Public Signals, Default Risk, and Voluntary Disclosure

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01332

References

  • Acharya VV, DeMarzo P, Kremer I (2011) Endogenous information flows and the clustering of announcements. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101(7):2955–2979.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Aghamolla C, An B-J (2021) Voluntary disclosure with evolving news. J. Financial Econom. 140(1):21–53.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Anantharaman D, Zhang Y (2011) Cover me: Managers’ responses to changes in analyst coverage in the post-regulation FD period. Accounting Rev. 86(6):1851–1885.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Arya A, Glover J (1998) Debt and voluntary disclosure. Working paper, Ohio State University, Columbus.Google Scholar
  • Bagnoli M, Watts SG (2007) Financial reporting and supplemental voluntary disclosures. J. Accounting Res. 45(5):885–913.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Bakshi G, Skoulakis G (2010) Do subjective expectations explain asset pricing puzzles? J. Financial Econom. 98(3):462–477.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Balakrishnan K, Billings MB, Kelly B, Ljungqvist A (2014) Shaping liquidity: On the causal effects of voluntary disclosure. J. Finance 69(5):2237–2278.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Barron O, Kim O, Lim S, Stevens D (1998) Using analysts’ forecasts to measure properties of analysts’ information environment. Accounting Rev. 73(4):421–433.Google Scholar
  • Bertomeu J, Beyer A, Dye RA (2011) Capital structure, cost of capital, and voluntary disclosures. Accounting Rev. 86(3):857–886.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Bertomeu J, Hu PK, Liu Y (2023) Disclosure and investor inattention: Theory and evidence. Accounting Rev. 98(6):1–36.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Beyer A (2009) Capital market prices, management forecasts, and earnings management. Accounting Rev. 84(6):1713–1747.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Beyer A, Dye RA (2021) Debt and voluntary disclosure. Accounting Rev. 96(4):111–130.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Cianciaruso D, Lee-Lo D, Sridhar S (2016) Dynamic disclosures and the secondary market for loan sales. Working paper, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.Google Scholar
  • Collin-Dufresne P, Johannes M, Lochstoer LA (2016) Parameter learning in general equilibrium: The asset pricing implications. Amer. Econom. Rev. 106(3):664–698.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Daley LA, Senkow DW, Vigeland RL (1988) Analysts’ forecasts, earnings variability, and option pricing: Empirical evidence. Accounting Rev. 63(4):563–585. Google Scholar
  • DeGroot MH (1970) Optimal Statistical Decisions (John Wiley, Hoboken, NJ).Google Scholar
  • Ding P (2016) On the conditional distribution of the multivariate t distribution. Amer. Statist. 70(3):293–295.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Dutta S, Trueman B (2002) The interpretation of information and corporate disclosure strategies. Rev. Accounting Stud. 7(1):75–96.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Dye RA (1985) Disclosure of nonproprietary information. J. Accounting Res. 23(1):123–145.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Dye RA, Hughes JS (2018) Equilibrium voluntary disclosures, asset pricing, and information transfers. J. Accounting Econom. 66(1):1–24.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ebert M, Schäfer U, Schneider G (2021) Information leaks and voluntary disclosure. Working paper, University in Paderborn, Paderborn, Germany.Google Scholar
  • Einhorn E (2005) The nature of the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosures. J. Accounting Res. 43(4):593–621.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Einhorn E (2018) Competing information sources. Accounting Rev. 93(4):151–176.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Fang VW, Huang AH, Wang W (2017) Imperfect accounting and reporting bias. J. Accounting Res. 55(4):919–962.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Fischer PE, Verrecchia RE (1997) The effect of limited liability on the market response to disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Res. 14(3):515–541.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Foster FD, Viswanathan S (1993) The effect of public information and competition on trading volume and price volatility. Rev. Financial Stud. 6(1):23–56.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Frenkel S, Guttman I, Kremer I (2020) The effect of exogenous information on voluntary disclosure and market quality. J. Financial Econom. 138(1):176–192.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Friedman HL, Hughes JS, Michaeli B (2020) Optimal reporting when additional information might arrive. J. Accounting Econom. 69(2–3):101276.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Friedman HL, Hughes JS, Michaeli B (2022) A rationale for imperfect reporting standards. Management Sci. 68(3):2028–2046.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Goldstein I, Yang L (2017) Information disclosure in financial markets. Ann. Rev. Financial Econom. 9(1):101–125.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Gomez E, Gomez-Villegas MA, Marin JM (2003) A survey on continuous elliptical vector distributions. Rev. Mat. Complut. 16(1):346–361.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Graham JR, Harvey CR, Rajgopal S (2005) The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. J. Accounting Econom. 40(1):3–73.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Heinle MS, Smith KC (2017) A theory of risk disclosure. Rev. Accounting Stud. 22:1459–1491. CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Hughes JS, Pae S (2004) Voluntary disclosure of precision information. J. Accounting Econom. 37(2):261–289.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Hughes JS, Pae S (2014) Discretionary disclosure and efficiency of entrepreneurial investment. Contemporary Accounting Res. 31(4):982–1007.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Jorgensen B, Kirschenheiter M (2003) Discretionary risk disclosures. Accounting Rev. 78(2):449–469.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Jung W-O, Kwon YK (1988) Disclosure when the market is unsure of information endowment of managers. J. Accounting Res. 26(1):146–153.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Kim E, Pae S (2025) Voluntary disclosure when information quality is unknown. Accounting Rev. 100(2):269–297.Google Scholar
  • Kim JM, Taylor DJ, Verrecchia RE (2021) Voluntary disclosure when private information and disclosure costs are jointly determined. Rev. Accounting Stud. 26:971–1001.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Kirschenheiter M, Melumad ND (2002) Can “big bath” and earnings smoothing co-exist as equilibrium financial reporting strategies? J. Accounting Res. 40(3):761–796.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Langberg N, Sivaramakrishnan K (2008) Voluntary disclosures and information production by analysts. J. Accounting Econom. 46(1):78–100.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Langberg N, Sivaramakrishnan K (2010) Voluntary disclosures and analyst feedback. J. Accounting Res. 48(3):603–646.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Libgober J, Michaeli B, Wiedman E (2025) With a grain of salt: Investor reactions to uncertain news and (non)disclosure. J. Accounting Econom., ePub ahead of print June 13, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101802.Google Scholar
  • Magee RP, Sridhar S (1996) Financial contracts, opportunism, and disclosure management. Rev. Accounting Stud. 1(3):225–258.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Menon R (2020) Voluntary disclosures when there is an option to delay disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Res. 37(2):829–856.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Penno M (1996) Unobservable precision choices in financial reporting. J. Accounting Res. 34(1):141–149.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Petris G, Petrone S, Campagnoli P (2009) Dynamic Linear Models with R (Springer, Berlin).CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Samuels D, Taylor DJ, Verrecchia RE (2021) The economics of misreporting and the role of public scrutiny. J. Accounting Econom. 71(1):101340.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Subramanyam KR (1996) Uncertain precision and price reactions to information. Accounting Rev. 71(2): 207–219. Google Scholar
  • Suijs J (2007) Voluntary disclosure of information when firms are uncertain of investor response. J. Accounting Econom. 43(2–3):391–410.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Trueman B, Titman S (1988) An explanation for accounting income smoothing. J. Accounting Res. 26:127–139.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Vashishtha R (2014) The role of bank monitoring in borrowers’ discretionary disclosure: Evidence from covenant violations. J. Accounting Econom. 57(2):176–195.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Weitzman ML (2007) Subjective expectations and asset-return puzzles. Amer. Econom. Rev. 97(4):1102–1130.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.