Conflict of Interest in Third-Party Reviews: An Experimental Study

References

• Allon G, Bassamboo A, Gurvich I (2011) “We will be right with you”: Managing customer expectations with vague promises and cheap talk. Oper. Res. 59(6):1382–1394.Link, Google Scholar
• Amaldoss W, He C (2013) Pricing prototypical products. Marketing Sci. 32(5):733–752.Link, Google Scholar
• Amaldoss W, Jain S (2005) Pricing of conspicuous goods: A competitive analysis of social effects. J. Marketing Res. 42(1):30–42.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Amaldoss W, Jain S (2015) Branding conspicuous goods: An analysis of the effects of social influence and competition. Management Sci. 61(9):2064–2079.Link, Google Scholar
• Anderson ET, Simester DI (2014) Reviews without a purchase: Low ratings, loyal customers, and deception. J. Marketing Res. 51(3):249–269.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Andreoni J, Harbaugh W, Vesterlund L (2003) The carrot or the stick: Rewards, punishments, and cooperation. Amer. Econom. Rev. 93(3):893–902.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baker G, Gibbons R, Murphy K (2002) Relational contracts and the theory of the firm. Quart. J. Econom. 117(1):39–84.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Battigalli P, Dufwenberg M (2007) Guilt in games. Amer. Econom. Rev. 97(2):170–176.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cai H, Wang J (2006) Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games. Games Econom. Behav. 56(1):7–36.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cain D, Loewenstein G, Moore D (2005) The dirt on coming clean: Perverse effects of disclosing conflicts of interest. J. Legal Stud. 34(1):1–25.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cain D, Loewenstein G, Moore D (2011) When sunlight fails to disinfect: Understanding the perverse effects of disclosing conflicts of interest. J. Consumer Res. 37(5):836–857.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Charness G, Dufwenberg M (2006) Promises and partnership. Econometrica 74(6):1579–1601.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Charness G, Dufwenberg M (2011) Participation. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101(4):1213–1239.Google Scholar
• Chen H, Ham S, Lim N (2011) Designing multiperson tournaments with asymmetric contestants: An experimental study. Management Sci. 57(5):864–883.Link, Google Scholar
• Chen Y, Xie J (2005) Third-party product review and firm marketing strategy. Marketing Sci. 24(2):218–240.Link, Google Scholar
• Crawford V, Sobel J (1982) Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50(6):1431–1451.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ding M, Eliashberg J, Huber J, Saini R (2005) Emotional bidders? An analytical and experimental examination of consumers’ behavior in a priceline-like reverse auction. Management Sci. 51(3):352–364.Link, Google Scholar
• Dufwenberg M, Kirchsteiger G (2004) A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games Econom. Behav. 47(2):268–298.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Eliashberg J, Shugan S (1997) Film critics: Influencers or predictors? J. Marketing 61(2):68–78.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ellingsen T, Johannesson M (2004) Promises, threats and fairness. Econom. J. 114(495):397–420.Google Scholar
• Erat S, Gneezy U (2012) White lies. Management Sci. 58(4):723–733.Link, Google Scholar
• Falk A (2007) Gift exchange in the field. Econometrica 75(5):1501–1511.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Falk A, Fischbacher U (2006) A theory of reciprocity. Games Econom. Behav. 54(2):293–315.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Falk A, Gächter S (2002) Reputation and reciprocity—consequences for labour relations. Scandinavian J. Econom. 104(1):1–26.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Farrell J, Rabin M (1996) Cheap talk. J. Econom. Perspect. 10(3):103–118.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Gächter S (2000) Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity. J. Econom. Perspect. 14(3):159–181.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Schmidt KM (1999) A theory of fairness, coordination and competition. Quart. J. Econom. 114(3):817–868.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Gächter S, Kirchsteiger G (1997) Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: Experimental evidence. Econometrica 65(4):833–860.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Kirchler E, Weichbold A, Gächter S (1998) When social norms overpower competition: Gift exchange in experimental labor markets. J. Labor Econom. 16(2):324–351.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fischbacher U (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experiment. Econom. 10(2):171–178.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gentzkow M, Shapiro JM (2006) Media bias and reputation. J. Political Econom. 114(21):280–316.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gentzkow M, Shapiro JM (2008) Competition and truth in the market for news. J. Econom. Perspect. 22(2):133–154.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gneezy U, List J (2006) Putting behavioral economics to work: Testing for gift exchange in labor markets using field experiments. Econometrica 74(5):1365–1384.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guo L (2009) Quality disclosure formats in a distribution channel. Management Sci. 55(9):1513–1526.Link, Google Scholar
