1452.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cohen MC, Lobel R, Perakis G (2016) The impact of demand uncertainty on consumer subsidies for green technology adoption. Management Sci. 62(5):1235–1258.Link, Google Scholar
• Denicolò V (2008) A signaling model of environmental overcompliance. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 68(1):293–303.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Drake DF, Kleindorfer PR, Van Wassenhove LN (2015) Technology choice and capacity portfolios under emissions regulation. Production Oper. Management 25(6):1006–1025.Crossref, Google Scholar
• EPA (1999) Regulatory impact analysis—Control of air pollution from new motor vehicles: Tier 2 motor vehicle emissions standards and gasoline sulfur control requirements. Report, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
• EPA (2012) Regulatory impact analysis: Final rulemaking for 2017-2025 light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas emission standards and corporate average fuel economy standards. Report, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
• EPA (2014a) Tier 3 gasoline sulfur standard’s impact on gasoline refining. Report, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
• EPA (2014b) Control of air pollution from motor vehicles: Tier 3 motor vehicle emission and fuel standards: Summary and analysis of comments. Report, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
• EPA (2014c) Control of air pollution from motor vehicles: Tier 3 motor vehicle emission and fuel standards final rule: Regulatory impact analysis. Report, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
• ExxonMobile (2017) Our history. Accessed June 8, 2017, http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/company/about-us/history/overview.Google Scholar
• Faiz A, Weaver CS, Walsh MP (1996) Air Pollution from Motor Vehicles: Standards and Technologies for Controlling Emissions (World Bank, Washington, DC).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Farrell J, Klemperer P (2007) Coordination and lock-in: Competition with switching costs and network effects. Schmalensee R, ed. Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 3 (Elsevier Science Ltd., Bridgewater, NJ), 1967–2072.Google Scholar
• Farzin YH, Kort PM (2000) Pollution abatement investment when environmental regulation is uncertain. J. Public Econom. Theory 2(2):183–212.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fleckinger P, Glachant M (2011) Negotiating a voluntary agreement when firms self-regulate. J. Environ. Econom. Management 62(1):41–52.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gopalakrishnan S, Granot D, Granot F, Sošić G, Cui H (2016) Allocation of greenhouse gas emissions in supply chains. Working paper, University of Southern California, Los Angeles.Google Scholar
• Hattori K (2017) Optimal combination of innovation and environmental policies under technology licensing. Econom. Model. 64:601–609.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Heyes A (2005) A signaling-motive for self-regulation in the shadow of coercion. J. Bus. Econom. 57(3):238–246.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hoen K, Huang X, Tan T, Toktay B (2015) Carbon leakage: The impact of asymmetric emission regulation on technology and capacity investments. Working paper, Georgia Tech, Atlanta.Google Scholar
• Innes R, Bial J (2002) Inducing innovation in the environmental technology of oligopolistic firms. J. Indust. Econom. 50(3):265–287.Crossref, Google Scholar
• İşlegen Ö, Plambeck E, Taylor T (2016) Variability in emissions cost: Implications for facility location, production and shipping. Atasu A, ed. Environmentally Responsible Supply Chains (Springer, New York), 283–312.Google Scholar
• Kalkanci B, Plambeck EL (2020) Managing supplier social and environmental impacts with voluntary vs. mandatory disclosure to investors. Management Sci. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
• Karp L, Lee IH, Mason R (2007) A global game with strategic substitutes and complements. Games Econom. Behav. 60(1):155–175.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Katz M, Shapiro C (1986) Technology adoption in the presence of network externalities. J. Political Econom. 94(4):822–841.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kendall P, Grossman M (1999) BP Amoco all alone in fuel vow. Chicago Tribune (January 27), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1999-01-27-9901270375-story.html.Google Scholar
• Koch (1999) Koch, Holiday introduce new clean gas in twin cities. Koch Newsroom (September 22), https://kochnewsroom.kochprod.com/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=132b2787-ff2e-4217-9b67-7c6bb83fde97.Google Scholar
