Deferred Acceptance with News Utility

References

• Abdulkadiroğlu A, Che YK, Yasuda Y (2015) Expanding ”choice” in school choice. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics 7(1):1–42.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Antler Y (2015) Two-sided matching with endogenous preferences. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics 7(3):241–258.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Antler Y (2019) No one likes to be second choice. Econom. J. 129(619):1119–1138.Google Scholar
• Artemov G, Che YK, He Y (2017) Strategic “mistakes”: Implications for market design research. Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia.Google Scholar
• Azevedo EM, Leshno JD (2016) A supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets. J. Political Econom. 124(5):1235–1268.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baswana S, Chakrabarti PP, Chandran S, Kanoria Y, Patange U (2019) Centralized admissions for engineering colleges in India. INFORMS J. Appl. Analytics 49(5):338–354.Google Scholar
• Bó I, Hakimov R (2020) Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence. Econom. J. 130(626):356–392.Google Scholar
• Bó I, Hakimov R (2022) The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism. Games Econom. Behav. 135:411–433.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Börgers T, Li J (2019) Strategically simple mechanisms. Econometrica 87(6):2003–2035.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Campos-Mercade P, Goette L, Graeber T, Kellogg A, Sprenger C (2023) “De gustibus” and disputes about reference dependence. Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 24-046, Harvard Business School, Boston. Google Scholar
• Chade H, Smith L (2006) Simultaneous search. Econometrica 74(5):1293–1307.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chapman J, Snowberg E, Wang S, Camerer C (2024) Looming large or seeming small? Attitudes towards losses in a representative sample. Rev. Econom. Stud., ePub ahead of print September 16, https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae093.Google Scholar
• Chen DL, Schonger M, Wickens C (2016) oTree—An open-source platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments. J. Behav. Experiment. Finance 9:88–97.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen R, Katuščák P, Kittsteiner T, Kütter K (2024) Does disappointment aversion explain non-truthful reporting in strategy-proof mechanisms? Experiment. Econom. 27(5):1184–1210.Google Scholar
• Dato S, Grunewald A, Müller D, Strack P (2017) Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction. Games Econom. Behav. 104:681–705.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dreyfuss B, Heffetz O, Rabin M (2022) Expectations-based loss aversion may help explain seemingly dominated choices in strategy-proof mechanisms. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics 14(4):515–555.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Echenique F, Wilson AJ, Yariv L (2016) Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study. Quant. Econom. 7(2):449–482.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly 69(1):9–15.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gill D, Prowse V (2012) A structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real effort competition. Amer. Econom. Rev. 102(1):469–503.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gonczarowski YA, Heffetz O, Thomas C (2022) Strategyproofness-exposing mechanism descriptions. Preprint, submitted September 27, https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.13148.Google Scholar
• Gong B, Liang Y (2024) A dynamic matching mechanism for college admissions: Theory and experiment. Management Sci. 71(5):4396–4412.Google Scholar
• Grenet J, He Y, Kübler D (2022) Preference discovery in university admissions: The case for dynamic multioffer mechanisms. J. Political Econom. 130(6):1427–1476.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hakimov R, Kübler D (2021) Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: A survey. Experiment. Econom. 24(2):434–488.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hassidim A, Romm A, Shorrer RI (2021) The limits of incentives in economic matching procedures. Management Sci. 67(2):951–963.Link, Google Scholar
• Karpov A (2019) A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem. Econom. Lett. 178:63–65.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kleinberg J, Oren S, Ryu E, Tardos É (2024) Modeling reputation-based behavioral biases in school choice. Preprint, submitted March 7, https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.04616.Google Scholar
• Klijn F, Pais J, Vorsatz M (2019) Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment. Games Econom. Behav. 113:147–163.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kloosterman A, Troyan P (2023) Rankings-dependent preferences: A real goods matching experiment. Preprint, submitted May 5, https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.03644.Google Scholar
• Kőszegi B, Rabin M (2006) A model of reference-dependent preferences. Quart. J. Econom. 121(4):1133–1165.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kőszegi B, Rabin M (2007) Reference-dependent risk attitudes. Amer. Econom. Rev. 97(4):1047–1073.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kőszegi B, Rabin M (2009) Reference-dependent consumption plans. Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(3):909–936.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Li S (2017) Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms. Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(11):3257–3287.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Luflade M (2019) The value of information in centralized school choice systems. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania Department of Economics, Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics, Philadelphia.Google Scholar
• McVitie DG, Wilson LB (1971) The stable marriage problem. Comm. ACM 14(7):486–490.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Meisner V (2023) Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness. Management Sci. 69(5):2733–2745.Link, Google Scholar
• Meisner V, von Wangenheim J (2021) School choice and loss aversion. Preprint, submitted December 16, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3985777.Google Scholar
• Meisner V, von Wangenheim J (2023) Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms. J. Econom. Theory 207:105588.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pycia M, Troyan P (2023) A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design. Econometrica 91:1495–1526.Google Scholar
• Rees-Jones A, Shorrer R (2023) Behavioral economics in education market design: A forward-looking review. J. Political Econom. Microeconomics 1(3):557–613. Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rees-Jones A, Skowronek S (2018) An experimental investigation of preference misrepresentation in the residency match. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 115(45):11471–11476.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rees-Jones A, Shorrer R, Tergiman CJ (2020) Correlation neglect in student-to-school matching. NBER Working Paper No. 26734, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Rosato A (2023) Loss aversion in sequential auctions. Theoret. Econom. 18:561–596.Google Scholar
• Roth AE, Sotomayor MAO (1990) Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Econometric Society Monographs (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shorrer RI, Sóvágó S (2023) Dominated choices in a strategically simple college admissions environment. J. Political Econom. Microeconomics 1(4):781–807.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shorrer RI, Sóvágó S (2024) Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity. Games Econom. Behav. 144:167–182.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sims CA (2003) Implications of rational inattention. J. Monetary Econom. 50(3):665–690.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sprenger C (2015) An endowment effect for risk: Experimental tests of stochastic reference points. J. Political Econom. 123(6):1456–1499.Crossref, Google Scholar