• Guo L, Zhao Y (2009) Voluntary quality disclosure and market interaction. Marketing Sci. 28(3):488–501.Link, Google Scholar
• Ho T-H, Zhang J-J (2008) Designing price contracts for boundedly rational customers: Does the framing of the fixed fee matter? Management Sci. 54(4):686–700.Link, Google Scholar
• Hong H, Cacperczyk M (2010) Competition and bias. Quart. J. Econom. 125(4):1683–1725.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jain S, Li KJ (2018) Pricing and product design for vice goods: A strategic analysis. Marketing Sci. 37(4):592–610.Link, Google Scholar
• Joshi YV, Reibstein DA, Zhang ZJ (2009) Optimal entry timing in markets with social influence. Management Sci. 55(6):926–939.Link, Google Scholar
• Kessler JB, Leider S (2012) Norms and contracting. Management Sci. 58(1):62–77.Link, Google Scholar
• Kim K, Chung K, Lim N (2019) Third-party reviews and quality provision. Management Sci. 65(6):2965–2716.Link, Google Scholar
• Krupka EL, Leider S, Jiang M (2017) A meeting of the minds: Informal agreements and social norms. Management Sci. 63(6):1708–1729.Link, Google Scholar
• Levine D (1998) Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Rev. Econom. Dynam. 1(3):593–622.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lim N (2010) Social loss aversion and optimal contest design. J. Marketing Res. 47(4):777–787.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lim N, Ham SH (2014) Relationship organization and price delegation: An experimental study. Management Sci. 60(3):586–605.Link, Google Scholar
• Luca M, Zervas G (2016) Fake it till you make it: Reputation, competition, and Yelp review fraud. Management Sci. 62(12):3412–3427.Link, Google Scholar
• Malmendier U, Schmidt K (2017) You owe me. Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(2):493–526.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mayzlin D, Dover Y, Chevalier J (2014) Promotional reviews: An empirical investigation of online review manipulation. Amer. Econom. Rev. 104(8):2421–2455.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mehran H, Stulz RM (2007) The economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions. J. Financial Econom. 85(2):267–296.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Michaely R, Womack KL (1999) Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst recommendations. Rev. Financial Stud. 12(4):653–686.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Özer Ö, Zheng Y, Chen K-Y (2011) Trust in forecast information sharing. Management Sci. 57(6):1111–1137.Link, Google Scholar
• Özpolat K, Gao G, Jank W, Viswanathan S (2013) The value of third-party assurance seals in online retailing: An empirical investigation. Inform. Systems Res. 24(4):1100–1111.Link, Google Scholar
• Poppo L, Zenger T (2002) Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management J. 23(8):707–725.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rabin M (1993) Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. Amer. Econom. Rev. 83(5):1281–1302.Google Scholar
• Sah S, Loewenstein G (2014) Nothing to declare: Mandatory and voluntary disclosure leads advisors to avoid conflicts of interest. Psych. Sci. 25(2):575–584.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sah S, Loewenstein G (2015) Conflicted advice and second opinions: Benefits, but unintended consequences. Organ. Behav. Human Decision Processes 130(2015):89–107.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shaffer G, Zettelmeyer F (2002) When good news about your rival is good for you: The effect of third-party information on the division of channel profits. Marketing Sci. 21(3):273–293.Link, Google Scholar
• Sobel J (2005) Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. J. Econom. Literature 43(2):392–436.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Srivastava J, Chakravarti D (2009) Channel negotiations with information asymmetries: Contingent influences of communication and trustworthiness reputations. J. Marketing Res. 46(4):557–572.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sutter M, Haigner S, Kocher MG (2010) Choosing the carrot or the stick? Endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations. Rev. Econom. Stud. 77(4):1540–1566.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Taylor T, Plambeck E (2007) Supply chain relationships and contracts: The impact of repeated interaction on capacity investment and procurement. Management Sci. 53(10):1577–1593.Link, Google Scholar
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2019) Learn About Volkswagen Violations. Retrieved February 23, 2020, https://www.epa.gov/vw/learn-about-volkswagen-violations.Google Scholar
• Vanberg C (2008) Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations. Econometrica 76(6):1467–1480.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Xia H (2014) Can investor-paid credit rating agencies improve the information quality of issuer-paid rating agencies? J. Financial Econom. 111(2):450–468.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zhou B, Mela C, Amaldoss W (2015) Do firms endowed with higher strategic ability earn higher profits? J. Marketing Res. 52(3):325–336.Crossref, Google Scholar