Complex Disclosure

References

• Agarwal S, Ben-David I, Yao V (2017) Systematic mistakes in the mortgage market and lack of financial sophistication. J. Financial Econom. 123(1):42–58.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Agarwal S, Chomsisengphet S, Liu C (2010) The importance of adverse selection in the credit card market: Evidence from randomized trials of credit card solicitations. J. Money Credit Banking 42(4):743–754.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Agranov M, Schotter A (2012) Ignorance is bliss: An experimental study of the use of ambiguity and vagueness in the coordination games with asymmetric payoffs. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics 4(2):77–103.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson ML, Chiswell K, Peterson ED, Tasneem A, Topping J, Califf RM (2015) Compliance with results reporting at ClinicalTrials.gov. New England J. Medicine 372(11):1031–1039.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Armstrong M, Chen Y (2009) Inattentive consumers and product quality. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 7(2–3):411–422.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Armstrong M, Vickers J (2012) Consumer protection and contingent charges. J. Econom. Literature 50(2):477–493.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bederson BB, Jin GZ, Leslie P, Quinn AJ, Zou B (2018) Incomplete disclosure: Evidence of signaling and countersignaling. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics 10(1):41–66.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ben-Shahar O, Schneider CE (2014) More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bhargava S, Loewenstein G, Sydnor J (2017) Choose to lose: Health plan choices from a menu with dominated option. Quart. J. Econom. 132(3):1319–1372.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bianchi M, Jehiel P (2015) Financial reporting and market efficiency with extrapolative investors. J. Econom. Theory 157:842–878.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Blake T, Moshary S, Sweeney K, Tadelis S (2017) Price salience and product choice. NBER Working Paper No. w25186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Board O (2009) Competition and disclosure. J. Indust. Econom. 57(1):197–213.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bollinger B, Leslie P, Sorensen A (2011) Calorie posting in chain restaurants. Amer. Econom. J. Econom. Policy 3(1):91–128.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brown J, Hossain T, Morgan J (2010) Shrouded attributes and information suppression: Evidence from the field. Quart. J. Econom. 125(2):859–876.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cai H, Wang JTY (2006) Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games. Games Econom. Behav. 56(1):7–36.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Camerer C, Lovallo D (1999) Overconfidence and excess entry: An experimental approach. Amer. Econom. Rev. 89(1):306–318.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Caplin A, Martin DJ (2020) Framing, Information, and Welfare. NBER Working Paper No. w27265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Carlin BI (2009) Strategic price complexity in retail financial markets. J. Financial Econom. 91(3):278–287.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Célérier C, Vallée B (2017) Catering to investors through security design: Headline rate and complexity. Quart. J. Econom. 132(3):1469–1508.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chetty R, Looney A, Kroft K (2009) Salience and taxation: Theory and evidence. Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(4):1145–1177.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Costa-Gomes MA, Weizsäcker G (2008) Stated beliefs and play in normal-form games. Rev. Econom. Stud. 75(3):729–762.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Crawford VP, Iriberri N (2007) Level‐k auctions: Can a nonequilibrium model of strategic thinking explain the winner’s curse and overbidding in private‐value auctions? Econometrica 75(6):1721–1770.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Crawford VP, Sobel J (1982) Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50(6):1431–1451.Crossref, Google Scholar
• DellaVigna S (2018) Structural behavioral economics. NBER Working Paper No. w24797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• DellaVigna S, Pollet JM (2005) Attention, demographics, and the stock market. NBER Working Paper No. w11211, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• DellaVigna S, Pollet JM (2009) Investor inattention and Friday earnings announcements. J. Finance 64(2):709–749.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Deversi M, Ispano A, Schwardmann P (2018) Spin Doctors: A Model and an Experimental Investigation of Vague Disclosure (Mimeo). CESifo Working Paper 7244.Google Scholar
• de Clippel G, Rozen K (2020) Communication, perception, and strategic obfuscation. Working paper, Brown University, Providence, RI.Google Scholar
