Network-Motivated Forbearance Lending

References

• Acemoglu D, Carvalho V, Ozdaglar A, Tahbaz-Salehi A (2012) The network origins of aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica 80(5):1977–2016.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Acharya VV, Eisert T, Eufinger C, Hirsch C (2019) Whatever it takes: The real effects of unconventional monetary policy. Rev. Financial Stud. 32(9):3366–3411.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Azizpour S, Giesecke K, Schwenkler G (2018) Exploring the sources of default clustering. J. Financial Econom. 129(1):154–183.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baqaee DR (2018) Cascading failures in production networks. Econometrica 86(5):1819–1838.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barrot JN, Sauvagnat J (2016) Input specificity and the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in production networks. Quart. J. Econom. 131(3):1543–1592.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Berglöf E, Roland G (1997) Soft budget constraints and credit crunches in financial transition. Eur. Econom. Rev. 41(3–5):807–817.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bernstein S, Colonnelli E, Giroud X, Iverson B (2019) Bankruptcy spillovers. J. Financial Econom. 133(3):608–633.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bigio S, La’o J (2016) Financial frictions in production networks. NBER Working Paper No. 22212, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Boissay F, Gropp R (2013) Payment defaults and interfirm liquidity provision. Rev. Finance 17(6):1853–1894.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Boot AWA, Thakor AV (2000) Can relationship banking survive competition? J. Finance 55(2):679–713.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bruche M, Llobet G (2014) Preventing zombie lending. Rev. Financial Stud. 27(3):923–956.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Caballero RJ, Hoshi T, Kashyap AK (2008) Zombie lending and depressed restructuring in Japan. Amer. Econom. Rev. 98(5):1943–1977.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Campello M, Gao J (2017) Customer concentration and loan contract terms. J. Financial Econom. 123(1):108–136.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Carvalho VM, Nirei M, Saito YU, Tahbaz-Salehi A (2021) Supply chain disruptions: Evidence from the Great East Japan Earthquake. Quart. J. Econom. 136(2):1255–1321.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen TK, Liao HH, Kuo HJ (2013) Internal liquidity risk, financial bullwhip effects, and corporate bond yield spreads: Supply chain perspectives. J. Banking Finance 37(7):2434–2456.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Degryse H, van Cayseele P (2000) Relationship lending within a bank-based system: Evidence from European small business data. J. Financial Intermediation 9(1):90–109.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Demange G (2018) Contagion in financial network: A threat index. Management Sci. 64(2):955–970.Link, Google Scholar
• Dewatripont MF, Maskin ES (1995) Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies. Rev. Econom. Stud. 62(4):541–555.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dupor B (1999) Aggregation and irrelevance in multi-sector models. J. Monetary Econom. 43(2):391–409.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Faria-e-Castro M, Paul P, Sánchez JM (2024) Evergreening. J. Financial Econom. 153(March):103778.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Favara G, Giannetti M (2017) Forced asset sales and the concentration of outstanding debt: Evidence from the mortgage market. J. Finance 72(3):1081–1118.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Giannetti M, Saidi F (2019) Shock propagation and banking structure. Rev. Financial Stud. 32(7):2499–2540.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gupta D (2022) Too much skin-in-the-game? The effect of mortgage market concentration on credit and house prices. Rev. Financial Stud. 35(2):814–865.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hertzel MG, Li Z, Officer MS, Rodgers KJ (2008) Inter-firm linkages and the wealth effects of financial distress along the supply chain. J. Financial Econom. 87(2):374–387.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Horvath M (2000) Sectoral shocks and aggregate fluctuations. J. Monetary Econom. 45(1):69–106.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ioannidou V, Ongena S (2010) Time for a change: Loan conditions and bank behavior when firms switch banks. J. Finance 65(5):1847–1877.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jacobson T, von Schedvin E (2015) Trade credit and the propagation of corporate failure: An empirical analysis. Econometrica 83(4):1315–1371.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Landier A, Sraer D, Thesmar D (2011) The risk-shifting hypothesis: Evidence from subprime originations. Preprint, submitted March 17, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1786542.Google Scholar
• Leitner Y (2005) Financial networks: Contagion, commitment, and private sector bailouts. J. Finance 60(6):2925–2953.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Long JB, Plosser CI (1983) Real business cycles. J. Political Econom. 91(6):39–69.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McKinnon JD, Solomon D, Hitt G (2008) Detroit gets access to bailout funds. Wall Street Journal (December 13), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122909133751001705?msockid=1c73c2a4b1546cb63716d697b0f56d20.Google Scholar
• Myers SC (1977) Determinants of corporate borrowing. J. Financial Econom. 5(2):147–175.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nikkei (2006) Rettou kin’yu fairu Tochigi hatsu [Archipelago finance file from Tochigi]. (February 28), 3.Google Scholar
• Okazaki T, Okuno M, Ueda K, Ishii S, Hori N (2002) Sengo Nihon No Shikin Haibun [Fund Allocation in Postwar Japan] (University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo).Google Scholar
• Peek J, Rosengren ES (2005) Unnatural selection: Perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in Japan. Amer. Econom. Rev. 95(4):1144–1166.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rajan RG (1992) Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm’s-length debt. J. Finance 47(4):191–212.Google Scholar
• Rogers LCG, Veraart LAM (2013) Failure and rescue in an interbank network. Management Sci. 59(4):882–898.Link, Google Scholar
• Sekine T, Kobayashi K, Saita Y (2003) Forbearance lending: The case of Japanese firms. Monetary Econom. Stud. 21(2):69–92.Google Scholar
• Sharpe S (1990) Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: A stylized model of customer relationships. J. Finance 45(4):1069–1087.Google Scholar
• Tarski A (1955) A lattice theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications. Pacific J. Math. 5(2):285–309.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zhou L (1994) The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice. Games Econom. Behav. 7(2):295–300.Crossref, Google Scholar