Blocking Block Formation: Evidence from Private Loan Contracts

References

• Aghion P, Bolton P (1992) Distribution and growth in models of imperfect capital markets. Eur. Econom. Rev. 36(2–3):603–611.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Agrawal A, Knoeber CR (1998) Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover. J. Financial Econom. 47(2):219–239.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Akins B, De Angelis D, Gaulin M (2020) Debt contracting on management. J. Finance 75(4):2095–2137.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Amihud Y (2002) Illiquidity and stock returns: Cross-section and time-series effects. J. Financial Markets 5(1):31–56.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Amiram D, Beaver WH, Landsman WR, Zhao J (2017) The effects of credit default swap trading on information asymmetry in syndicated loans. J. Financial Econom. 126(2):364–382.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Angrist JD, Pischke JS (2009) Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Armstrong C, Kepler JD, Samuels D, Taylor D (2022) Causality redux: The evolution of empirical methods in accounting research and the growth of quasi-experiments. J. Accounting Econom. 74(2–3):101521.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Artiga González T, Calluzzo P (2019) Clustered shareholder activism. Corporate Governance 27(3):210–225.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Aslan H, Kumar P (2012) Strategic ownership structure and the cost of debt. Rev. Financial Stud. 25(7):2257–2299.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Aslan H, Kumar P (2016) The product market effects of hedge fund activism. J. Financial Econom. 119(1):226–248.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Aslan H, Maraachlian H (2007) Wealth effects of hedge fund activism. Working paper, Georgia State University, Atlanta.Google Scholar
• Bebchuk LA, Cohen A, Ferrell A (2009) What matters in corporate governance? Rev. Financial Stud. 22:783–827.Google Scholar
• Bebchuk LA, Jackson RJ Jr, Jiang W (2013) Pre-disclosure accumulations by activist investors: Evidence and policy. J. Corporation Law 39:1–34.Google Scholar
• Bebchuk LA, Brav A, Jiang W, Keusch T (2020) Dancing with activists. J. Financial Econom. 137(1):1–41.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Becher DA, Griffin TP, Nini G (2022) Creditor control of corporate acquisitions. Rev. Financial Stud. 35(4):1897–1932.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bellucci MJ, McCluskey J (2017) The LSTA’s Complete Credit Agreement Guide (McGraw-Hill Education, New York).Google Scholar
• Benoit D (2014) How Lions Gate defeated Carl Icahn. Wall Street Journal (March 13), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-MBB-18012.Google Scholar
• Bereskin FL, Cicero DC (2013) CEO compensation contagion: Evidence from an exogenous shock. J. Financial Econom. 107(2):477–493.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Berrin D (2010) Jewish billionaire Carl Icahn wants to buy all of Lionsgate. Jewish J. (March 19), https://jewishjournal.com/uncategorized/77696/.Google Scholar
• Betton S, Eckbo BE (2000) Toeholds, bid jumps, and expected payoffs in takeovers. Rev. Financial Stud. 13(4):841–882.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Betton S, Eckbo BE, Thorburn KS (2009) Merger negotiations and the toehold puzzle. J. Financial Econom. 91(2):158–178.Google Scholar
• Bradley M, Roberts MR (2015) The structure and pricing of corporate debt covenants. Quart. J. Finance 5(2):1550001.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brav A, Dasgupta A, Mathews R (2021) Wolf pack activism. Management Sci. 68(8):5557–5568.Link, Google Scholar
• Brav A, Jiang W, Partnoy F, Thomas R (2008) Hedge fund activism, corporate governance, and firm performance. J. Finance 63(4):1729–1775.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bulow J, Huang M, Klemperer P (1999) Toeholds and takeovers. J. Political Econom. 107(3):427–454.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Burkart M, Dasgupta A (2021) Competition for flow and short-termism in activism. Rev. Corporate Finance Stud. 10(1):44–81.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bushee BJ (1998) The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. Accounting Rev. 73(3):305–333.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cain MD, McKeon SB, Solomon SD (2017) Do takeover laws matter? Evidence from five decades of hostile takeovers. J. Financial Econom. 124(3):464–485.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chava S, Roberts MR (2008) How does financing impact investment? The role of debt covenants. J. Finance 63(5):2085–2121.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chava S, Kumar P, Warga A (2010) Managerial agency and bond covenants. Rev. Financial Stud. 23(3):1120–1148.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chava S, Livdan D, Purnanandam A (2009) Do shareholder rights affect the cost of bank loans? Rev. Financial Stud. 22(8):2973–3004.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cook DO, Easterwood JC (1994) Poison put bonds: An analysis of their economic role. J. Finance 49(5):1905–1920.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Corum AA, Levit D (2019) Corporate control activism. J. Financial Econom. 133(1):1–17.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Crabbe L (1991) Event risk: An analysis of losses to bondholders and “super poison put” bond covenants. J. Finance 46(2):689–706.Google Scholar
