Strategy-Proofness Made Simpler

References

• Abdulkadiroğlu A, Sönmez T (2003) School choice: A mechanism design approach. Amer. Econom. Rev. 93(3):729–747.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Andreoni J, Che Y-K, Kim J (2007) Asymmetric information about rivals’ types in standard auctions: An experiment. Games Econom. Behav. 59(2):240–259.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Artemov G, Che Y-K, He YH (2023) Stable matching with mistaken agents. J. Polit. Econom. Microeconom. 1(2):270–320.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I, Gonczarowski YA (2018) Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof. J. Econom. Theory 177:405–425.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Azevedo EM, Leshno JD (2016) A supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets. J. Polit. Econom. 124(5):1235–1268.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Braun S, Dwenger N, Kübler D, Westkamp A (2014) Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis. Games Econom. Behav. 85:232–251.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cason TN, Plott CR (2014) Misconceptions and game form recognition: Challenges to theories of revealed preference and framing. J. Polit. Econom. 122(6):1235–1270.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Charness G, Levin D (2009) The origin of the winner’s curse: A laboratory study. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 1(1):207–236.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen L, Pereyra JS (2019) Self-selection in school choice. Games Econom. Behav. 117:59–81.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen Y, Sönmez T (2006) School choice: An experimental study. J. Econom. Theory 127(1):202–231.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen DL, Schonger M, Wickens C (2016) oTree—An open-source platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments. J. Behav. Experiment. Finance 9:88–97.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen R, Katuščák P, Kittsteiner T, Kütter K (2024) Does disappointment aversion explain non-truthful reporting in strategy-proof mechanisms? Experiment. Econom. Forthcoming.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cokely ET, Galesic M, Schulz E, Ghazal S, Garcia-Retamero R (2012) Measuring risk literacy: The Berlin Numeracy Test. Judgment Decision Making 7(1):25–47.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cooper DJ, Fang H (2008) Understanding overbidding in second price auctions: An experimental study. Econom. J. 118(532):1572–1595.Google Scholar
• Ding T, Schotter A (2019) Learning and mechanism design: An experimental test of school matching mechanisms with intergenerational advice. Econom. J. 129(623):2779–2804.Google Scholar
• Dreyfuss B, Heffetz O, Rabin M (2022a) Expectations-based loss aversion may help explain seemingly dominated choices in strategy-proof mechanisms. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 14(4):515–555.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dreyfuss B, Glicksohn O, Heffetz O, Romm A (2022b) Deferred acceptance with news utility. NBER Working Paper 30635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Esponda I, Vespa E (2024) Contingent thinking and the sure-thing principle: Revisiting classic anomalies in the laboratory. Rev. Econom. Stud. 91(5):2806–2831.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly 69(1):9–15.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gonczarowski YA, Heffetz O, Thomas C (2023) Strategyproofness-exposing mechanism descriptions. NBER Working Paper 31506, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Greiner B (2015) Subject pool recruitment procedures: Organizing experiments with ORSEE. J. Econom. Sci. Assoc. 1(1):114–125.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gross B, DeArmond M, Denice P (2015) Common enrollment, parents, and school choice: Early evidence from Denver and New Orleans. Technical Report, Center on Reinventing Public Education, Seattle.Google Scholar
• Guillen P, Hakimov R (2017) Not quite the best response: Truth-telling, strategy-proof matching, and the manipulation of others. Experiment. Econom. 20(3):670–686.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guillen P, Hakimov R (2018) The effectiveness of top-down advice in strategy-proof mechanisms: A field experiment. Eur. Econom. Rev. 101(Suppl. C):505–511.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guillen P, Hing A (2014) Lying through their teeth: Third party advice and truth telling in a strategy proof mechanism. Eur. Econom. Rev. 70:178–185.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hakimov R, Kübler D (2021) Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: A survey. Experiment. Econom. 24:434–488.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hammond PJ (1979) Straightforward individual incentive compatibility in large economies. Rev. Econom. Stud. 46(2):263–282.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Harstad RM (2000) Dominant strategy adoption and bidders’ experience with pricing rules. Experiment. Econom. 3(3):261–280.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hassidim A, Romm A, Shorrer RI (2021) The limits of incentives in economic matching procedures. Management Sci. 67(2):951–963.Link, Google Scholar
• Hassidim A, Marciano D, Romm A, Shorrer RI (2017) The mechanism is truthful, why aren’t you? Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(5):220–224.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kagel JH, Levin D (1993) Independent private value auctions: Bidder behaviour in first-, second- and third-price auctions with varying numbers of bidders. Econom. J. 103(419):868–879.Google Scholar
• Kagel JH, Harstad RM, Levin D (1987) Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: A laboratory study. Econometrica 55(6):1275–1304.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Klijn F, Pais J, Vorsatz M (2019) Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment. Games Econom. Behav. 113:147–163.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kloosterman A, Troyan P (2023) Rankings-dependent preferences: A real goods matching experiment. Preprint, submitted May 5, https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.03644.Google Scholar
• Köszegi B (2006) Ego utility, overconfidence, and task choice. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 4(4):673–707.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lee JY, Nayga RM Jr, Deck C, Drichoutis AC (2020) Cognitive ability and bidding behavior in second price auctions: An experimental study. Amer. J. Agric. Econom. 102(5):1494–1510.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Leshno JD, Lo I (2021) The cutoff structure of top trading cycles in school choice. Rev. Econom. Stud. 88(4):1582–1623.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Li S (2017) Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms. Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(11):3257–3287.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Martínez-Marquina A, Niederle M, Vespa E (2019) Failures in contingent reasoning: The role of uncertainty. Amer. Econom. Rev. 109(10):3437–3474.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Meisner V (2023) Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness. Management Sci. 69(5):2733–2745.Link, Google Scholar
• Meisner V, von Wangenheim J (2023) Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms. J. Econom. Theory 207:105588.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Morgan J, Steiglitz K, Reis G (2003) The spite motive and equilibrium behavior in auctions. Contributions Econom. Anal. Policy 2(1):1–25.Google Scholar
• Opitz T, Schwaiger C (2023a) Everyone likes to be liked: Experimental evidence from matching markets. Accessed July 19, 2023, https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/94023/1/366-1.pdf.Google Scholar
• Opitz T, Schwaiger C (2023b) Reciprocal preferences in matching markets. Preprint, submitted March 11, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=4365472.Google Scholar
• Pais J, Pintér Á (2008) School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms. Games Econom. Behav. 64(1):303–328.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rees-Jones A (2018) Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency match. Games Econom. Behav. 108:317–330.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rees-Jones A, Shorrer RI (2023) Behavioral economics in education market design: A forward-looking review. J. Polit. Econom. Microeconom. 1(3):557–613.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rees-Jones A, Skowronek S (2018) An experimental investigation of preference misrepresentation in the residency match. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 115(45):11471–11476.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shapley L, Scarf H (1974) On cores and indivisibility. J. Math. Econom. 1(1):23–37.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shorrer RI, Sóvágó S (2023) Dominated choices in a strategically simple college admissions environment. J. Polit. Econom. Microeconom. 1(4):781–807.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Troyan P (2019) Obviously strategy-poof implementation of top trading cycles. Internat. Econom. Rev. 60(3):1249–1261.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zhang L, Levin D (2021) Partition obvious preference and mechanism design: Theory and experiment. Preprint, submitted November 11, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2927190.Google Scholar