Hidden in Plain Sight: The Role of Corporate Board of Directors in Public Charity Lobbying

References

• Acemoglu D, Johnson S, Kermani A, Kwak J, Mitton T (2016) The value of connections in turbulent times: Evidence from the United States. J. Financial Econom. 121(2):368–391.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Akey P (2015) Valuing changes in political networks: Evidence from campaign contributions to close congressional elections. Rev. Financial Stud. 28(11):3188–3223.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Akey P, Lewellen S (2017) Policy uncertainty, political capital, and firm risk taking. Working paper, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France.Google Scholar
• Albuquerque R, Koskinen Y, Zhang C (2019) Corporate social responsibility and firm risk: Theory and empirical evidence. Management Sci. 65(10):4451–4469.Link, Google Scholar
• Ansolabehere S, de Figueiredo JM, Snyder JM Jr (2003) Why is there so little money in U.S. politics? J. Econom. Perspect. 17(1):105–130.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Babenko I, Fedaseyeu V, Zhang S (2020) Do CEOs affect employees’ political choices? Rev. Financial Stud. 33(4):1781–1817.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baker AC, Larcker DF, Wang CCY (2022) How much should we trust staggered difference-in-differences estimates? J. Financial Econom. 144(2):370–395.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baker SR, Bloom N, Davis SJ (2016) Measuring economic policy uncertainty. Quart. J. Econom. 131(4):1593–1636.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bénabou R, Tirole J (2006) Incentives and prosocial behavior. Amer. Econom. Rev. 96(5):1652–1678.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bénabou R, Tirole J (2010) Individual and corporate social responsibility. Economica 77(305):1–19.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bertrand M, Bombardini M, Trebbi F (2014) Is it whom you know or what you know? An empirical assessment of the lobbying process. Amer. Econom. Rev. 104(12):3885–3920.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bertrand M, Bombardini M, Fisman R, Trebbi F (2020) Tax-exempt lobbying: Corporate philanthropy as a tool for political influence. Amer. Econom. Rev. 110(7):2065–2102.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bertrand M, Bombardini M, Fisman R, Hackinen B, Trebbi F (2021) Hall of mirrors: Corporate philanthropy and strategic advocacy. Quart. J. Econom. 136(4):2413–2465.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Borghesi R, Houston JF, Naranjo A (2014) Corporate socially responsible investments: CEO altruism, reputation, and shareholder interests. J. Corporate Finance 26:164–181.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Borisov A, Goldman E, Gupta N (2016) The corporate value of (corrupt) lobbying. Rev. Financial Stud. 29(4):1039–1071.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brogaard J, Denes M, Duchin R (2021) Political influence and the renegotiation of government contracts. Rev. Financial Stud. 34(6):3095–3137.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brown WO, Helland E, Smith JK (2006) Corporate philanthropic practices. J. Corporate Finance 12(5):855–877.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cai Y, Xu J, Yang J (2021) Paying by donating: Corporate donations affiliated with independent directors. Rev. Financial Stud. 34(2):618–660.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Claessens S, Feijen E, Laeven L (2008) Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions. J. Financial Econom. 88(3):554–580.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cooper MJ, Gulen H, Ovtchinnikov AV (2010) Corporate political contributions and stock returns. J. Finance 65(2):687–724.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Correia MM (2014) Political connections and SEC enforcement. J. Accounting Econom. 57(2–3):241–262.Crossref, Google Scholar
• deShazo RD, Johnson M, Eriator I, Rodenmeyer K (2018) Backstories on the US opioid epidemic. Good intentions gone bad, an industry gone rogue, and watch dogs gone to sleep. Amer. J. Med. 131:595–601.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Duchin R, Sosyura D (2012) The politics of government investment. J. Financial Econom. 106(1):24–48.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fabisik K, Fahlenbrach R, Stulz RM, Taillard JP (2021) Why are firms with more managerial ownership worth less? J. Financial Econom. 140(3):699–725.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Faccio M (2006) Politically connected firms. Amer. Econom. Rev. 96(1):369–386.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Faccio M, Masulis RW, McConnell JJ (2006) Political connections and corporate bailouts. J. Finance 61(6):2597–2635.