Correlation of Rankings in Matching Markets

References

• Abdulkadiroğlu A (2005) College admissions with affirmative action. Internat. J. Game Theory 33(4):535–549.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Abdulkadiroğlu A, Sönmez T (2003) School choice: A mechanism design approach. Amer. Econom. Rev. 93(3):729–747.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Abdulkadiroğlu A, Che YK, Yasuda Y (2015) Expanding “choice” in school choice. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics 7(1):1–42.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Abdulkadiroğlu A, Pathak PA, Roth AE (2009) Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(5):1954–1978.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Angwin J, Larson J, Mattu S, Kirchner L (2016) Machine bias. ProPublica (May 23), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.Google Scholar
• Arcidiacono P, Kinsler J, Ransom T (2022) Asian American discrimination in Harvard admissions. Eur. Econom. Rev. 144(C):104079.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arnosti N (2022) A continuum model of stable matching with finite capacities. Proc. 23rd ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 960.Google Scholar
• Arnosti N (2023) Lottery design for school choice. Management Sci. 69(1):244–259.Link, Google Scholar
• Arrow KJ (1973) The theory of discrimination. Ashenfelter O, Rees A, eds. Discrimination in Labor Markets (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ), 3–33.Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I, Nikzad A (2020) What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design. J. Econom. Theory 190(C):105120.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I, Nikzad A, Romm A (2019) Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules. Games Econom. Behav. 115(C):167–187.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Azevedo EM, Leshno JD (2016) A supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets. J. Political Econom. 124(5):1235–1268.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Balinski M, Sönmez T (1999) A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement. J. Econom. Theory 84(1):73–94.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bertrand M, Mullainathan S (2004) Are Emily and Greg more employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A field experiment on labor market discrimination. Amer. Econom. Rev. 94(4):991–1013.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bohren JA, Hull P, Imas A (2025) Systemic discrimination: Theory and measurement. Quart. J. Econom. 140(3):1743–1799.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bommasani R, Creel KA, Kumar A, Jurafsky D, Liang PS (2022) Picking on the same person: Does algorithmic monoculture lead to outcome homogenization? Koyejo S, Mohamed S, Agarwal A, Belgrave D, Cho K, Oh A, eds. Adv. Neural Inform. Processing Systems, vol. 35 (Curran Associates, Inc., Red Hook, NY), 3663–3678.Google Scholar
• Brilliantova A, Hosseini H (2022) Fair stable matching meets correlated preferences. Proc. 21st Internat. Conf. Autonomous Agents Multiagent Systems (International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC), 190–198.Google Scholar
• Carvalho JP, Pradelski BSR (2022) Identity and underrepresentation: Interactions between race and gender. J. Public Econom. 216:104764.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Carvalho JP, Pradelski BSR, Williams C (2025) Intersectionality: Affirmative action with multidimensional identities. Management Sci. 71(5):4495–4509.Link, Google Scholar
• Celis LE, Mehrotra A, Vishnoi NK (2020) Interventions for ranking in the presence of implicit bias. Proc. 2020 Conf. Fairness Accountability Transparency (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 369–380.Google Scholar
• Chade H, Lewis G, Smith L (2014) Student portfolios and the college admissions problem. Rev. Econom. Stud. 81(3):971–1002.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Che YK, Tercieux O (2019) Efficiency and stability in large matching markets. J. Political Econom. 127(5):2301–2342.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Citron DK, Pasquale F (2014) The scored society: Due process for automated predictions. Washington Law Rev. 89(1):1–34.Google Scholar
• Correa J, Epstein N, Epstein R, Escobar J, Rios I, Aramayo N, Bahamondes B, et al. (2022) School choice in Chile. Oper. Res. 70(2):1066–1087.Link, Google Scholar
• Delacrétaz D, Kominers SD, Teytelboym A (2023) Matching mechanisms for refugee resettlement. Amer. Econom. Rev. 113(10):2689–2717.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Devic S, Kempe D, Sharan V, Korolova A (2023) Fairness in matching under uncertainty. Krause A, Brunskill E, Cho K, Engelhardt B, Sabato S, Scarlett J, eds. Proc. 40th Internat. Conf. Machine Learn., Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, vol. 202 (PMLR, New York), 7775–7794.Google Scholar
• Dur U, Pathak PA, Sönmez T (2020) Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago’s exam schools. J. Econom. Theory 187(C):104996.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Emelianov V, Gast N, Gummadi KP, Loiseau P (2020) On fair selection in the presence of implicit variance. Proc. 21st ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 649–675.Google Scholar
