Peer Evaluation and Team Performance: An Experiment on Complex Problem Solving

References

• Anderson PM, Sherman CA (2010) Applying the FERMI estimation technique to business problems. J. Appl. Bus. Econom. 10(5):33–42.Google Scholar
• Ariely D, Gneezy U, Loewenstein G, Mazar N (2009) Large stakes and big mistakes. Rev. Econom. Stud. 76(2):451–469.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ärlebäck J, Albarracín L (2019) The use and potential of Fermi problems in the STEM disciplines to support the development of twenty-first century competencies. ZDM Math. Ed. 51:979–990.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bagues M, Sylos-Labini M, Zinovyeva N (2017) Does the gender composition of scientific committees matter? Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(4):1207–1238.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Balietti S, Goldstone RL, Helbing D (2016) Peer review and competition in the art exhibition game. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 113(30):8414–8419.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bandiera O, Fischer G, Prat A, Ytsma E (2021) Do women respond less to performance pay? Building evidence from multiple experiments. Amer. Econom. Rev. Insights 3(4):435–454.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bohl DL (1996) Minisurvey: 360-degree appraisals yield superior results, survey shows. Compensation Benefits Rev. 28(5):16–19.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Boyle I (2013) Individual performance management: A review of current practices. Asia Pacific Management Bus. Appl. 1(3):157–170.Google Scholar
• Bracken DW, Rose DS (2011) When does 360-degree feedback create behavior change? And how would we know it when it does? J. Bus. Psych. 26:183–192.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bradler C, Neckermann S, Warnke AJ (2019) Incentivizing creativity: A large-scale experiment with performance bonuses and gifts. J. Labor Econom. 37(3):793–851.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Breza E, Kaur S, Shamdasani Y (2017) The morale effects of pay inequality. Quart. J. Econom. 133(2):611–663.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Carpenter J, Matthews PH, Schirm J (2010) Tournaments and office politics: Evidence from a real effort experiment. Amer. Econom. Rev. 100(1):504–517.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Charness G, Grieco D (2019) Creativity and incentives. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 17(2):454–496.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen DL, Schonger M, Wickens C (2016) oTree—An open-source platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments. J. Behav. Experiment. Finance 9:88–97.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Coates DE (1998) Don’t tie 360 feedback to pay. Training 35(9):68–78.Google Scholar
• Coffman KB (2014) Evidence on self-stereotyping and the contribution of ideas. Quart. J. Econom. 129(4):1625–1660.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Deci EL, Koestner R, Ryan RM (1999) A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Psych. Bull. 125(6):627–668.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Delfgaauw J, Dur R, Souverijn M (2020) Team incentives, task assignment, and performance: A field experiment. Leadership Quart. 31(3):101241.Crossref, Google Scholar
• DeNisi AS, Kluger AN (2000) Feedback effectiveness: Can 360-degree appraisals be improved? Acad. Management Perspect. 14(1):129–139.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Eckartz K, Kirchkamp O, Schunk D (2012) How do incentives affect creativity? CESifo Working Paper No. 4049, CESifo, Munich, Germany.Google Scholar
• Edwards MR, Ewen AJ (1996) How to manage performance and pay with 360-degree feedback: Multisource assessment can work for both performance and pay management when participants know the system is fair. But doing it right requires a commitment. Compensation Benefits Rev. 28(3):41–46.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Englmaier F, Grimm S, Grothe D, Schindler D, Schudy S (2024) The effect of incentives in nonroutine analytical team tasks. J. Political Econom. 132(8):2695–2747.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Gächter S (2000) Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Amer. Econom. Rev. 90(4):980–994.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Frey BS, Jegen R (2001) Motivation crowding theory. J. Econom. Surveys 15(5):589–611.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gall T, Hu X, Vlassopoulos M (2025) Incentivizing team leaders: A firm-level experiment on subjective performance evaluation of leadership skills. J. Econom. Management Strategy 35(1):139–167.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greiner B (2015) Subject pool recruitment procedures: Organizing experiments with ORSEE. J. Econom. Sci. Assoc. 1(1):114–125.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Harbring C, Irlenbusch B (2011) Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a laboratory experiment. Management Sci. 57(4):611–627.Link, Google Scholar
• Huang Y, Shum M, Wu X, Xiao JZ (2019) Discovery of bias and strategic behavior in crowdsourced performance assessment. Preprint, submitted August 5, https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.01718.Google Scholar
• Lane JN, Teplitskiy M, Gray G, Ranu H, Menietti M, Guinan EC, Lakhani KR (2022) Conservatism gets funded? A field experiment on the role of negative information in novel project evaluation. Management Sci. 68(6):4478–4495.Google Scholar
• Laske K, Schröder M (2017) Quantity, quality and originality: The effects of incentives on creativity. Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen – Session: Organization and Firms II, No. B01-V3, ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (EconStor), Kiel, Hamburg.Google Scholar
• Levitin D (2014) How to solve Google’s crazy open-ended interview questions. Wired.com (August 22), https://www.wired.com/2014/08/how-to-solve-crazy-open-ended-google-interview-questions/.Google Scholar
• Love KG (1981) Comparison of peer assessment methods: Reliability, validity, friendship bias, and user reaction. J. Appl. Psych. 66(4):451–457.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Murphy RO, Ackermann KA, Handgraaf MJ (2011) Measuring social value orientation. Judgment Decision Making 6(8):771–781.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nalbantian HR, Schotter A (1997) Productivity under group incentives: An experimental study. Amer. Econom. Rev. 87(3):314–341.Google Scholar
• Ramm J, Tjotta S, Torsvik G (2013) Incentives and creativity in groups. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4374, CESifo, Munich, Germany.Google Scholar
• Sonnentag S (1998) Identifying high performers: Do peer nominations suffer from a likeability bias? Eur. J. Work Organ. Psych. 7(4):501–515.Crossref, Google Scholar
• van Dijk F, Sonnemans J, van Winden F (2001) Incentive systems in a real effort experiment. Eur. Econom. Rev. 45(2):187–214.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Villeval MC (2020) Performance feedback and peer effects. Zimmermann K, ed. Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics (Springer International Publishing, Cham, Switzerland), 1–38.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Weinstein L, Adam JA (2008) Guesstimation: Solving the World’s Problems on the Back of a Cocktail Napkin (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zenger TR, Marshall CR (2000) Determinants of incentive intensity in group-based rewards. Acad. Management J. 43(2):149–163.Crossref, Google Scholar