Estimating Effects of Incentive Contracts in Online Labor Platforms

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4450

References

  • Adams WP, Forrester RJ, Glover FW (2004) Comparisons and enhancement strategies for linearizing mixed 0-1 quadratic programs. Discrete Optim. 1(2):99–120.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Anderson TW (1962) On the distribution of the two-sample Cramer-von Mises criterion. Ann. Math. Statist. 33(3):1148–1159.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Anderson TW, Darling DA (1952) Asymptotic theory of certain goodness of fit criteria based on stochastic processes. Ann. Math. Statist. 23(2):193–212.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Aswani A, Shen Z-J, Siddiq A (2018) Inverse optimization with noisy data. Oper. Res. 66(3):870–892.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Aswani A, Shen Z-JM, Siddiq A (2019) Data-driven incentive design in the Medicare Shared Savings Program. Oper. Res. 67(4):1002–1026.AbstractGoogle Scholar
  • Bajari P, Benkard CL, Levin J (2007) Estimating dynamic models of imperfect competition. Econometrica 75(5):1331–1370.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Barnhart C, Johnson EL, Nemhauser GL, Savelsbergh MWP, Vance PH (1998) Branch-and-price: Column generation for solving huge integer programs. Oper. Res. 46(3):316–329.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Bertsimas D, Tsitsiklis JN (1997) Introduction to Linear Optimization, vol. 6 (Athena Scientific, Belmont, MA).Google Scholar
  • Bertsimas D, Gupta V, Paschalidis IC (2015) Data-driven estimation in equilibrium using inverse optimization. Math. Programming 153(2):595–633.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Bickel PJ, Doksum KA (2015) Mathematical Statistics: Basic Ideas and Selected Topics, Volumes I-II Package (Chapman and Hall).Google Scholar
  • Breiman L (1996) Bagging predictors. Machine Learn. 24(2):123–140.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Casella G, Berger RL (2002) Statistical Inference, vol. 2 (Duxbury, Pacific Grove, CA).Google Scholar
  • Chan TCY, Lee T, Terekhov D (2019) Inverse optimization: Closed-form solutions, geometry, and goodness of fit. Management Sci. 65(3):1115–1135.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Cochran WG (1952) The Chi-squared test of goodness of fit. Ann. Math. Statist. 23(3):315–345.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Conover WJ (1972) A Kolmogorov goodness-of-fit test for discontinuous distributions. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 67(339):591–596.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • de Zegher JF, Iancu DA, Lee H (2019) Designing contracts and sourcing channels to create shared value. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management. 21(2):271–289.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Difallah D, Filatova E, Ipeirotis P (2018) Demographics and dynamics of mechanical turk workers. Proc. 11th ACM Internat. Conf. on Web Search and Data Mining (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 135–143.Google Scholar
  • Duflo E, Hanna R, Ryan SP (2012) Incentives work: Getting teachers to come to school. Amer. Econom. Rev. 102(4):1241–1278.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Esfahani PM, Shafieezadeh-Abadeh S, Grani A Hanasusanto DK (2018) Data-driven inverse optimization with imperfect information. Math. Programming 167(1):191–234.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ferrall C, Shearer B (1999) Incentives and transactions costs within the firm: Estimating an agency model using payroll records. Rev. Econom. Stud. 66(2):309–338.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • George-Levi G, Miller RA (2015) Identifying and testing models of managerial compensation. Rev. Econom. Stud. 82(3):1074–1118.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Georgiadis G, Powell M (2022) A/B contracts. Amer. Econom. Rev. 112(1):267–303.Google Scholar
  • Glover F (1975) Improved linear integer programming formulations of nonlinear integer problems. Management Sci. 22(4):455–460.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Grossman SJ, Hart OD (1983) An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica 51(1):7–45.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Hara K, Adams A, Milland K, Savage S, Callison-Burch C, Bigham JP (2018) A data-driven analysis of workers’ earnings on amazon mechanical turk. Proc. CHI Conf. on Human Factors in Comput. Systems (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 1–14.Google Scholar
  • Harris C (2011) You’re hired! An examination of crowdsourcing incentive models in human resource tasks. Proc. Workshop on Crowdsourcing for Search and Data Mining at the 4th ACM Internat. Conf. on Web Search and Data Mining (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 15–18.Google Scholar