• Crane AD, Koch A, Michenaud S (2019) Institutional investor cliques and governance. J. Financial Econom. 133(1):175–197.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cremers M, Guernsey S, Sepe SM (2019) Stakeholder orientation and firm value. Working paper, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN.Google Scholar
• Cremers M, Nair VB, Wei C (2007) Governance mechanisms and bond prices. Rev. Financial Stud. 20(5):1359–1388.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dahiya S, Hallak I, Matthys T (2020) Targeted by an activist hedge fund, do the lenders care? J. Corporate Finance 62:101600.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Eaton GW, Irvine PJ, Liu T (2021) Measuring institutional trading costs and the implications for finance research: The case of tick size reductions. J. Financial Econom 139(3):832–851.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Eckbo BE, Verma S (1994) Managerial shareownership, voting power, and cash dividend policy. J. Corporate Finance 1(1):33–62.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Edmans A, Holderness CG (2017) Blockholders: A survey of theory and evidence. Hermalin B, Weisbach M, eds. Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, vol. 1 (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 541–636.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Edmans A, Fang VW, Zur E (2013) The effect of liquidity on governance. Rev. Financial Stud. 26(6):1443–1482.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Eldar O, Kirmse T, Wittry MD (2023) The rise of anti-activist poison pills. Finance Working Paper No. 869, European Corporate Governance Institute, Brussels.Google Scholar
• Feng FZ, Xu Q, Zhu CH (2021) Caught in the crossfire: How the threat of hedge fund activism affects creditors. J. Empirical Finance 64:128–143.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Francis BB, Hasan I, John K, Waisman M (2010) The effect of state antitakeover laws on the firm’s bondholders. J. Financial Econom. 96(1):127–154.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gantchev N, Jotikasthira C (2018) Institutional trading and hedge fund activism. Management Sci. 64(6):2930–2950.Link, Google Scholar
• Garleanu N, Zwiebel J (2009) Design and renegotiation of debt covenants. Rev. Financial Stud. 22(2):749–781.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gompers P, Ishii J, Metrick A (2003) Corporate governance and equity prices. Quart. J. Econom. 118(1):107–156.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Griffith SJ, Reisel N (2017) Dead hand proxy puts and shareholder value. Univ. Chicago Law Rev. 84(3):1027.Google Scholar
• Griffith SJ, Reisel N (2019) Dead hand proxy puts and hedge fund activism. J. Financial Quant. Anal. 54(4):1615–1642.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grover R (2009) Fighting takeovers by playing the debt card. Bloomberg (April 8), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-04-08/fighting-takeovers-by-playing-the-debt-card.Google Scholar
• Guernsey S, Sepe SM, Serfling M (2022) Blood in the water: The value of antitakeover provisions during market shocks. J. Financial Econom. 143(3):1070–1096.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hainmueller J (2012) Entropy balancing for causal effects: A multivariate reweighting method to produce balanced samples in observational studies. Political Anal. 20(1):25–46.Crossref, Google Scholar
• He JJ, Huang J (2017) Product market competition in a world of cross-ownership: Evidence from institutional blockholdings. Rev. Financial Stud. 30(8):2674–2718.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Heckman JJ (1979) Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 47(1):153–161.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hirshleifer D, Titman S (1990) Share tendering strategies and the success of hostile takeover bids. J. Political Econom. 98(2):295–324.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ivashina V (2009) Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads. J. Financial Econom. 92(2):300–319.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jennings RH, Mazzeo MA (1993) Competing bids, target management resistance, and the structure of takeover bids. Rev. Financial Stud. 6(4):883–909.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jensen MC, Meckling WH (1976) Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. J. Financial Econom. 3(4):305–360.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Johnson WC, Karpoff JM, Wittry MD (2019) The consequences to directors of deploying poison pills. Working Paper No. 2019-03-023, Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH.Google Scholar
