Procurement for Assembly Under Asymmetric Information: Theory and Evidence

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4000

References

  • Ausubel LM, Cramton P, Deneckere RJ (2002) Bargaining with incomplete information. Aumann RJ, Hart S, eds. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, vol. 3 (North Holland), –1945.Google Scholar
  • Bhandari A, Secomandi N (2011) Revenue management with bargaining. Oper. Res. 59(2):498–506.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Bolton GE, Ockenfels A (2000) ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. Amer. Econom. Rev. 90:166–193.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Camerer CF (2003) Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Google Scholar
  • Chen KY, Wu D (2019) Buyer-supplier interactions. Donohue K, Katok E, Leider S, eds. The Handbook of Behavioral Operations (Wiley, New York), 459–487.Google Scholar
  • Chen Z, Mihm J, Schlapp J (2021) Sourcing innovation: Integrated system or individual components? Manufacturing Service Oper. Management, ePub ahead of print July 2, https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0983.Google Scholar
  • Corbett C, Zhou D, Tang C (2004) Designing supply contracts: Contract type and information asymmetry. Management Sci. 50(4):550–559.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Cui TH, Kong G, Pourghannad B (2020) Is simplicity the ultimate sophistication? The superiority of linear pricing. Production Oper. Management 29(7):1767–1788.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Davis AM, Hyndman K (2019) Multidimensional bargaining and inventory risk in supply chains: An experimental study. Management Sci. 65(3):1286–1304.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Davis AM, Hyndman K (2020) Private information and dynamic bargaining in supply chains: An experimental study. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management, ePub ahead of print October 6, https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0896.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Davis AM, Leider S (2018) Contracts and capacity investment in supply chains. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 20(3):403–421.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Fang X, Ru J, Wang Y (2014) Optimal procurement design of an assembly supply chain with information asymmetry. Production Oper. Management 23(12):2075–2088.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Fehr E, Schmidt KM (1999) A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. Quart. J. Econom. 114:817–868.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Feng Q, Lu LX (2012) The strategic perils of low cost outsourcing. Management Sci. 58(6):1196–1210.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Feng Q, Lai G, Lu LX (2014) Dynamic bargaining in a supply chain with asymmetric demand information. Management Sci. 61(2):301–315.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Fischbacher U (2007) z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experiment. Econom. 10(2):171–178.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Fung VK, Fung WK, Wind Y (2008) Competing in a Flat World: Building Enterprises for a Borderless World (Pearson Education, Inc).Google Scholar
  • Gurnani H, Ramachandran K, Ray S, Xia Y (2014) Ordering behavior under supply risk: An experimental investigation. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 16(1):61–75.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Ho TH, Su X (2009) Peer-induced fairness in games. Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(5):2022–2049.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ho TH, Su X, Wu Y (2014) Distributional and peer-induced fairness in supply chain contract design. Production Oper. Management 23(2):161–175.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Hu B, Qi A (2018) Optimal procurement mechanisms for assembly. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 20(4):655–666.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Johnsen L, Sadrieh A, Voigt G (2020) Short-term vs. long-term contracting: Empirical assessment of the ratchet effect in supply chain interaction. Working paper, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany.Google Scholar
  • Johnsen LC, Voigt G, Corbett CJ (2019) Behavioral contract design under asymmetric forecast information. Decision Sci. 50(4):786–815.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Kalkanci B, Erhun F (2012) Pricing games and impact of private demand information in decentralized assembly systems. Oper. Res. 60(5):1142–1156.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Kalkanci B, Chen KY, Erhun F (2011) Contract complexity and performance under asymmetric demand information: An experimental evaluation. Management Sci. 57(4):689–704.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Kalkanci B, Chen KY, Erhun F (2014) Complexity as a contract design factor: A human-to-human experimental study. Production Oper. Management 23(2):269–284.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Kuo CW, Ahn HS, Aydın G (2011) Dynamic pricing of limited inventories when customers negotiate. Oper. Res. 59(4):882–897.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Leider S, Lovejoy WS (2016) Bargaining in supply chains. Management Sci. 62(10):3039–3058.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Li Z, Gilbert SM, Lai G (2013) Supplier encroachment under asymmetric information. Management Sci. 60(2):449–462.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Li Z, Ryan JK, Shao L, Sun D (2019) Incentive-compatible in dominant strategies mechanism design for an assembler under asymmetric information. Production Oper. Management 28(2):479–496.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Lovejoy WS (2010) Bargaining chains. Management Sci. 56(12):2282–2301.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Myerson RB (1984a) Cooperative games with incomplete information. Internat. J. Game Theory 13(2):69–96.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Myerson RB (1984b) Two-person bargaining problems with incomplete information. Econometrica 52(2):461–487.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Nagarajan M, Sošić G (2008) Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 187(3):719–745.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Nash JF (1950) The bargaining problem. Econometrica 2(18):155–162.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Tang CS, Zimmerman JD, Nelson JI (2009) Managing new product development and supply chain risks: The Boeing 787 case. Supply Chain Forum 10(2):74–86.Google Scholar
  • U.S. Census Bureau (2020) Annual Survey of Manufacturers (U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC).Google Scholar
  • Wang GH (1998) Bargaining over a menu of wage contracts. Rev. Econom. Stud. 65(2):295–305.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Yang Z, Aydın G, Babich V, Beil DR (2009) Supply disruptions, asymmetric information, and a backup production option. Management Sci. 55(2):192–209.LinkGoogle Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.