Making the Grade (But Not Disclosing It): How Withholding Grades Affects Student Behavior and Employment

References

• Agan A, Starr S (2018) Ban the box, criminal records, and racial discrimination: A field experiment. Quart. J. Econom. 133(1):191–235.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Akerlof GA, Kranton RE (2005) Identity and the economics of organizations. J. Econom. Perspect. 19(1):9–32.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Autor DH, Scarborough D (2008) Does job testing harm minority workers? Evidence from retail establishments. Quart. J. Econom. 123(1):219–277.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Autor DH, Levy F, Murnane RJ (2003) The skill content of recent technological change: An empirical exploration. Quart. J. Econom. 118(4):1279–1333.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Babcock P (2010) Real costs of nominal grade inflation? New evidence from student course evaluations. Econom. Inquiry 48(4):983–996.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bar T, Kadiyali V, Zussman A (2009) Grade information and grade inflation: The Cornell experiment. J. Econom. Perspect. 23(3):93–108.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barrios JM, Giuliano LM, Leone AJ (2020) In living color: Does in-person screening affect who gets hired? Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper 2020-38, University of Chicago, IL. https://bfi.uchicago.edu/working-paper/in-living-color-does-in-person-screening-affect-who-gets-hired/.Google Scholar
• Bartik A, Nelson S (2020) Deleting a signal: Evidence from pre-employment credit checks. MIT Department of Economics Graduate Student Research Paper 16-01. Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 19-23. Preprint, submitted September 28, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2759560.Google Scholar
• Bénabou R, Tirole J (2006) Incentives and prosocial behavior. Amer. Econom. Rev. 96(5):1652–1678.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bénabou R, Tirole J (2016) Bonus culture: Competitive pay, screening, and multitasking. J. Political Econom. 124(2):305–370.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Benjamin DJ, Choi JJ, Strickland AJ (2010) Social identity and preferences. Amer. Econom. Rev. 100(4):1913–1928.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Berger PG, Hann R (2003) The impact of SFAS No. 131 on information and monitoring. J. Accounting Res. 41(2):163–223.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bertrand M, Mullainathan S (2004) Are Emily and Greg more employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A field experiment on labor market discrimination. Amer. Econom. Rev. 94(4):991–1013.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Burks SV, Cowgill B, Hoffman M, Housman M (2015) The value of hiring through employee referrals. Quart. J. Econom. 130(2):805–839.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Butcher KF, McEwan PJ, Weerapana A (2014) The effects of an anti-grade-inflation policy at Wellesley College. J. Econom. Perspect. 28(3):189–204.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chioda L, Contreras-Loya D, Gertler P, Carney D (2021) Making entrepreneurs: Returns to training youth in hard vs. soft business skills. NBER Working Paper No. 28845, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. https://www.nber.org/papers/w28845.Google Scholar
• Christensen HB, Floyd E, Liu LY, Maffett M (2017) The real effects of mandated information on social responsibility in financial reports: Evidence from mine-safety records. J. Accounting Econom. 64(2–3):284–304.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ciolli A (2007) Grade non-disclosure policies: An analysis of restrictions on MBA student speech to employers. Univ. Pennsylvania J. Bus. Law 9(3):709–734.Google Scholar
• Coates JC, Srinivasan S (2014) Sox after ten years: A multidisciplinary review. Accounting Horizons 28(3):627–671.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Deming DJ (2017) The growing importance of social skills in the labor market. Quart. J. Econom. 132(4):1593–1640.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Denning J, Eide E, Warnick M (2022) Why have college completion rates increased? Amer. Econom. J. Appl. Econom. 14(3):1–29.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dranove D, Kessler D, McClellan M, Satterthwaite M (2003) Is more information better? The effects of “report cards” on healthcare providers. J. Political Econom. 111(3):555–588.Crossref, Google Scholar
• FairTest (2022) Test-optional growth chronology. Accessed August 31, 2022, https://www.fairtest.org/sites/default/files/Optional-Growth-Chronology.pdf.Google Scholar
• Gao M, Huang J (2020) Informing the market: The effect of modern information technologies on information production. Rev. Financial Stud. 33(4):1367–1411.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gipper B, Leuz C, Maffett M (2020) Public oversight and reporting credibility: Evidence from the PCAOB audit inspection regime. Rev. Financial Stud. 33(10):4532–4579.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gloeckler G (2005) Campus confidential; four top-tier B-Schools don’t disclose grades. Now that policy is under attack (Business Schools). Bus. Week 3950:75.Google Scholar
• Gottlieb D, Smetters K (2011) Grade non-disclosure. NBER Working Paper No. 17465, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. https://www.nber.org/papers/w17465.Google Scholar