• Dranove D, Jin GZ (2010) Quality disclosure and certification: Theory and practice. J. Econom. Literature 48(4):935–963.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dranove D, Kessler D, McClellan M, Satterthwaite M (2003) Is more information better? The effects of “report cards” on healthcare providers. J. Political Econom. 111(3):555–588.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Duarte F, Hastings JS (2012) Fettered consumers and sophisticated firms: Evidence from Mexico’s privatized social security market. NBER Working Paper No. w18582, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Eil D, Rao JM (2011) The good news-bad news effect: Asymmetric processing of objective information about yourself. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics 3(2):114–138.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ellison G (2005) A model of add-on pricing. Quart. J. Econom. 120(2):585–637.Google Scholar
• Ellison G, Ellison SF (2009) Search, obfuscation, and price elasticities on the internet. Econometrica 77(2):427–452.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ellison G, Wolitzky A (2012) A search cost model of obfuscation. RAND J. Econom. 43(3):417–441.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Englmaier F, Schmöller A, Stowasser T (2017) Price discontinuities in an online market for used cars. Management Sci. 64(6):2754–2766.Link, Google Scholar
• Eyster E, Rabin M (2005) Cursed equilibrium. Econometrica 73(5):1623–1672.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Schmidt KM (1999) A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quart. J. Econom. 114(3):817–868.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Feltovich N, Harbaugh R, To T (2002) Too cool for school? Signalling and countersignalling. RAND J. Econom. 33(4):630–649.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fischbacher U (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experiment. Econom. 10(2):171–178.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fischer M, Sliwka D (2018) Confidence in knowledge or confidence in the ability to learn: An experiment on the causal effects of beliefs on motivation. Games Econom. Behav. 111:122–142.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fishman MJ, Hagerty KM (2003) Mandatory vs. voluntary disclosure in markets with informed and uninformed customers. J. Law Econom. Organ. 19(1):45–63.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fung A, Graham M, Weil D (2007) Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gabaix X, Laibson D (2006) Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets. Quart. J. Econom. 121(2):505–540.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grether DM (1980) Bayes rule as a descriptive model: The representativeness heuristic. Quart. J. Econom. 95(3):537–557.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grossman SJ (1981) The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. J. Law Econom. 24(3):461–483.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grossman SJ, Hart OD (1980) Disclosure laws and takeover bids. J. Finance 35(2):323–334.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grubb MD (2011) Developing a reputation for reticence. J. Econom. Management Strategy 20(1):225–268.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grubb MD (2015) Overconfident consumers in the marketplace. J. Econom. Perspect. 29(4):9–36.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gu Y, Wenzel T (2015) Putting on a tight leash and levelling playing field: An experiment in strategic obfuscation and consumer protection. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 42:120–128.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hagenbach J, Perez-Richet E (2018) Communication with evidence in the laboratory. Games Econom. Behav. 112:139–165.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hanna R, Mullainathan S, Schwartzstein J (2014) Learning through noticing: Theory and evidence from a field experiment. Quart. J. Econom. 129(3):1311–1353.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Heidhues P, Kőszegi B, Murooka T (2016) Inferior products and profitable deception. Rev. Econom. Stud. 84(1):323–356.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hershfield HE, Roese NJ (2015) Dual payoff scenario warnings on credit card statements elicit suboptimal payoff decisions. J. Consumer Psych. 25(1):15–27.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hirshleifer D, Teoh SH (2003) Limited attention, information disclosure, and financial reporting. J. Accounting Econom. 36(1–3):337–386.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holt CA, Smith AM (2009) An update on Bayesian updating. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 69(2):125–134.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Huffman D, Raymond C, Shvets J (2018) Persistent Overconfidence and Biased Memory: Evidence from Managers (Mimeo). Working paper, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA.Google Scholar