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ferguson T, Voth HJ (2008) Betting on Hitler—The value of political connections in Nazi Germany. Quart. J. Econom. 123(1):101–137.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fisman R (2001) Estimating the value of political connections. Amer. Econom. Rev. 91(4):1095–1102.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Flammer C (2018) Competing for government procurement contracts: The role of corporate social responsibility. Strategic Management J. 39(5):1299–1324.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gawande K, Bandyopadhyay U (2000) Is protection for sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman theory of endogenous protection. Rev. Econom. Statist. 82(1):139–152.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goldberg PK, Maggi G (1999) Protection for sale: An empirical investigation. Amer. Econom. Rev. 89(5):1135–1155.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goldman E, Rocholl J, So J (2009) Do politically connected boards affect firm value? Rev. Financial Stud. 22(6):2331–2360.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goldman E, Rocholl J, So J (2013) Politically connected boards of directors and the allocation of procurement contracts. Rev. Finance 17(5):1617–1648.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goodman-Bacon A (2021) Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment timing. J. Econometrics 225(2):254–277.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grossman GM, Helpman E (1994) Protection for sale. Amer. Econom. Rev. 84(4):833–850.Google Scholar
• Grossman GM, Helpman E (2001) Special Interest Politics (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Hassan TA, Hollander S, van Lent L, Tahoun A (2019) Firm-level political risk: Measurement and effects. Quart. J. Econom. 134(4):2135–2202.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hoepner AGF, Oikonomou I, Sautner Z, Starks LT, Zhou X (2024) ESG shareholder engagement and downside risk. Rev. Finance 28(2):483–510.Google Scholar
• Houston JF, Jiang L, Lin C, Ma Y (2014) Political connections and the cost of bank loans. J. Accounting Res. 52(1):193–243.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Igan D, Mishra P, Tressel T (2011) A fistful of dollars: Lobbying and the financial crisis. NBER Macroeconom. Annual 26(1):195–230.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Johnson S, Mitton T (2003) Cronyism and capital controls: Evidence from Malaysia. J. Financial Econom. 67(2):351–382.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Julio B, Yook Y (2012) Political uncertainty and corporate investment cycles. J. Finance 67(1):45–83.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kroszner RS, Strahan PE (1999) What drives deregulation? Economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions. Quart. J. Econom. 114(4):1437–1467.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Krüger P (2015) Corporate goodness and shareholder wealth. J. Financial Econom. 115(2):304–329.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lins KV, Servaes H, Tamayo A (2017) Social capital, trust, and firm performance: The value of corporate social responsibility during the financial crisis. J. Finance 72(4):1785–1824.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Masulis RW, Reza SW (2015) Agency problems of corporate philanthropy. Rev. Financial Stud. 28(2):592–636.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Masulis RW, Reza SW (2023) Private benefits of corporate philanthropy and distortions to corporate financing and investment decisions. Corporate Governance Internat. Rev. 31(3):464–490.Google Scholar
• Navarro P (1988) Why do corporations give to charity? J. Bus. 61(1):65–93.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ovtchinnikov AV, Pantaleoni E (2012) Individual political contributions and firm performance. J. Financial Econom. 105(2):367–392.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Reich R (2018) Just Giving: Why Philanthropy Is Failing Democracy and How It Can Do Better (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Snyder JM Jr (1990) Campaign contributions as investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980–1986. J. Political Econom. 98(6):1195–1227.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tullock G (1972) The purchase of politicians. Western Econom. J. 10:354–355.Google Scholar
• Yu F, Yu X (2011) Corporate lobbying and fraud detection. J. Financial Quant. Anal. 46(6):1865–1891.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zingales L (2012) A Capitalism for the People (Basic Books, New York).Google Scholar
• Zingales L (2017) Towards a political theory of the firm. J. Econom. Perspect. 31(3):113–130.Crossref, Google Scholar