• Kök AG, Shang K, Yücel S (2018) Impact of electricity pricing policies on renewable energy investments and carbon emissions. Management Sci. 64(1):131–148.Link, Google Scholar
• Kotha S, Nolan R (2005) Boeing 787: The Dreamliner. HBS Case 9-305-101, Harvard Business School, Boston.Google Scholar
• Kraft T, Raz G (2017) Collaborate or compete: Examining manufacturers’ replacement strategies for a substance of concern. Production Oper. Management 26(9):1646–1662.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kraft T, Erhun F, Carlson RC, Rafinejad D (2013) Replacement decisions for potentially hazardous substances. Production Oper. Management 22(4):958–975.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Krass D, Nedorezov T, Ovchinnikov A (2013) Environmental taxes and the choice of green technology. Production Oper. Management 22(5):1035–1055.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lacey S (2017) Everyone is revising their electric vehicle forecasts upward—except automakers. Greentech Media (July 17), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/everyone-is-revising-electric-vehicle-forecasts-upward.Google Scholar
• Langpap C (2015) Voluntary agreements and private enforcement of environmental regulation. J. Regulatory Econom. 47(1):99–116.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lyon TP, Maxwell JW (2003) Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements. J. Public Econom. 87(7):1453–1486.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lyon TP, Maxwell JW (2004) Corporate Environmentalism and Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Marks ME (2008) There are too many car companies anyway. Forbes (December 17), https://www.forbes.com/2008/12/17/gm-chrysler-bailout-leadership-cx_mm_1217autos.html.Google Scholar
• Millimet DL, Roy S, Sengupta A (2009) Environmental regulations and economic activity: Influence on market structure. Annual Rev. Resource Econom. 1:99–117.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Morris S, Shin HS (1998) Unique equilibrium in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks. Amer. Econom. Rev. 88(3):587–597.Google Scholar
• Morris S, Shin HS (2003) Global games: Theory and applications. Dewatripont M, Hansen L, Turnovsky S, eds. Advances in Economics and Econometrics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA), 56–114.Google Scholar
• Morris S, Shin HS (2005) Notes on strategic substitutes and complements in global games. Working paper, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.Google Scholar
• National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) (2009) Average fuel economy standards passenger cars and light trucks model year 2011. Report, Department of Transportation, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
• Percy S (2013) BP’s sustainability strategy: Capturing returns from first-mover advantage. Amer. J. Bus. 28(2):Article 8.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Plantin G, Sapra H, Shin HS (2008) Marking-to-market: Panacea or Pandora’s box? J. Accounting Res. 46(2):435–460.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Puller SL (2006) The strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards. J. Environ. Econom. Management 52(3):690–706.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Reinhart FL, Yao D, Egawa M (2006) Toyota Motor Corporation: Launching Prius. HBS Case 9-706-458, Harvard Business School, Boston.Google Scholar
• Sunar N, Plambeck E (2016) Allocating emissions among co-products: Implications for procurement and climate policy. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 18(3):414–428.Link, Google Scholar
• Tarui N, Polasky S (2005) Environmental regulation with technology adoption, learning and strategic behavior. J. Environ. Econom. Management 50(3):447–467.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Taylor A (2006) Toyota: The birth of the Prius. CNN Money (February 21), https://money.cnn.com/2006/02/17/news/companies/mostadmired_fortune_toyota/.Google Scholar
• Toyota (2017) Worldwide sales of Toyota hybrids surpass 10 million units. Toyota Global Newsroom (February 14), https://global.toyota/en/detail/14940871.Google Scholar
• Vives X (2000) Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Welch EW, Mazur A, Bretschneider S (2000) Voluntary behavior by electric utilities: Levels of adoption and contribution of the climate challenge program to the reduction of carbon dioxide. J. Policy Anal. Management 19(3):407–425.Crossref, Google Scholar