Investor Sentiment and Stock Option Vesting Terms

References

• Arif S, Lee CM (2014) Aggregate investment and investor sentiment. Rev. Financial Stud. 27(11):3241–3279.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Armstrong C, Core J, Guay W (2015) Why do CEOs hold so much equity? Working paper, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.Google Scholar
• Baker M, Wurgler J (2000) The equity share in new issues and aggregate stock returns. J. Finance 5(5):2219–2258.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baker M, Wurgler J (2006) Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns. J. Finance 61(4):1645–1680.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baker M, Wurgler J (2007) Investor sentiment in the stock market. J. Econom. Perspect. 21(2):129–151.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baker M, Stein J, Wurgler J (2003) When does the market matter? Stock prices and the investment of equity-dependent firms. Quart. J. Econom. 118(3):969–1006.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ben-Rephael A, Kandel S, Wohl A (2012) Measuring investor sentiment with mutual fund flows. J. Financial Econom. 104(2):363–382.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bergman N, Roychowdhury S (2008) Investor sentiment and corporate disclosure. J. Accounting Res. 46(5):1057–1083.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Blanchard O, Rhee C, Summers L (1993) The stock market, profit, and investment. Quart. J. Econom. 108(1):115–136.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bolton P, Scheinkman J, Wong X (2006) Executive compensation and short-termist behavior in speculative markets. Rev. Econom. Stud. 73(3):577–610.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brisley N (2006) Executive stock options: Early exercise provisions and risk-taking incentives. J. Finance 61(5):2487–2509.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brown N, Christensen T, Elliott W, Mergenthaler R (2012) Investor sentiment and pro forma earnings disclosures. J. Accounting Res. 50(1):1–40.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bushee BJ (1998) The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. Accounting Rev. 73(3):305–333.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bushee BJ, Noe CF (2000) Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and stock return volatility. J. Accounting Res. 38(Suppl. Stud. Accounting Inform. Econom. Firm):171–202.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cadman B, Sunder J (2014) Investor horizon and CEO horizon incentives. Accounting Rev. 89(4):1299–1328.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cadman B, Rusticus T, Sunder J (2013) Stock option grant vesting terms: Economic and financial reporting determinants. Rev. Accounting Stud. 18:1159–1190.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cassell C, Huang S, Sanchez JM (2013) Forecasting without consequence? Evidence on the properties of retiring CEOs’ forecasts of future earnings. Accounting Rev. 88(6):1909–1937.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Collins DW, Gong G, Li H (2009) Corporate governance and backdating of executive stock options. Contemp. Accounting Res. 26(2):403–445.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Core J, Guay W (1999) The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. J. Accounting Econom. 28(2):151–184.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dechow P, Sloan R (1991) Executive incentives and the horizon problem: An empirical investigation. J. Accounting Econom. 14(1):51–89.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dong M, Hirshleifer DA, Teoh SH (2012) Overvalued equity and financing decisions. Rev. Financial Stud. 25(12):3645–3683.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Equilar (2013) CEO realizable compensation report. Accessed April 05, 2014, http://www.equilar.com/images/pdf/publications/2013/equilar-2013-ceo-realizable-compensation-exec-summary.pdf.Google Scholar
• Fischer S, Merton RC (1984) Macroeconomics and finance: The role of the stock market. NBER Working Paper w1291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Froot KA, Scharfstein DS, Stein JC (1992) Herd on the street: Informational inefficiencies in a market with short‐term speculation. J. Finance 47(4):1461–1484.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gilchrist S, Himmelberg C, Huberman G (2005) Do stock price bubbles influence corporate investment? J. Monetary Econom. 52(4):805–827.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gopalan R, Milbourn T, Song F, Thakor AV (2014) Duration of executive compensation. J. Finance 69(6):2777–2817.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grinblatt M, Keloharju M, Linnainmaa TJ (2012) IQ, trading behavior, and performance. J. Financial Econom. 104(2):339–362.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grossman SJ, Hart OD (1983) An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica 51(1):7–45.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hartzell J, Starks L (2003) Institutional investors and executive compensation. J. Finance 58(6):2351–2354.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Henderson BC, Masli A, Richardson V, Sanchez JM (2010) Layoffs and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation: Does CEO power influence the relationship? J. Accounting Auditing Finance 25(4):709–748.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmstrom B (1982) Moral hazard in teams. Bell J. Econom. 13(2):324–340.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmstrom B (1989) Agency costs and innovation. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 12(3):305–327.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hribar P, Quinn P (2013) Managers and investor sentiment. Working paper, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA.Google Scholar
