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April 10, 2013 - June 5, 2026

Available Issues

April 10, 2013 - June 5, 2026

Principal Trading Arrangements: When Are Common Contracts Optimal?

Published Online:12 Aug 2021https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4022

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