• Jacob BA, Levitt SD (2003) Rotten apples: An investigation of the prevalence and predictors of teacher cheating. Quart. J. Econom. 118(3):843–877.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jehiel P (2005) Analogy-based expectation equilibrium. J. Econom. Theory 123(2):81–104.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jin GZ (2005) Competition and disclosure incentives: An empirical study of HMOs. RAND J. Econom. 36(1):93–112.Google Scholar
• Jin GZ, Luca M, Martin D (2021) Is no news (perceived as) bad news? An experimental investigation of information disclosure. Microeconomics. Amer. Econom. J. 13(2):141–173.Google Scholar
• Jovanovic B (1982) Truthful disclosure of information. Bell J. Econom. 13(1):36–44.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kalaycı K, Potters J (2011) Buyer confusion and market prices. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 29(1):14–22.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lacetera N, Pope DG, Sydnor JR (2012) Heuristic thinking and limited attention in the car market. Amer. Econom. Rev. 102(5):2206–2236.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Li YX, Schipper BC (2018) Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment (Mimeo).Google Scholar
• Lowenstein G, Sunstein CR, Golman R (2014) Disclosure: Psychology changes everything. Annual Rev. Econom. 6:391–419.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lu SF (2012) Multitasking, information disclosure, and product quality: Evidence from nursing homes. J. Econom. Management Strategy 21(3):673–705.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Luca M, Smith J (2013) Salience in quality disclosure: Evidence from the US News college rankings. J. Econom. Management Strategy 22(1):58–77.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Luca M, Smith J (2015) Strategic disclosure: The case of business school rankings. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 112:17–25.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Marinovic I, Varas F (2016) No news is good news: Voluntary disclosure in the face of litigation. RAND J. Econom. 47(4):822–856.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Martin D (2015) Rational inattention in games: Experimental evidence. Preprint, submitted October 16, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2674224.Google Scholar
• Martin D, Muñoz Rodriguez E (2019) Misperceiving Mechanisms: Imperfect Perception and the Failure to Recognize Dominant Strategies (Mimeo). SSRN Working Paper 3316346.Google Scholar
• Mathios AD (2000) The impact of mandatory disclosure laws on product choices: An analysis of the salad dressing market. J. Law Econom. 43(2):651–678.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Matthews S, Postlewaite A (1985) Quality testing and disclosure. RAND J. Econom. 16(3):328–340.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR (1995) Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games Econom. Behav. 10(1):6–38.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Milgrom PR (1981) Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications. Bell J. Econom. 12(2):380–391.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mobius MM, Niederle M, Niehaus P, Rosenblat TS (2011) Managing self-confidence: Theory and experimental evidence. NBER Working Paper No. w17014.Google Scholar
• Montero M, Sheth J (2019) Naivety about hidden information: An experimental investigation. CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ISSN 1749 – 3293.Google Scholar
• Moore DA, Healy PJ (2008) The trouble with overconfidence. Psych. Rev. 115(2):502–517.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mullainathan S, Schwartzstein J, Shleifer A (2008) Coarse thinking and persuasion. Quart. J. Econom. 123(2):577–619.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Perez-Richet E, Prady D (2012) Complicating to Persuade. Working paper, Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France.Google Scholar
• Pope DG (2009) Reacting to rankings: Evidence from “America’s Best Hospitals.” J. Health Econom. 28(6):1154–1165.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ru H, Schoar A (2016) Do credit card companies screen for behavioral biases? NBER Working Paper No. 22360, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Schwardmann P, Van der Weele J (2019) Deception and self-deception. Nature Human Behav. 3(10):1055–1061.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Serra-Garcia M, van Damme E, Potters J (2011) Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness. Games Econom. Behav. 73(1):244–261.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sheth J (2019) Disclosure of information under competition: An experimental study. SSRN Working Paper 3410940.Google Scholar
• Sitzia S, Zizzo DJ (2011) Does product complexity matter for competition in experimental retail markets? Theory Decision 70(1):65–82.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Spiegler R (2006) Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations. Theoretical Econom. 1(2):207–231.Google Scholar
• Sullivan M (2017) Economic Issues: Economic Analysis of Resort Fees. FTC Economic Issue Paper, Federal Trade Commission, Washington DC.Google Scholar
• Viscusi WK (1978) A note on “lemons” markets with quality certification. Bell J. Econom. 9(1):277–279.Crossref, Google Scholar