Help
Cart
Skip main navigation

Available Issues

April 10, 2013 - June 5, 2026

Available Issues

April 10, 2013 - June 5, 2026

How to De-Reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India

Published Online:11 Nov 2022https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4566

References

  • Abdulkadiroğlu A (2005) College admissions with affirmative action. Internat. J. Game Theory 33:535–549.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Abdulkadiroğlu A, Grigoryan A 2021. Priority-based assignment with reserves and quotas. NBER Working Paper.Google Scholar
  • Abdulkadiroğlu A, Sönmez T (2003) School choice: A mechanism design approach. Amer. Econom. Rev. 93:729–747.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Afacan MO (2017) Some further properties of the cumulative offer process. Games Econom. Behav. 104:656–665.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Ashoka Kumar Thakur (2008) Supreme Court Case. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1219385/.Google Scholar
  • Avataneo M, Turhan B (2021) Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers. Games Econom. Behav. 129:536–548.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Aygün O, Bó I (2021) College admissions with multidimensional privileges: The Brazilian affirmative action case. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 13(3):1–28.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Aygün O, Turhan B (2017) Large scale affirmative action in school choice: Admissions to IITs in India. Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(5):210–213.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Aygün O, Turhan B (2020) Dynamic reserves in matching markets. J. Econom. Theory 188:105069.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Aygün O, Turhan B (2022) Affirmative action in India: Restricted strategy space, complex constraints, and direct mechanism design. Working paper, Iowa State University, Ames.Google Scholar
  • Aygün O, Turhan B (2022b) Affirmative action in India via backward and forward transfers. Working paper, Iowa State University, Ames, IA.Google Scholar
  • Aziz H, Brandl F (2021) Efficient, fair, and incentive-compatible healthcare rationing. Preprint, submitted February 8, https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.04384.Google Scholar
  • Aziz H, Baychkov A, Biró P (2021) Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching. Preprint, submitted February 5, https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.02931.Google Scholar
  • Balinski M, Sönmez T (1999) A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement. J. Econom. Theory 84(1):73–94.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Baswana S, Chakrabarti PP, Chandran S, Kanoria Y, Patange U (2018) Centralized admissions for engineering colleges in India. INFORMS J. Appl. Anal. 49(5):338–354.Link, Google Scholar
  • Baswana S, Chakrabarti PP, Chandran S, Kanoria Y, Patange U (2019) Joint seat allocation 2018: An algorithmic perspective. Preprint, submitted April 14, https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.06698.Google Scholar
  • Correa J, Epstein R, Escobar J, Rios I, Bahamondes B, Bonet C, Epstein N, et al. (2019) School choice in Chile. Oper. Res. 70(2):1066–1087.Link, Google Scholar
  • Delacrétaz D (2021) Processing reserves simultaneously. Proc. 22nd ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (ACM, New York), 345–346.Google Scholar
  • Doğan B (2016) Responsive affirmative action in school choice. J. Econom. Theory 165:69–105.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Doğan B (2017) How to control controlled school choice. [Comment] Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(4):1362–1364.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Doğan B, Yildiz K (2021) Choice with affirmative action. Management Sci. ePub ahead of print June 8, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4447.Google Scholar
  • Dur U, Kominers SD, Pathak P, Sönmez T (2018) Reserve design: Unintended consequences and the demise of Boston’s walk zones. J. Political Econom. 126(6):2457–2479.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Echenique F, Yenmez B (2015) How to control controlled school choice. Amer. Econom. Rev. 105(8):2679–2694.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Ehlers L, Hafalir I, Yenmez B, Yildirim MA (2014) School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds vs. soft bounds. J. Econom. Theory 153:648–683.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Fragiadakis D, Troyan P (2017) Improving matching under hard distributional constraints. Theoret. Econom. 12(2):863–908.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly 69(1):9–15.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Gonczarowski Y, Kovalio L, Nisan N, Romm A (2020) Matching for the Israeli “Mechinot” gap-year programs: Handling rich diversity requirements. Preprint, submitted August 25, https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.00364v2.Google Scholar
  • Greenberg K, Pathak P, Sönmez T (2021) Mechanism design meets priority design: Redesigning the US Army’s branching process. NBER Working Paper No. 28911, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
  • Grigoryan A (2021) Effective, fair and equitable pandemic rationing. Preprint, submitted October 6, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3646539.Google Scholar
  • Hafalir IE, Yenmez B, Yildirim MA (2013) Effective affirmative action in school choice. Theoret. Econom. 8(2):325–363.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Hatfield JW, Kojima F (2010) Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts. J. Econom. Theory 145(5):1704–1723.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Hatfield JW, Milgrom P (2005) Matching with contracts. Amer. Econom. Rev. 95(4):913–935.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Hatfield JW, Kominers SD, Westkamp A (2021) Stability, strategy-proofness, and cumulative offer mechanism. Rev. Econom. Stud. 88(3):1457–1502.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Hirata D, Kasuya Y (2017) On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts. J. Econom. Theory 168:26–43.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Kamada Y, Kojima F (2015) Efficient matching under distributional constraints: Theory and applications. Amer. Econom. Rev. 105(1):67–99.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Kamada Y, Kojima F (2017) Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints. J. Econom. Theory 168:107–142.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Kesten O (2010) School choice with consent. Quart. J. Econom. 125(3):1297–1348.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Kojima F (2012) School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action. Games Econom. Behav. 75(2):685–693.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Kojima F, Tamura A, Yokoo M (2018) Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis. J. Econom. Theory 176:803–833.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Kominers SD, Sönmez T (2016) Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory. Theoret. Econom. 11(2):683–710.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Kurata R, Hamada N, Iwasaki A, Yokoo M (2017) Controlled school choice with soft bounds and overlapping types. J. Artificial Intelligence Res. 58:153–184.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Nguyen T, Vohra RR (2019) Stable matching with proportionality constraints. Oper. Res. 67(6):1503–1519.Link, Google Scholar
  • Pathak P, Rees-Jones A, Sönmez T (2020) Immigration lottery design: Engineered and coincidental consequences of H-1B reforms. NBER Working Paper No. 26767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Pathak P, Sönmez T, Ünver U, Yenmez B (2021) Fair allocation of vaccines, ventilators and antiviral treatments: Leaving no ethical value behind in health care rationing. NBER Working Paper No. 26951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
  • Sönmez T, Yenmez B (2022) Affirmative action in India via vertical, horizontal, and overlapping reservations. Econometrica 90(3):1143–1176.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Thakur A (2020) Matching in the civil service: A market design approach to public administration and development. Working paper, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.Google Scholar
  • Westkamp A (2013) An analysis of the German university admissions system. Econom. Theory 53(3):561–589.Crossref, Google Scholar
Previous
Back to Top
Next
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.
Agree