• Grant D, Green WB (2013) Grades as incentives. Empirical Econom. 44(3):1563–1592.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grossman SJ (1981) The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. J. Law Econom. 24(3):461–483.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guvenen F, Kuruscu B, Tanaka S, Wiczer D (2020) Multidimensional skill mismatch. Amer. Econom. J. Macroeconomics 12(1):210–244.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Heckman JJ, Kautz T (2012) Hard evidence on soft skills. Labour Econom. 19(4):451–464.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hoffman M, Kahn LB, Li D (2018) Discretion in hiring. Quart. J. Econom. 133(2):765–800.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmstrom B, Milgrom P (1991) Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J. Law Econom. Organ. 7:24–52.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Horton JJ (2017) The effects of algorithmic labor market recommendations: Evidence from a field experiment. J. Labor Econom. 35(2):345–385.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jewell RT, McPherson MA, Tieslau MA (2013) Whose fault is it? Assigning blame for grade inflation in higher education. Appl. Econom. 45(9):1185–1200.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jones EB, Jackson JD (1990) College grades and labor market rewards. J. Human Resources 25(2):253–266.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jovanovic B (1979) Job matching and the theory of turnover. J. Political Econom. 87(5, Part 1):972–990.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kuhnen CM, Oyer P (2016) Exploration for human capital: Evidence from the MBA labor market. J. Labor Econom. 34(S2):S255–S286.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lazear EP (2000) Performance pay and productivity. Amer. Econom. Rev. 90(5):1346–1361.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lindenlaub I (2017) Sorting multidimensional types: Theory and application. Rev. Econom. Stud. 84(2):718–789.Google Scholar
• Lise J, Postel-Vinay F (2020) Multidimensional skills, sorting, and human capital accumulation. Amer. Econom. Rev. 110(8):2328–2376.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Loury LD, Garman D (1995) College selectivity and earnings. J. Labor Econom. 13(2):289–308.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Main JB, Ost B (2014) The impact of letter grades on student effort, course selection, and major choice: A regression-discontinuity analysis. J. Econom. Ed. 45(1):1–10.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mas A, Pallais A (2017) Valuing alternative work arrangements. Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(12):3722–3759.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Oreopoulos P, Salvanes KG (2011) Priceless: The nonpecuniary benefits of schooling. J. Econom. Perspect. 25(1):159–184.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ostrovsky M, Schwarz M (2010) Information disclosure and unraveling in matching markets. Am. Econom. J. Microeconomics 2(2):34–63.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Palan S, Schitter C (2018) Prolific.ac—A subject pool for online experiments. J. Behav. Experiment. Finance 17:22–27.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prendergast C (1999) The provision of incentives in firms. J. Econom. Literature 37(1):7–63.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prendergast C (2002) Uncertainty and incentives. J. Labor Econom. 20(S2):S115–S137.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prendergast C (2008) Intrinsic motivation and incentives. Amer. Econom. Rev. 98(2):201–205.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pries MJ, Rogerson R (2022) Declining worker turnover: The role of short-duration employment spells. Am. Econom. J. Macroeconomics 14(1):260–300.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth AE (1982) The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Math. Oper. Res. 7(4):617–628.Link, Google Scholar
• Schwantes M (2020) If you can truthfully say yes to any of these 5 questions, your emotional intelligence is lower than you think. Inc. Magazine Online. https://www.inc.com/marcel-schwantes/if-you-can-truthfully-say-yes-to-any-of-these-5-questions-your-emotional-intelligence-is-lower-than-you-think.html.Google Scholar
• Segal C (2012) Working when no one is watching: Motivation, test scores, and economic success. Management Sci. 58(8):1438–1457.Link, Google Scholar
• Shroff N (2017) Corporate investment and changes in GAAP. Rev. Accounting Stud. 22(1):1–63.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Singer J (2013) The perks of GND. Accessed August 31, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/9eaa3099-81dc-36aa-8578-19f80c032518.Google Scholar
• Sorkin I (2018) Ranking firms using revealed preference. Quart. J. Econom. 133(3):1331–1393.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Spence MA (1973) Job market signaling. Quart. J. Econom. 87(3):355–374.Crossref, Google Scholar
• The Economist (2005) News from the schools. (December 16), https://www.economist.com/unknown/2005/12/16/news-from-the-schools.Google Scholar
• Tomar S (2023) Greenhouse gas disclosure and emissions benchmarking. J. Accounting Research 61:451–492. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12473.Google Scholar
• Verrecchia RE (1983) Discretionary disclosure. J. Accounting Econom. 5:179–194.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Watanabe T (2021) UC slams the door on standardized admissions tests, nixing any SAT alternative. Los Angeles Times Online (November 18), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-11-18/uc-slams-door-on-sat-and-all-standardized-admissions-tests.Google Scholar
• Weinberger CJ (2014) The increasing complementarity between cognitive and social skills. Rev. Econom. Statist. 96(4):849–861.Crossref, Google Scholar