  • Ho C-J, Slivkins A, Suri S, Vaughan JW (2015) Incentivizing high quality crowdwork. Proc. 24th Internat. Conf. on World Wide Web. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 419–429.Google Scholar
  • Holmstrom B (1979) Moral hazard and observability. Bell J. Econom. 10(1):74–91.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Horton JJ, Chilton LB (2010) The labor economics of paid crowdsourcing. Proc. 11th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce. 209–218.Google Scholar
  • Ipeirotis PG, Provost F, Wang J (2010) Quality management on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Proc. ACM SIGKDD Workshop on Human Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 64–67.Google Scholar
  • Keshavarz A, Wang Y, Boyd S (2011) Imputing a convex objective function. Proc. IEEE Internat. Sympos. on Intelligent Control (IEEE, Piscataway, NJ), 613–619.Google Scholar
  • Lee DKK, Zenios SA (2012) An evidence-based incentive system for Medicare’s End-Stage Renal Disease Program. Management Sci. 58(6):1092–1105.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Lubbecke ME, Desrosiers J (2005) Selected topics in column generation. Oper. Res. 53(6):1007–1023.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Luedtke J, Namazifar M, Linderoth J (2012) Some results on the strength of relaxations of multilinear functions. Math. Programming 136(2):325–351.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Lyft (2021) Ride challenges. Accessed March 30, 2021, https://help.lyft.com/hc/enca/articles/360001943867-Ride-Challenges.Google Scholar
  • Mason W, Watts DJ (2009) Financial incentives and the performance of crowds. Proc. ACM SIGKDD Workshop on Human Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 77–85.Google Scholar
  • Massey FJ (1951) The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for goodness of fit. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 46(253):68–78.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Misra S, Nair HS (2011) A structural model of sales-force compensation dynamics: Estimation and field implementation. Quant. Marketing Econom. 9(3):211–257.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Misra S, Coughlan AT, Narasimhan C (2005) Salesforce compensation: An analytical and empirical examination of the agency theoretic approach. Quant. Marketing Econom. 3(1):5–39.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Paarsch HJ, Shearer B (2000) Piece rates, fixed wages, and incentive effects: Statistical evidence from payroll records. Internat. Econom. Rev. 41(1):59–92.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Postmates (2021) How do bonuses and incentives work? Accessed March 30, 2021, https://support.postmates.com/fleet/articles/228603028-article-How-do-bonuses-and-incentives-work-.Google Scholar
  • Sappington DEM (1991) Incentives in principal-agent relationships. J. Econom. Perspectives 5(2):45–66.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Scholz FW, Stephens MA (1987) K-sample Anderson–Darling tests. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 82(399):918–924.Google Scholar
  • Shaw AD, Horton JJ, Chen DL (2011) Designing incentives for inexpert human raters. Proc. ACM Conf. on Computer Supported Cooperative Work (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 275–284.Google Scholar
  • Shearer B (2004) Piece rates, fixed wages and incentives: Evidence from a field experiment. Rev. Econom. Stud. 71(2):513–534.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Slakter MJ (1965) A comparison of the Pearson chi-square and Kolmogorov goodness-of-fit tests with respect to validity. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 60(311):854–858.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Smirnov N (1948) Table for estimating the goodness of fit of empirical distributions. Ann. Math. Statist. 19(2):279–281.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Stephens MA (1974) Edf statistics for goodness of fit and some comparisons. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 69(347):730–737.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Van der Vaart AW (2000) Asymptotic Statistics, vol. 3 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).Google Scholar
  • Vanderbeck F, Wolsey LA (1996) An exact algorithm for IP column generation. Oper. Res. Lett. 19(4):151–159.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Vera-Hernandez M (2003) Structural estimation of a principal-agent model: Moral hazard in medical insurance. RAND J. Econom. 34(4):670–693.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Yin M, Chen Y, Sun Y-A (2013) The effects of performance-contingent financial incentives in online labor markets. Proc. AAAI Conf. on Artificial Intelligence (Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, Menlo Park, CA), vol. 27.Google Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.