• Kahan M, Klausner M (1992) Antitakeover provisions in bonds: Bondholder protection or management entrenchment. UCLA Law. Rev. 40:931.Google Scholar
• Karpoff JM, Wittry MD (2018) Institutional and legal context in natural experiments: The case of state antitakeover laws. J. Finance 73(2):657–714.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kedia S, Starks LT, Wang X (2021) Institutional investors and hedge fund activism. Rev. Corporate Finance Stud. 10(1):1–43.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Klein A, Zur E (2011) The impact of hedge fund activism on the target firm’s existing bondholders. Rev. Financial Stud. 24 (5):1735–1771.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Klock MS, Mansi SA, Maxwell WF (2005) Does corporate governance matter to bondholders? J. Financial Quant. Anal. 40(4):693–719.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lee LF (1978) Unionism and wage rates: A simultaneous equations model with qualitative and limited dependent variables. Internat. Econom. Rev. 19(2):415–433.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lehn K, Poulsen A (1991) Contractual resolution of bondholder-stockholder conflicts in leveraged buyouts. J. Law Econom. 34(2, Part 2):645–673.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levine M (2024) Someone bought the Children’s Place. Bloomberg (February 15), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-02-15/someone-bought-the-children-s-place.Google Scholar
• Lewellen J, Lewellen K (2022) The ownership structure of U.S. corporations. Working paper, Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business, Hanover, NH.Google Scholar
• Li S, Whited TM, Wu Y (2016) Collateral, taxes, and leverage. Rev. Financial Stud. 29(6):1453–1500.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lin C, Ma Y, Malatesta P, Xuan Y (2011) Ownership structure and the cost of corporate borrowing. J. Financial Econom. 100(1):1–23.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lin C, Ma Y, Malatesta P, Xuan Y (2012) Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure. J. Financial Econom. 104(1):1–22.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maug E, Rydqvist K (2009) Do shareholders vote strategically? Voting behavior, proposal screening, and majority rules. Rev. Finance 13(1):47–79.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maury B, Pajuste A (2005) Multiple large shareholders and firm value. J. Banking Finance 29(7):1813–1834.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Miller DP, Puthenpurackal JJ (2002) The costs, wealth effects, and determinants of international capital raising: Evidence from public Yankee bonds. J. Financial Intermediation 11(4):455–485.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Miller DP, Reisel N (2012) Do country-level investor protections affect security-level contract design? Evidence from foreign bond covenants. Rev. Financial Stud. 25(2):408–438.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Milnor JW, Shapley LS (1978) Values of large games II: Oceanic games. Math. OR 3(4):290–307.Link, Google Scholar
• Nini G, Smith DC, Sufi A (2009) Creditor control rights and firm investment policy. J. Financial Econom. 92(3):400–420.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nini G, Smith DC, Sufi A (2012) Creditor control rights, corporate governance, and firm value. Rev. Financial Stud. 25(6):1713–1761.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Norli Ø, Ostergaard C, Schindele I (2015) Liquidity and shareholder activism. Rev. Financial Stud. 28(2):486–520.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Povel P, Sertsios G (2014) Getting to know each other: The role of toeholds in acquisitions. J. Corporate Finance 26:201–224.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rapaccioli DA (2016) Keeping shareholder activism alive: A comparative approach to outlawing dead hand proxy puts in Delaware. Fordham Law Rev. 84(6):2947.Google Scholar
• Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1986) Large shareholders and corporate control. J. Political Econom. 94(3, Part 1):461–488.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sunder J, Sunder S, Wongsunwai W (2014) Debtholder responses to shareholder activism: Evidence from hedge fund interventions. Rev. Financial Stud. 27(11):3318–3342.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Vanacore A (2010) Carl Icahn steps up fight with Lions Gate. (June 11), https://archive.boston.com/ae/movies/articles/2010/06/11/carl_icahn_steps_up_fight_with_lions_gate/.Google Scholar
• Volkova E (2017) Blockholders diversity and company value. Working paper, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.Google Scholar
• Walkling RA (1985) Predicting tender offer success: A logistic analysis. J. Financial Quant. Anal. 20(4):461–478.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wong YTF (2020) Wolves at the door: A closer look at hedge fund activism. Management Sci. 66(6):2347–2371.Link, Google Scholar
• Xu J, Li Y (2010) Hedge fund activism and bank loan contracting. Working paper, Virginia Tech - Pamplin College of Business, Blacksburg, VA.Google Scholar