When Liability Is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets with Advice

References

• Albuquerque RA, Cabral LM, Correia Guedes JF (2019) Incentive pay and systemic risk. Rev. Financial Stud. 32(11):4304–4342.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Armstrong M, Vickers J (2010) Competitive non-linear pricing and bundling. Rev. Econom. Stud. 77(1):30–60.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bebchuk LA, Fried JM (2010) Paying for long-term performance. University Pennsylvania Law Rev. 158(7):1915–1960.Google Scholar
• Bénabou R, Tirole J (2016) Bonus culture: Competitive pay, screening, and multi-tasking. J. Political Econom. 124(2):305–370.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Carey CM, Lieber EMJ, Miller S (2020) Drug firms’ payments and physicians’ prescribing behavior in Medicare Part D. J. Public Econom. 197:104402.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chang B, Szydlowski M (2020) The market for conflicted advice. J. Finance 75(2):867–903.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Che YK, Spier K (2008) Strategic judgment proofness. RAND J. Econom. 39(4):926–948.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chung DJ, Steenburgh T, Sudhir K (2013) Do bonuses enhance sales productivity? A dynamic structural analysis of bonus-based compensation plans. Marketing Sci. 33(2):165–187.Link, Google Scholar
• Competition and Markets Authority (2019) Consumer protection law compliance: Principles for businesses offering online accommodation booking services. Report, Competition and Markets Authority, London.Google Scholar
• Cummins D, Doherty N (2006) The economics of insurance intermediaries. J. Risk Insurance 73(3):259–396.Crossref, Google Scholar
• de Cornière A, Taylor G (2019) A model of biased intermediation. RAND J. Econom. 50(4):854–882.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Financial Stability Board (2011) Consumer finance protection with particular focus on credit. Report, Financial Stability Board, Basel, Switzerland.Google Scholar
• Gill A, Heinz M, Schumacher H, Sutter M (2022) Social preferences of young professionals and the financial industry. Management Sci.Google Scholar
• Guo T, Sriram S, Manchanda P (2021) The effect of information disclosure on industry payment to physicians. J. Marketing Res. 58(1):115–140.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gravelle H (1994) Remunerating information providers: Commissions vs. fees in life insurance. J. Risk Insurance 61(3):425–457.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grennan M, Myers K, Swanson A, Chatterji A (2020) No free lunch? Welfare analysis of firms selling through expert intermediaries. NBER Working Paper No. 24864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Hagiu A, Jullien B (2011) Why do intermediaries divert search? RAND J. Econom. 42(2):337–362.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hoffmann F, Inderst R, Opp MM (2021) Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation. Rev. Econom. Stud. 88(3):1253–1278.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmström B, Milgrom P (1987) Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Econometrica 55(2):303–328.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Iizuka T (2007) Experts’ agency problems: Evidence from the prescription drug market in Japan. RAND J. Econom. 38(3):844–862.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Iizuka T (2012) Physician agency and adoption of generic pharmaceuticals. Amer. Econom. Rev. 102(6):2826–2858.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Inderst R, Ottaviani M (2009) Misselling through agents. Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(3):883–908.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Inderst R, Ottaviani M (2012a) Competition through commissions and kickbacks. Amer. Econom. Rev. 102(2):780–809.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Inderst R, Ottaviani M (2012b) How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer financial protection. J. Financial Econom. 105(2):393–411.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Innes RD (1990) Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choice. J. Econom. Theory 52(1):42–67.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kishore S, Rao RS, Narasimhan O, John G (2013) Bonuses vs. commissions: A field study. J. Marketing Res. 50(3):317–333.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Larkin I (2014) The cost of high-powered incentives: Employee gaming in enterprise software sales. J. Labor Econom. 32(2):199–227.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McAfee RP, McMillan J, Whinston MD (1989) Multiproduct monopoly, commodity bundling, and correlation of values. Quart. J. Econom. 104(2):371–383.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Misra S, Nair HS (2011) A structural model of salesforce compensation dynamics: Estimation and field implementation. Quant. Marketing Econom. 9:211–257.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pitchford R (1995) How liable should a lender be? The case of judgment-proof firms and environmental risk. Amer. Econom. Rev. 85(5):1171–1186.Google Scholar
• Robles-Garcia C (2020) Competition and incentives in mortgage markets: The role of brokers. Working paper, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA.Google Scholar
• Schuler S (2020) Capping commissions in the presence of price competition. Working paper, Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany.Google Scholar
• Steenburgh TJ (2008) Effort or timing: The effect of lump-sum bonuses. Quant. Marketing Econom. 6:235–256.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stoughton NM, Wu Y, Zechner J (2011) Intermediated investment management. J. Finance 66(3):947–980.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Teh T-H, Wright J (2022) Intermediation and steering: Competition in prices and commissions. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 14(2):281–321.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Thanassoulis J (2012) The case for intervening in bankers pay. J. Finance 67(3):849–895.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tzioumis K, Gee M (2013) Nonlinear incentives and mortgage officers’ decisions. J. Financial Econom. 107(2):436–453.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Weitzel U, Kirchler M (2023) The banker’s oath and financial advice. J. Bank. Finance 148:106750.Crossref, Google Scholar