Organized Crime and Firms: Evidence from Antimafia Enforcement Actions

References

• Acconcia A, Corsetti G, Simonelli S (2014) Mafia and public spending: Evidence on the fiscal multiplier from a quasi-experiment. Amer. Econom. Rev. 104:2185–2209.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Acemoglu D, De Feo G, De Luca GD (2020) Weak states: Causes and consequences of the Sicilian Mafia. Rev. Econom. Stud. 87(2):537–581.Google Scholar
• Akerlof GA (1978) The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Diamond P, Rothschild M, eds. Uncertainty in Economics (Academic Press, New York), 235–251.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Alesina A, Piccolo S, Pinotti P (2019) Organized crime, violence, and politics. Rev. Econom. Stud. 86(2):457–499.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson A (1995) Organised crime, mafia and governments. Fiorentini G, Peltzman S, eds. The Economics of Organised Crime (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK), 33–53.Google Scholar
• Baker AC, Larcker DF, Wang CCY (2022) How much should we trust staggered difference-in-differences estimates? J. Financial Econom. 144(2):370–395.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Balletta L, Lavezzi AM (2023) The economics of extortion: Theory and the case of the Sicilian Mafia. J. Comparative Econom.Google Scholar
• Balsamo A, Contrafatto V, Nicastro G (2010) Le misure Patrimoniali Contro la Criminalità Organizzata, vol. 13 (Giuffrè Editore, Milan, Italy).Google Scholar
• Bandiera O (2003) Land reform, the market for protection, and the origins of the Sicilian Mafia: Theory and evidence. J. Law Econom. Organ. 19:218–244.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barone G, Narciso G (2015) Organized crime and business subsidies: Where does the money go? J. Urban Econom. 86:98–110.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bell D (1959) The racket-ridden longshoremen. Dissent 6(4):417–429.Google Scholar
• Bianchi PA, Marra A, Masciandaro D, Pecchiari N (2017) Is it worth having the Sopranos on board? Corporate governance pollution and organized crime: The case of Italy. BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1759, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.Google Scholar
• Bianchi PA, Marra A, Masciandaro D, Pecchiari N (2022) Organized crime and firms’ financial statements: Evidence from criminal investigations in Italy. Accounting Rev. 97(3):77–106.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bliss C, Di Tella R (1997) Does competition kill corruption? J. Polit. Econom. 105(5):1001–1023.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bonanno J, Lalli S (1983) A Man of Honour: The Autobiography of a Godfather (Andre Deutsch, London).Google Scholar
• Bourveau T, She G, Žaldokas A (2020) Corporate disclosure as a tacit coordination mechanism: Evidence from cartel enforcement regulations. J. Accounting Res. 58(2):295–332.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Buonanno P, Pazzona M (2014) Migrating mafias. Regional Sci. Urban Econom. 44:75–81.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Buonanno P, Durante R, Prarolo G, Vanin P (2015) Poor institutions, rich mines: Resource curse in the origins of the Sicilian Mafia. Econom. J. 125:F175–F202.Google Scholar
• Calamunci F, Drago F (2020) The economic impact of organized crime infiltration in the legal economy: Evidence from the judicial administration of organized crime firms. Italian Econom. J. 6:275–297.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Calderoni F (2014) Mythical numbers and the proceeds of organised crime: Estimating mafia proceeds in Italy. Global Crime 15:138–163.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Callaway B, Sant’Anna PH (2020) Difference-in-differences with multiple time periods. J. Econometrics 225(2):200–230.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Catino M (2014) How do mafias organize? Arch. Eur. Sociol. 55:177–220.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cengiz D, Dube A, Lindner A, Zipperer B (2019) The effect of minimum wages on low-wage jobs. Quart. J. Econom. 134(3):1405–1454.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Collier P, Hoeffler A (2002) On the incidence of civil war in Africa. J. Conflict Resolution 46:13–28.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cordella S (2006) Matteo Messina Denaro: Il “Re” di Trapani. Antimafia Duemila 3:7–10.Google Scholar
