On Customer (Dis-)Honesty in Unobservable Queues: The Role of Lying Aversion

References

• Abeler J, Becker A, Falk A (2014) Representative evidence on lying costs. J. Public Econom. 113:96–104.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Abeler J, Nosenzo D, Raymond C (2019) Preferences for truth-telling. Econometrica 87(4):1115–1153.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Afeche P (2013) Incentive-compatible revenue management in queueing systems: Optimal strategic delay. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 15(3):423–443.Link, Google Scholar
• Afeche P, Mendelson H (2004) Pricing and priority auctions in queueing systems with a generalized delay cost structure. Management Sci. 50(7):869–882.Link, Google Scholar
• Afeche P, Pavlin JM (2016) Optimal price/lead-time menus for queues with customer choice: Segmentation, pooling, and strategic delay. Management Sci. 62(8):2412–2436.Link, Google Scholar
• Allon G, Hanany E (2012) Cutting in line: Social norms in queues. Management Sci. 58(3):493–506.Link, Google Scholar
• Allon G, Kremer M (2018) Behavioral foundations of queueing systems. Donohue K, Katok E, Leider S, eds. The Handbook of Behavioral Operations (Wiley Blackwell, Hoboken, NJ), 325–366.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Althenayyan A, Cui S, Ulku S, Yang L (2022) Not all lines are skipped equally: An experimental investigation of line-sitting and express lines. Preprint, submitted August 9, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4179751.Google Scholar
• Argon NT, Ziya S (2009) Priority assignment under imperfect information on customer type identities. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 11(4):674–693.Link, Google Scholar
• Armony M, Roels G, Song H (2021) Pooling queues with strategic servers: The effects of customer ownership. Oper. Res. 69(1):13–29.Link, Google Scholar
• Banciu M, Mirchandani P (2013) New results concerning probability distributions with increasing generalized failure rates. Oper. Res. 61(4):925–931.Link, Google Scholar
• BBC (2020a) Coronavirus: People without symptoms “misusing testing.” (September 9), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-54088206.Google Scholar
• BBC (2020b) Matt Hancock has urged coronavirus tests to be prioritised for key workers. Jade says she lied about her employment status to get a test. Accessed September 16, 2020, https://twitter.com/BBCBreakfast/status/1306109442295988224.Google Scholar
• Bren A, Saghafian S (2019) Data-driven percentile optimization for multiclass queueing systems with model ambiguity: Theory and application. INFORMS J. Optim. 1(4):267–287.Link, Google Scholar
• Buell RW (2021) Last-place aversion in queues. Management Sci. 67(3):1430–1452.Link, Google Scholar
• Celse J, Max S, Steinel W, Soraperra I, Shalvi S (2019) Uncertain lies: How payoff uncertainty affects dishonesty. J. Econom. Psych. 71:117–125.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Coffman Jr EG, Mitrani I (1980) A characterization of waiting time performance realizable by single-server queues. Oper. Res. 28(3 Part II):810–821.Link, Google Scholar
• Cox DR, Smith W (1991) Queues, vol. 2 (CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL).Google Scholar
• Dai Z, Galeotti F, Villeval MC (2018) Cheating in the laboratory predicts fraud in the field: An experiment in public transportation. Management Sci. 64(3):1081–1100.Link, Google Scholar
• DellaVigna S, List JA, Malmendier U, Rao G (2016) Voting to tell others. Rev. Econom. Stud. 84(1):143–181.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Duch RM, Laroze D, Zakharov A (2021) The moral cost of lying. Technical report, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.Google Scholar
• Dufwenberg M, Dufwenberg MA (2018) Lies in disguise—A theoretical analysis of cheating. J. Econom. Theory 175:248–264.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dugar S, Mitra A, Shahriar Q (2019) Deception: The role of uncertain consequences. Eur. Econom. Rev. 114:1–18.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fischbacher U, Föllmi-Heusi F (2013) Lies in disguise—An experimental study on cheating. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 11(3):525–547.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fries T, Parra D (2021) Because I (don’t) deserve it: Entitlement and lying behavior. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 185:495–512.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fries T, Gneezy U, Kajackaite A, Parra D (2021) Observability and lying. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 189:132–149.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gächter S, Schulz JF (2016) Intrinsic honesty and the prevalence of rule violations across societies. Nature 531(7595):496–499.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gibson R, Tanner C, Wagner AF (2013) Preferences for truthfulness: Heterogeneity among and within individuals. Amer. Econom. Rev. 103(1):532–548.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gneezy U, Kajackaite A, Sobel J (2018) Lying aversion and the size of the lie. Amer. Econom. Rev. 108(2):419–453.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gneezy U, Rockenbach B, Serra-Garcia M (2013) Measuring lying aversion. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 93:293–300.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hassin R, Haviv M (2003) To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems, vol. 59 (Springer Science & Business Media, New York).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Heather B (2017) Babylon pilot was not pursued by CCGs. Accessed January 29, 2020, https://www.hsj.co.uk/technology-and-innovation/babylon-pilot-was-not-pursued-by-ccgs/7021131.article.Google Scholar
