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Available Issues

April 10, 2013 - June 5, 2026

Available Issues

April 10, 2013 - June 5, 2026

Market Liquidity and Competition Among Designated Market Makers

Published Online:29 Mar 2024https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01801

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