Dueling Contests and Platform’s Coordinating Role

References

• Ales L, Cho S-H, Körpeoğlu E (2017) Optimal award scheme in innovation tournaments. Oper. Res. 65(3):693–702.Link, Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I, Monderer D, Tennenholtz M (2011) Simultaneous ad auctions. Math. Oper. Res. 36(1):1–13.Link, Google Scholar
• Azmat G, Möller M (2009) Competition among contests. RAND J. Econom. 40(4):743–768.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baye MR, Hoppe HC (2003) The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games. Games Econom. Behav. 44(2):217–226.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bimpikis K, Ehsani S, Mostagir M (2019) Designing dynamic contests. Oper. Res. 67(2):339–356.Abstract, Google Scholar
• Chawla S, Hartline JD, Sivan B (2019) Optimal crowdsourcing contests. Games Econom. Behav. 113(1):80–96.Crossref, Google Scholar
• DiPalantino D, Vojnovic M (2009) Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions. Proc. 10th ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (ACM, New York), 119–128.Google Scholar
• Erat S, Krishnan V (2012) Managing delegated search over design spaces. Management Sci. 58(3):606–623.Link, Google Scholar
• Fullerton RL, McAfee RP (1999) Auctioning entry into tournaments. J. Political Econom. 107(3):573–605.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grossmann M (2021) Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests. Rev. Econom. Des. 25(2021):289–316.Google Scholar
• Hu M, Wang L (2021) Joint vs. separate crowdsourcing contests. Management Sci. 67(5):2711–2728.Link, Google Scholar
• Kalra A, Shi M (2001) Designing optimal sales contests: A theoretical perspective. Marketing Sci. 20(2):170–193.Link, Google Scholar
• Khorasani S, Nittala L, Krishnan VV (2023) Screening in multistage contests. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 25(6):2249–2267.Abstract, Google Scholar
• Körpeoğlu E, Korpeoglu CG, Hafalır İE (2022) Parallel innovation contests. Oper. Res. 70(3):1506–1530.Link, Google Scholar
• Lazear E, Rosen S (1981) Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. J. Political Econom. 89(5):841–864.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Luce RD (1959) Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis (Wiley, Hoboken, NJ).Google Scholar
• McFadden D (1974) Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behaviour. Zarembka P, ed. Frontiers in Econometrics (Academic Press, New York), 105–142.Google Scholar
• Moldovanu B, Sela A (2001) The optimal allocation of prizes in contests. Amer. Econom. Rev. 91(3):542–558.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nalebuff BJ, Stiglitz JE (1983) Prizes and incentives: Toward a general theory of compensation and competition. Bell J. Econom. 14(1):21–43.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stouras KI (2017) Crowdsourcing contests with private types and evaluation uncertainty. Proc. 3rd Cambridge Area Econom. Comput. Conf. (ACM, New York), 100–114.Google Scholar
• Stouras KI, Erat S, Lichtendahl KC (2020) Prizes on crowdsourcing platforms: An equilibrium analysis of competing contests. Proc. 21st ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (ACM, New York), 875–876.Google Scholar
• Stouras KI, Hutchison-Krupat J, Chao RO (2022) The role of participation in innovation contests. Management Sci. 68(6):4135–4150.Link, Google Scholar
• Taylor CR (1995) Digging for golden carrots: An analysis of research tournaments. Amer. Econom. Rev. 85(4):872–890.Google Scholar
• Terwiesch C, Xu Y (2008) Innovation contests, open innovation, and multiagent problem solving. Management Sci. 54(9):1529–1543.Link, Google Scholar
• Tullock G (1980) Innovation and intellectual property rights. Buchanan JM, Tollison RD, Tullock G, eds. Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX), 97–112.Google Scholar
• Vojnović M (2016) Contest Theory: Incentive Mechanisms and Ranking Methods (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).Google Scholar