Organizing Data Analytics

References

• Abeler J, Nosenzo D, Raymond C (2019) Preferences for truth-telling. Econometrica 87(4):1115–1153.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Adda J, Decker C, Ottaviani M (2020) P-hacking in clinical trials and how incentives shape the distribution of results across phases. Proc. National Acad. Sci. USA 117(24):13386–13392.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Aghion P, Tirole J (1997) Formal and real authority in organizations. J. Political Econom. 105(1):1–29.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Alizamir S, de Véricourt F, Wang S (2020) Warning against recurring risks: An information design approach. Management Sci. 66(10):4612–4629.Link, Google Scholar
• Alonso R, Câmara O (2016a) Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors. J. Econom. Theory 165:672–706.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Alonso R, Câmara O (2016b) Persuading voters. Amer. Econom. Rev. 106(11):3590–3605.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Alonso R, Matouschek N (2007) Relational delegation. RAND J. Econom. 38(4):1070–1089.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Argenziano R, Severinov S, Squintani F (2016) Strategic information acquisition and transmission. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 8(3):119–155.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Blackwell DA, Girshick MA (1954) Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions (John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ).Google Scholar
• Blume A, Board OJ, Kawamura K (2007) Noisy talk (2007-12-13). Theoretical Econom. 2(4):395–440.Google Scholar
• Boleslavsky R, Cotton CS, Gurnani H (2017) Demonstrations and price competition in new product release. Management Sci. 63(6):2016–2026.Link, Google Scholar
• Bolton P, Dewatripont M (2013) Authority in organizations a survey. Gibbons R, Roberts J, eds. The Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ), 342–372.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brynjolfsson E, McElheran K (2016) The rapid adoption of data-driven decision-making. Amer. Econom. Rev. 106(5):133–139.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brynjolfsson E, Hitt LM, Kim HH (2011) Strength in numbers: How does data-driven decisionmaking affect firm performance? Preprint, submitted April 24, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1819486.Google Scholar
• Che Y-K, Kartik N (2009) Opinions as incentives. J. Political Econom. 117(5):815–860.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Crawford VP, Sobel J (1982) Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50(6):1431.Crossref, Google Scholar
• de Véricourt F, Gurkan H, Wang S (2021) Informing the public about a pandemic. Management Sci. 67(10):6350–6357.Link, Google Scholar
• Deimen I, Szalay D (2019) Delegated expertise, authority, and communication. Amer. Econom. Rev. 109(4):1349–1374.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Demski JS, Sappington DEM (1987) Delegated expertise. J. Accounting Res. 25(1):68.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dessein W (2002) Authority and communication in organizations. Rev. Econom. Stud. 69(4):811–838.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dewatripont M, Tirole J (1999) Advocates. J. Political Econom. 107(1):1–39.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dewatripont M, Jewitt I, Tirole J (2000) Multitask agency problems: Focus and task clustering. Eur. Econom. Rev. 44(4–6):869–877.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Drakopoulos K, Jain S, Randhawa R (2021) Persuading customers to buy early: The value of personalized information provisioning. Management Sci. 67(2):828–853.Link, Google Scholar
• Felgenhauer M, Loerke P (2017) Bayesian persuasion with private experimentation. Internat. Econom. Rev. 58(3):829–856.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fréchette G, Lizzeri A, Perego J (2022) Rules and commitment in communication: An experimental analysis. Econometrica 90(5):2283–2318.Google Scholar
• Friedman HL, Hughes JS, Michaeli B (2022) A rationale for imperfect reporting standards. Management Sci. 68(3):2028–2046.Link, Google Scholar
• Gentzkow M, Kamenica E (2016) Disclosure of endogenous information. Econom. Theory Bull. 5(1):47–56.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gibbons R, Matouschek N, Roberts J (2013) Decisions in organizations. Gibbons R, Roberts J, eds. The Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ), 373–431.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gneezy U (2005) Deception: The role of consequences. Amer. Econom. Rev. 95(1):384–394.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goldfarb A, Tucker C (2019) Digital economics. J. Econom. Literature 57(1):3–43.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guo Y, Shmaya E (2019) The interval structure of optimal disclosure. Econometrica 87(2):653–675.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guo Y, Shmaya E (2021) Costly miscalibration. Theoretical Econom. 16(2):477–506.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hoffmann F, Inderst R, Ottaviani M (2020) Persuasion through selective disclosure: Implications for marketing, campaigning, and privacy regulation. Management Sci. 66(11):4958–4979.Link, Google Scholar