• Daniele G (2019) Strike one to educate one hundred: Organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 159:650–662.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Daniele G, Geys B (2015) Organised crime, institutions and political quality: Empirical evidence from Italian municipalities. Econom. J. 125(586):F233–F255.Google Scholar
• Daniele V, Marani U (2011) Organized crime, the quality of local institutions and FDI in Italy: A panel data analysis. Eur. J. Polit. Econom. 27:132–142.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dasgupta S, Zaldokas A (2019) Anti-collusion enforcement: Justice for consumers and equity for firms. Rev. Financial Stud. 32(7):2587–2624.Google Scholar
• De Lia A (2017) La sconfinata giovinezza delle misure di prevenzione. Archivio Penale 1:1–36.Google Scholar
• Deshpande M, Li Y (2019) Who is screened out? Application costs and the targeting of disability programs. Amer. Econom. J. Econom. Policy 11(4):213–248.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Di Cataldo M, Mastrorocco N (2022) Organized crime, captured politicians, and the allocation of public resources. J. Law Econom. Organ. 38(3):774–839.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dickie J (2004) Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia (Palgrave Macmillan Trade, London).Google Scholar
• Dimico A, Isopi A, Olsson O (2017) Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The market for lemons. J. Econom. History 77:1083–1115.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Djankov S, La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A (2002) The regulation of entry. Quart. J. Econom. 117(1):1–37.Crossref, Google Scholar
• D’Souza A, Kaufmann D (2013) Who bribes in public contracting and why: Worldwide evidence from firms. Econom. Governance 14(4):333–367.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fabrizi M, Malaspina P, Parbonetti A (2019) The economic consequences of criminal firms. Preprint, submitted September 5, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3444839.Google Scholar
• Fenizia A, Saggio R (2023) Can the mafia’s tentacles be severed? The economic effects of removing corrupt city councils. Working paper, George Washington University.Google Scholar
• Fernández-Val I (2009) Fixed effects estimation of structural parameters and marginal effects in panel probit models. J. Econometrics 150:71–85.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ferrante L, Fontana S, Reito F (2021) Mafia and bricks: Unfair competition in local markets and policy interventions. Small Bus. Econom. 56:1461–1484.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Finocchiaro S (2020) La confisca e il sequestro di prevenzione. Mezzetti L, Lupaŕia L, Amarelli G, eds. La legislazione antimafia, chapter 19 (Zanichelli Editore S.P.A., Bologna).Google Scholar
• Fiorentini G, Peltzman S (1997) The Economics of Organised Crime (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).Google Scholar
• Gambetta D (1993) The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Gambetta D, Reuter P (1995) Conspiracy among the many: The mafia in legitimate industries. Fielding NG, Clarke A, Witt R, eds. The Economic Dimensions of Crime (Palgrave Macmillan, London), 99–120.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ganau R, Rodríguez-Pose A (2018) Industrial clusters, organized crime, and productivity growth in Italian SMEs. J. Regional Sci. 58:363–385.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gentzkow M, Shapiro J, Taddy M (2019) Measuring group differences in high-dimensional choices: Method and application to congressional speech. Econometrica 87(4):1307–1340.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goodman-Bacon A (2021) Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment timing. J. Econometrics 225(2):254–277.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gormley TA, Matsa DA (2011) Growing out of trouble? Corporate responses to liability risk. Rev. Financial Stud. 24(8):2781–2821.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guimaraes P, Portugal P (2010) A simple feasible procedure to fit models with high-dimensional fixed effects. Stata J. 10(4):628–649.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Konrad KA, Skaperdas S (1998) Extortion. Economica 65:461–477.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Le Moglie M, Sorrenti G (2022) Revealing “Mafia Inc.”? Financial crisis, organized crime, and the birth of new enterprises. Rev. Econom. Statist. 104(1):142–156.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levenstein MC, Suslow VY (2012) Cartels and collusion—Empirical evidence. Ross School of Business Paper 1182.Google Scholar
