Parallel Lotteries: Insights from Alaskan Hunting Permit Allocation

References

• Abdulkadiroğlu A, Che Y-K, Yasuda Y (2011) Resolving conflicting preferences in school choice: The “Boston mechanism” reconsidered. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101(1):399–410.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Abdulkadiroğlu A, Che Y-K, Yasuda Y (2015) Expanding “choice” in school choice. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 7(1):1–42.Crossref, Google Scholar
• ADFG (2019) 2019-2020 Alaska drawing permit hunt supplement. Accessed April 4, 2019, https://www.adfg.alaska.gov/static/applications/web/nocache/license/huntlicense/pdfs/2019-2020_draw_supplement.pdfDDB3E5422A81D382A439F6878368477C/2019-2020_draw_supplement.pdf.Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I, Shi P (2015) Optimal allocation without money: An engineering approach. Management Sci. 62(4):1078–1097.Link, Google Scholar
• Azevedo EM, Leshno JD (2016) A supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets. J. Political Econom. 124(5):1235–1268.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cavallo R (2014) Incentive compatible two-tiered resource allocation without money. Proc. 2014 Internat. Conf. Autonomous Agents Multi-Agent Systems (IFAAMAS) in cooperation with the ACM (ACM, New York, NY), 1313–1320.Google Scholar
• Chade H, Smith L (2006) Simultaneous search. Econometrica 74(5):1293–1307.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dur U, Hammond RG, Morrill T (2018) Identifying the harm of manipulable school-choice mechanisms. Amer. Econom. J. Econom. Policy 10(1):187–213.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gale D (1976) The linear exchange model. J. Math. Econom. 3(2):205–209.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hylland A, Zeckhauser R (1979) The efficient allocation of individuals to positions. J. Political Econom. 87(2):293–314.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Immorlica N, Lucier B, Weyl G, Mollner J (2017) Approximate efficiency in matching markets. Proc. Internat. Conf. Web Internet Econom. (Springer, Berlin), 252–265.Google Scholar
• Miralles A (2009) School choice: The case for the Boston mechanism. Proc. Internat. Conf. Auctions Market Mechanisms Their Applications (Springer, Berlin), 58–60.Google Scholar
• Verdier V, Reeling C (2021) Welfare effects of dynamic matching: An empirical analysis. Rev. Econom. Stud. Forthcoming.Google Scholar