Optimal Subjective Contracting with Revision

References

• Baker G, Gibbons R, Murphy KJ (1994) Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts. Quart. J. Econom. 109(4):1125–1156.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bull C (1987) The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts. Quart. J. Econom. 102(1):147–159.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chan J, Zheng B (2011) Rewarding improvements: Optimal dynamic contracts with subjective evaluation. RAND J. Econom. 42(4):758–775.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cheng C (2021) Moral hazard in teams with subjective evaluations. RAND J. Econom. 52(1):22–48.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Deb J, Li J, Mukherjee A (2016) Relational contracts with subjective peer evaluations. RAND J. Econom. 47(1):3–28.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fuchs W (2007) Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations. Amer. Econom. Rev. 97(4):1432–1448.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fuchs W (2015) Subjective evaluations: Discretionary bonuses and feedback credibility. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 7(1):99–108.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grossman SJ, Hart OD (1983) An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica 51(1):7–45.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kamphorst JJ, Swank OH (2018) The role of performance appraisals in motivating employees. J. Econom. Management Strategy 27(2):251–269.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Letina I, Liu S, Netzer N (2020) Delegating performance evaluation. Theoretical Econom. 15(2):477–509.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levin J (2003) Relational incentive contracts. Amer. Econom. Rev. 93(3):835–857.Crossref, Google Scholar
• MacLeod WB (2003) Optimal contracting with subjective evaluation. Amer. Econom. Rev. 93(1):216–240.Crossref, Google Scholar
• MacLeod WB, Malcomson JM (1989) Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment. Econometrica 57(2):447–480.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maestri L (2012) Bonus payments vs. efficiency wages in the repeated principal-agent model with subjective evaluations. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 4(3):34–56.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Milgrom PR (1981) Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications. Bell J. Econom. 12(2):380–391.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rajan MV, Reichelstein S (2009) Objective vs. subjective indicators of managerial performance. Accounting Rev. 84(1):209–237.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zábojník J (2014) Subjective evaluations with performance feedback. RAND J. Econom. 45(2):341–369.Crossref, Google Scholar