• Lupo S (2004) Storia della mafia: Dalle origini ai giorni nostri (Donzelli Editore, Rome).Google Scholar
• Manna A (2020) Natura giuridica delle misure di prevenzione: Legislazione, giurisprudenza, dottrina. Dasein und Gerechtigkeit| Ser-aí e Justiça (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, Germany), 105–128.Google Scholar
• Mano R, Castillo M (2015) The level of productivity in traded and non-traded sectors for a large panel of countries. International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 15-48, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
• Mauro P (1995) Corruption and growth. Quart. J. Econom. 110(3):681–712.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mirenda L, Mocetti S, Rizzica L (2022) The economic effects of mafia: Firm level evidence. Amer. Econom. Rev. 112(8):2748–2773.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Olson M (1993) Dictatorship, democracy, and development. Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 87(3):567–576.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pinotti P (2015a) The economic costs of organised crime: Evidence from Southern Italy. Econom. J. 125:F203–F232.Google Scholar
• Pinotti P (2015b) The causes and consequences of organised crime: Preliminary evidence across countries. Econom. J. 125:F158–F174.Google Scholar
• Pinotti P, Stanig P (2016) Sowing the mafia: A natural experiment. Working paper, Bocconi University, Milan.Google Scholar
• Polo M (1995) Internal cohesion and competition among criminal organizations. Fiorentini G, Peltzman S, eds. The Economics of Organised Crime (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK), 87–109.Google Scholar
• Reuter P (1987) Testing and deterrence. J. Policy Anal. Management 7(3):554–557.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Reuter P (1995) The decline of the American Mafia. Public Interest 120(120):89–99.Google Scholar
• Ruffolo G, Veltri E, Archibugi F, Masneri A (2010) Rapporto sulla criminalita in Italia. Analisi, Prevenzione, Contrasto Ministero degli Interni con Stime Aggiornate dal Centro Studi di Confindustria per Ottobre 2010. Report, Ministero Degli Interni, Rome.Google Scholar
• Sanchez de la Sierra R (2020) On the origins of the state: Stationary bandits and taxation in eastern Congo. J. Polit. Econom. 128(1):32–74.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sanchez-Jankowski M (1991) Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Savona E, Riccardi M (2015) From illegal markets to legitimate businesses: The portfolio of organised crime in Europe. Final report of Project OCP Organized Crime Portfolio, Transcrime – Universitá degli Studi di Trento, Trento.Google Scholar
• Schelling TC (1971) What is the business of organized crime? Amer. Scholar 40(4):643–652.Google Scholar
• Scognamiglio A (2018) When the mafia comes to town. Eur. J. Polit. Econom. 55:573–590.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sergi A (2017) From Mafia to Organised Crime: A Comparative Analysis of Policing Models (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shleifer A, Vishny R (1993) Corruption. Quart. J. Econom. 3(1):599–617.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Skaperdas S (2001) The political economy of organized crime: Providing protection when the state does not. Econom. Governance 2:173–202.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Skaperdas S (2002) Warlord competition. J. Peace Res. 39:435–446.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sun L, Abraham S (2020) Estimating dynamic treatment effects in event studies with heterogeneous treatment effects. J. Econometrics 225(1):175–199.Google Scholar
• The Guardian (2015) Italian police open headquarters in former mafia hideout. Guardian (May 10), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/10/italian-police-headquarters-former-mafia-hideout.Google Scholar
• Wei S (2000) How taxing is corruption on international investors? Rev. Econom. Statist. 82(1):1–11.Crossref, Google Scholar
• World Economic Forum (2017) The Global Competitiveness Report 2017–2018. World Economic Forum, Geneva.Google Scholar