• Hu M, Momot R, Wang J (2021) Privacy management in service systems. Technical report, University of Toronto, Toronto.Google Scholar
• Janezic KA (2020) Heterogeneity in lies and lying preferences. Working paper, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE, Barcelona, Spain.Google Scholar
• Jones J (2020) Take it from a paramedic: The ambulance service can’t keep up with demand. The Guardian (January 29), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/29/paramedic-ambulance-service-call-triage.Google Scholar
• Kaidan M (2020) Coronavirus UK: Supermarkets to prioritise vulnerable people with deliveries. Express (March 27), https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1261014/coronavirus-supermarket-news-vulnerable-delivery-priority-shopping-sainsburys-waitrose.Google Scholar
• Kajackaite A, Gneezy U (2017) Incentives and cheating. Games Econom. Behav. 102:433–444.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kartik N (2009) Strategic communication with lying costs. Rev. Econom. Stud. 76(4):1359–1395.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Khalmetski K, Sliwka D (2019) Disguising lies-image concerns and partial lying in cheating games. Amer. Econom. J. Microconomics 11(4):79–110.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kim S-H, Tong J, Peden C (2020) Admission control biases in hospital unit capacity management: How occupancy information hurdles and decision noise impact utilization. Management Sci. 66(11):5151–5170.Link, Google Scholar
• Kirton JA, Thompson W, Pearce M, Brown JM (2020) Ability of the wider dental team to triage patients with acute conditions: A qualitative study. British Dental J. 228(2):103–107.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kittsteiner T, Moldovanu B (2005) Priority auctions and queue disciplines that depend on processing time. Management Sci. 51(2):236–248.Link, Google Scholar
• Kleinrock L (1967) Optimum bribing for queue position. Oper. Res. 15(2):304–318.Link, Google Scholar
• Lariviere MA, Porteus EL (2001) Selling to the newsvendor: An analysis of price-only contracts. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 3(4):293–305.Link, Google Scholar
• Lui FT (1985) An equilibrium queuing model of bribery. J. Political Econom. 93(4):760–781.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Luo J, Valdés L, Linardi S (2022) Experienced and prospective wait in queues: A behavioral investigation. Preprint, submitted July 27, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4169028.Google Scholar
• Mendelson H, Whang S (1990) Optimal incentive-compatible priority pricing for the M/M/1 queue. Oper. Res. 38(5):870–883.Link, Google Scholar
• NPR (2021a) How people are jumping the covid-19 vaccine line. (February 9), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/02/09/965841419/does-loose-enforcement-of-vaccine-eligibility-rules-encourage-line-jumping.Google Scholar
• NPR (2021b) Is it ever ok to jump ahead in the vaccine line? (February 6), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/02/06/964139633/is-it-ever-ok-to-jump-ahead-in-the-vaccine-line?t=1623992132881.Google Scholar
• Özer Ö, Zheng Y, Chen K-Y (2011) Trust in forecast information sharing. Management Sci. 57(6):1111–1137.Link, Google Scholar
• Rosenbaum SM, Billinger S, Stieglitz N (2014) Let’s be honest: A review of experimental evidence of honesty and truth-telling. J. Econom. Psych. 45:181–196.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shunko M, Niederhoff J, Rosokha Y (2018) Humans are not machines: The behavioral impact of queueing design on service time. Management Sci. 64(1):453–473.Link, Google Scholar
• Singh S, Gurvich I, Van Mieghem JA (2022) Feature-based priority queuing. Preprint, submitted January 19, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3731865.Google Scholar
• Steinel W, Valtcheva K, Gross J, Celse J, Max S, Shalvi S (2022) (Dis)honesty in the face of uncertain gains or losses. J. Econom. Psych. 90:102487.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Syal R (2021) Thousands of vulnerable people missed out on support at start of pandemic. The Guardian (April 21), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/21/thousands-of-vulnerable-people-missed-out-on-support-at-start-of-pandemic.Google Scholar
• Ülkü S, Hydock C, Cui S (2020) Making the wait worthwhile: Experiments on the effect of queueing on consumption. Management Sci. 66(3):1149–1171.Link, Google Scholar
• Van der Zee S, Theil H (1961) Priority assignment in waiting-line problems under conditions of misclassification. Oper. Res. 9(6):875–885.Link, Google Scholar
• Van Mieghem JA (1995) Dynamic scheduling with convex delay costs: The generalized c mu rule. Ann. Appl. Probab. 5(3):809–833.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wang J, Zhou Y-P (2018) Impact of queue configuration on service time: Evidence from a supermarket. Management Sci. 64(7):3055–3075.Link, Google Scholar
• Weaver M, Proctor K (2020) No checks to be made on essential-worker status for UK COVID-19 tests. The Guardian (April 24), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/24/no-checks-to-be-made-on-essential-worker-status-for-uk-covid-19-tests.Google Scholar
• Wooldridge JM (2015) Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach (Cengage Learning, Boston).Google Scholar
• Yang L (2021) Invite your friend and you’ll move up in line: Optimal design of referral priority programs. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 23(5):1139–1156.Link, Google Scholar
• Yang L, Cui S, Wang Z (2022) Design of COVID-19 testing queues. Production Oper. Management 31(5):2204–2221.Crossref, Google Scholar