• Holmstrom B, Milgrom P (1991) Multitask principal–agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J. Law Econom. Organ. 7(special_issue):24–52.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kamenica E, Gentzkow M (2011) Bayesian persuasion. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101(6):2590–2615.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kartik N (2009) Strategic communication with lying costs. Rev. Econom. Stud. 76(4):1359–1395.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kartik N, Ottaviani M, Squintani F (2007) Credulity, lies, and costly talk. J. Econom. Theory 134(1):93–116.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kolotilin A (2018) Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach. Theoretical Econom. 13(2):607–635.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kolotilin A, Mylovanov T, Zapechelnyuk A, Li M (2017) Persuasion of a privately informed receiver. Econometrica 85(6):1949–1964.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kolstad CD, Ulen TS, Johnson GV (1990) Ex post liability for harm vs. ex ante safety regulation: Substitutes or complements? Amer. Econom. Rev. 80(4):888–901.Google Scholar
• KPMG (2016) Building trust in analytics. Technical report, KPMG International Data Analytics, Zurich, Switzerland.Google Scholar
• Landier A, Sraer D, Thesmar D (2009) Optimal dissent in organizations. Rev. Econom. Stud. 76(2):761–794.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lennox C, Wu X (2022) Mandatory internal control audits, audit adjustments, and financial reporting quality: Evidence from china. Accounting Rev. 97(1):341–364.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lewis TR, Sappington DEM (1997) Information management in incentive problems. J. Political Econom. 105(4):796–821.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Libgober J (2022) False positives and transparency. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 14(2):478–505.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lipnowski E, Ravid D, Shishkin D (2018) Persuasion via weak institutions. Preprint, submitted May 10, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3168103.Google Scholar
• Lipnowski E, Ravid D, Shishkin D (2022) Persuasion via weak institutions. J. Political Econom. 130(10):2705–2730.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Marino AM (1988) Monopoly, liability and regulation. South. Econom. J. 54(4):913–927.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McKinsey & Co (2017) Advanced analytics: Nine insights from the c-suite. Technical report, McKinsey Analytics, New York.Google Scholar
• McKinsey & Co (2018a) Breaking away: The secrets to scaling analytics. Technical report, McKinsey Analytics, New York.Google Scholar
• McKinsey & Co (2018b) Building an effective analytics organization. Technical report, McKinsey on Payments.Google Scholar
• Milgrom P, Shannon C (1994) Monotone comparative statics. Econometrica 62(1):157–180.Google Scholar
• Min D (2021) Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment. Econom. Theory 72(3):743–764. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01386-1.Google Scholar
• Nayeem OA (2017) Bend them but don’t break them: Passionate workers, skeptical managers, and decision making in organizations. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 9(3):100–125.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nguyen A, Tan TY (2021) Bayesian persuasion with costly messages. J. Econom. Theory 193:105212.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pei HD (2015) Communication with endogenous information acquisition. J. Econom. Theory 160:132–149.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Perez-Richet E, Skreta V (2021) Test design under falsification. CEPR Discussion Papers 15627, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.Google Scholar
• Pfeffer J, Sutton RI (2006) Evidence-based management. Harvard Bus. Rev. 84(1):62.Google Scholar
• Schmitz PW (2013) Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered. Eur. Econom. Rev. 57:108–117.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Schweizer N, Szech N (2018) Optimal revelation of life-changing information. Management Sci. 64(11):5250–5262.Link, Google Scholar
• Shah S, Horne A, Capellá J (2012) Good data won’t guarantee good decisions. Harvard Bus. Rev. 90(4):23–25.Google Scholar
• Shavell S (1984a) Liability for harm vs. regulation of safety. J. Legal Stud. 13(2):357–374.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shavell S (1984b) A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation. RAND J. Econom. 15(2):271–280.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sobel J (2020) Lying and deception in games. J. Political Econom. 128(3):907–947.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Szydlowski M (2021) Optimal financing and disclosure. Management Sci. 67(1):436–454.Link, Google Scholar
• Tapscott D, Tapscott A (2017) How blockchain will change organizations. MIT Sloan Management Rev. 58(2):10.Google Scholar
• Tillio AD, Ottaviani M, Sørensen PN (2017) Persuasion bias in science: Can economics help? Econom. J. (London) 127(605):F266–F304.Google Scholar
• Tillio AD, Ottaviani M, Sørensen PN (2021) Strategic sample selection. Econometrica 89(2):911–953.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wu L, Hitt L, Lou B (2020) Data analytics, innovation, and firm productivity. Management Sci. 66(5):2017–2039.Link, Google Scholar