• Emelianov V, Gast N, Gummadi KP, Loiseau P (2022) On fair selection in the presence of implicit and differential variance. Artificial Intelligence 302(C):103609.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Erdil A, Ergin H (2008) What’s the matter with tie-breaking? Improving efficiency in school choice. Amer. Econom. Rev. 98(3):669–689.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ergin H, Sönmez T (2006) Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism. J. Public Econom. 90(1–2):215–237.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Feagin J (2013) Systemic Racism: A Theory of Oppression (Routledge, Abingdon, UK).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fleisher W (2021) What’s fair about individual fairness? Proc. 2021 AAAI/ACM Conf. AI Ethics Soc. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 480–490.Google Scholar
• Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly 69(1):9–15.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Garg N, Li H, Monachou F (2021) Standardized tests and affirmative action: The role of bias and variance. Proc. 2021 ACM Conf. Fairness Accountability Transparency (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 261.Google Scholar
• Gola P (2021) Supply and demand in a two-sector matching model. J. Political Econom. 129(3):940–978.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goth G (2003) Addressing the monoculture. IEEE Security Privacy 1(6):8–10.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kamada Y, Kojima F (2015) Efficient matching under distributional constraints: Theory and applications. Amer. Econom. Rev. 105(1):67–99.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kamada Y, Kojima F (2024) Fair matching under constraints: Theory and applications. Rev. Econom. Stud. 91(2):1162–1199.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Karni G, Rothblum GN, Yona G (2022) On fairness and stability in two-sided matchings. Braverman M, ed. 13th Innovations Theoret. Comput. Sci. Conf. (Schloss Dagstuhl—Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Wadern, Germany), 92:1–92:17.Google Scholar
• Kleinberg J, Raghavan M (2018) Selection problems in the presence of implicit bias. Karlin AR, ed. Proc. 9th Innovations Theoret. Comput. Sci. Conf. (Schloss Dagstuhl—Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Wadern, Germany), 33:1–33:17.Google Scholar
• Kleinberg J, Raghavan M (2021) Algorithmic monoculture and social welfare. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 118(22):e2018340118.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Krishnaa P, Limaye G, Nasre M, Nimbhorkar P (2022) Envy-freeness and relaxed stability: Hardness and approximation algorithms. J. Combin. Optim. 45(41):1–30.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Leonhardt D (2024) The misguided war on the SAT. New York Times (January 7), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/07/briefing/the-misguided-war-on-the-sat.html.Google Scholar
• Leshno JD, Lo I (2020) The cutoff structure of top trading cycles in school choice. Rev. Econom. Stud. 88(4):1582–1623.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Longhofer SD (1995) Rooting out discrimination in home mortgage lending. Economic Commentary 11/1/1995, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Cleveland.Google Scholar
• Mehrotra A, Pradelski BSR, Vishnoi NK (2022) Selection in the presence of implicit bias: The advantage of intersectional constraints. Proc. 2022 ACM Conf. Fairness Accountability Transparency (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 599–609.Google Scholar
• Molina M, Loiseau P (2022) Bounding and approximating intersectional fairness through marginal fairness. Koyejo S, Mohamed S, Agarwal A, Belgrave D, Cho K, Oh A, eds. Adv. Neural Inform. Processing Systems, vol. 35 (Curran Associates, Inc., Red Hook, NY), 16796–16807.Google Scholar
• Niessen-Ruenzi A, Ruenzi S (2019) Sex matters: Gender bias in the mutual fund industry. Management Sci. 65(7):3001–3025.Link, Google Scholar
• Peng K, Garg N (2024a) Monoculture in matching markets. Globerson A, Mackey L, Belgrave D, Fan A, Paquet U, Tomczak J, Zhang C, eds. Adv. Neural Inform. Processing Systems, vol. 37 (Curran Associates, Red Hook, NY), 81959–81991.Google Scholar
• Peng K, Garg N (2024b) Wisdom and foolishness of noisy matching markets. Proc. 25th ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 675.Google Scholar
• Phelps E (1972) The statistical theory of racism and sexism. Amer. Econom. Rev. 62(4):659–661.Google Scholar
• Pincus FL (1996) Discrimination comes in many forms: Individual, institutional, and structural. Amer. Behav. Sci. 40(2):186–194.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Scarsini M (1984) On measures of concordance. Stochastica 8(3):201–218.Google Scholar
• Sklar M (1959) Fonctions de répartition à N dimensions et leurs marges. Ann. ISUP VIII(3):229–231.Google Scholar
• Yang K, Loftus JR, Stoyanovich J (2021) Causal intersectionality for fair ranking. Ligett K, Gupta S, eds. Proc. 2nd Sympos. Foundations Responsible Comput. (Schloss Dagstuhl—Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Wadern, Germany), 7:1–7:20.Google Scholar
• Yenmez MB (2013) Incentive-compatible matching mechanisms: Consistency with various stability notions. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics 5(4):120–141.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zehlike M, Yang K, Stoyanovich J (2022) Fairness in ranking, part I: Score-based ranking. ACM Comput. Surveys 55(6):1–36.Google Scholar