• Hui KW, Yeung PE (2013) Underreaction to industry-wide earnings and the post-forecast revision drift. J. Accounting Res. 51(4):701–737.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Janakiraman S, Radhakrishnan S, Tang S (2010) Institutional investors, managerial ownership and executive compensation. J. Accounting Auditing Finance 25(6):673–698.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jensen M, Murphy K (1990) Performance pay and top-management incentives. J. Polit. Econom. 98(2):225–264.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jensen MC, Meckling WH (1976) Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. J. Financial Econom. 3(4):305–360.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kalyta P (2009) Accounting discretion, horizon problem, and CEO retirement benefits. Accounting Rev. 84(5):1553–1573.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Keynes JM (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Macmillan, London).Google Scholar
• Kothari S, Shanken J (1997) Book-to-market, dividend yield, and expected market returns: a time-series analysis. J. Financial Econom. 44(2):169–203.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lambert R, Larcker D, Verrechia R (1991) Portfolio considerations in valuing executive compensation. J. Accounting Res. 29(1):129–149.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Laux V (2012) Stock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment. J. Financial Econom. 106(3):513–526.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Li J, Yu J (2012) Investor attention, psychological anchors, and stock return predictability. J. Financial Econom. 104(2):401–419.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mendel B, Shleifer A (2012) Chasing noise. J. Financial Econom. 104(2):303–320.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Morck R, Shleifer A, Vishny R (1990) The stock market and investment: Is the market a sideshow? Brookings Papers Econom. Activity 1990(2):157–215.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Murphy KJ (1999) Executive compensation. Ashenfelter O, Card D, eds. Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3, part B (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 2485–2563.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Murphy KJ (2012) Executive compensation: Where we are, and how we got there. Constantinides G, Harris M, Stulz R, eds. Handbook of Economics and Finance, vol. 2, part A (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 211–356.Crossref, Google Scholar
• National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) (2017) 2017-2018 Public Company Governance Survey. Report, National Association of Corporate Directors, Arlington, VA.Google Scholar
• Neal R, Wheatley SM (1998) Do measures of investor sentiment predict returns? J. Financial Quant. Anal. 33(4):523–547.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Polk C, Sapienza P (2004) The real effects of investor sentiment. NBER Working Paper w10563, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• PwC (2018) Serving on—and chairing—the compensation committee. Report, PricewaterhouseCoopers, New York, NY.Google Scholar
• Qiu L, Welch I (2006) Investor sentiment measures, Working paper. Brown University, Providence, RI.Google Scholar
• Rhodes-Kropf M, Robinson DT, Viswanathan S (2005) Valuation waves and merger activity: The empirical evidence. J. Financial Econom. 77(3):561–603.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ross SA (1973) The economic theory of agency: The principal’s problem. Amer. Econom. Rev. 63(2):134–139.Google Scholar
• Shiller R (1981) Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes in dividends? Amer. Econom. Rev. 71(3) 421–436.Google Scholar
• Shiller R (2000) Measuring bubble expectations and investor confidence. J. Psych. Financial Marketing 1(1):49–60.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shleifer A, Vishny RW (2003) Stock market driven acquisitions. J. Financial Econom. 70(3):295–311.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1997) The limits of arbitrage. J. Finance 52(1):35–55.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stambaugh RF, Yu J, Yuan Y (2012) The short of it: Investor sentiment and anomalies. J. Financial Econom. 104(2):288–302.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stein J (1996) Rational capital budgeting in an irrational world. J. Bus. 69(4):429–455.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Walker DI (2010) The challenge of improving the long-term focus of executive pay. Boston College Law Rev. 51(2):435–472.Google Scholar
• Waring GF (1996) Industry differences in the persistence of firm-specific returns. Amer. Econom. Rev. 86(5):1253–1265.Google Scholar