Help
Cart
Skip main navigation

Available Issues

April 10, 2013 - June 5, 2026

Available Issues

April 10, 2013 - June 5, 2026

Disclosure Costs of Relative Performance Evaluation

Published Online:24 Sep 2025https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06200

References

  • Abadie A, Athey S, Imbens G, Wooldridge JM (2023) When should you adjust standard errors for clustering? Quart. J. Econom. 138(1):1–35.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Aggarwal RK, Samwick AA (1999) Executive compensation, strategic competition, and relative performance evaluation: Theory and evidence. J. Finance 54(6):1999–2043.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Albuquerque AM, Chen B, Dong Q, Riedl EJ (2019) Ex post settling up in cash compensation: New evidence. Contemporary Accounting Res. 36(4):2283–2318.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Baginski SP, Hinson LA (2016) Cost of capital free-riders. Accounting Rev. 91(5):1291–1313.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Bagnoli M, Watts SG (2015) Delegating disclosure and production choices. Accounting Rev. 90(3):835–857.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Barth ME, Landsman WR, Tian YS, Yu M (2023) Does voluntary non-earnings disclosure substitute for redacted proprietary contract information? Working paper, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.Google Scholar
  • Bettis JC, Bizjak J, Coles JL, Kalpathy S (2018) Performance-vesting provisions in executive compensation. J. Accounting Econom. 66(1):194–221.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Bizjak J, Kalpathy S, Li ZF, Young B (2022) The choice of peers for relative performance evaluation in executive compensation. Rev. Finance 26(5):1217–1239.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Bloom N, Bond S, van Reenen J (2007) Uncertainty and investment dynamics. Rev. Econom. Stud. 74(2):391–415.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Bloomfield MJ, Guay WR, Timmermans O (2025) An algorithmic approach to understanding firms’ use of relative performance evaluation. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.Google Scholar
  • Bloomfield MJ, Heinle MS, Timmermans O (2024) Relative performance evaluation and strategic peer-harming disclosures. J. Accounting Res. 62(3):877–933.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Bloomfield MJ, Marvão CMP, Spagnolo G (2023) Relative performance evaluation, sabotage and collusion. J. Accounting Econom. 76(2–3):101608.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Bloomfield MJ, Gipper B, Kepler JD, Tsui D (2021) Cost shielding in executive bonus plans. J. Accounting Econom. 72(2):101428.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Bonsall SB, IV, Bozanic Z, Fischer PE (2013) What do management earnings forecasts convey about the macroeconomy? J. Accounting Res. 51(2):225–266.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Boone AL, Floros IV, Johnson SA (2016) Redacting proprietary information at the initial public offering. J. Financial Econom. 120(1):102–123.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Breuer M, Hombach K, Müller MA (2021) When you talk, I remain silent: Spillover effects of peers’ mandatory disclosures on firms’ voluntary disclosures. Accounting Rev. 97(4):155–186.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Carter ME, Lynch LJ, Martin M (2022) Board committee overlap and the use of earnings in CEO compensation contracts. Management Sci. 68(8):6268–6297.Link, Google Scholar
  • Choi J, Gipper B, Shi SX (2025) Executive pay transparency and relative performance evaluation: Evidence from the 2006 pay disclosure reforms. Rev. Accounting Stud. 30(3):2922–2962.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Cohn JB, Liu Z, Wardlaw MI (2022) Count (and count-like) data in finance. J. Financial Econom. 146(2):529–551.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Conyon MJ, Core JE, Guay WR (2011) Are U.S. CEOs paid more than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from risk-adjusted pay. Rev. Financial Stud. 24(2):402–438.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Core JE (2001) A review of the empirical disclosure literature: Discussion. J. Accounting Econom. 31(1):441–456.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Core JE, Guay WR (1999) The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. J. Accounting Econom. 28(2):151–184.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • De Angelis D, Grinstein Y (2020) Relative performance evaluation in CEO compensation: A talent-retention explanation. J. Financial Quant. Anal. 55(7):2099–2123.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Diamond DW, Verrecchia RE (1991) Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. J. Finance 46(4):1325–1359.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Dye RA (1985) Disclosure of nonproprietary information. J. Accounting Res. 23(1):123–145.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Fama EF, French KR (1997) Industry costs of equity. J. Financial Econom. 43(2):153–193.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Feichter C, Moers F, Timmermans O (2022) Relative performance evaluation and competitive aggressiveness. J. Accounting Res. 60(5):1859–1913.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Glaeser S (2018) The effects of proprietary information on corporate disclosure and transparency: Evidence from trade secrets. J. Accounting Econom. 66(1):163–193.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Gong G, Li LY, Shin JY (2011) Relative performance evaluation and related peer groups in executive compensation contracts. Accounting Rev. 86(3):1007–1043.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Gong G, Li LY, Yin H (2019) Relative performance evaluation and the timing of earnings release. J. Accounting Econom. 67(2–3):358–386.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Graham JR, Harvey CR, Rajgopal S (2005) The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. J. Accounting Econom. 40(1):3–73.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Guay WR, Kepler JD, Tsui D (2019) The role of executive cash bonuses in providing individual and team incentives. J. Financial Econom. 133(2):441–471.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Guay WR, Samuels D, Taylor DJ (2016) Guiding through the fog: Financial statement complexity and voluntary disclosure. J. Accounting Econom. 62(2):234–269.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Hainmueller J (2017) Entropy balancing for causal effects: A multivariate reweighting method to produce balanced samples in observational studies. Political Anal. 20(1):25–46.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Heinle M, Samuels D, Taylor D (2023) Disclosure substitution. Management Sci. 69(8):4363–4971.Google Scholar
  • Hoberg G, Phillips G (2010) Product market synergies and competition in mergers and acquisitions: A text-based analysis. Rev. Financial Stud. 23(10):3773–3811.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Hoberg G, Phillips G (2016) Text-based network industries and endogenous product differentiation. J. Political Econom. 124(5):1423–1465.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Holmström B (1982) Moral hazard in teams. Bell. J. Econom. 13(2):324–340.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Holmström B, Milgrom P (1991) Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J. Law Econom. Organ. 7(special_issue):24–52. Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (2022) Executive compensation data. Retrieved February 27, 2025, https://www.issgovernance.com/esg/governance-data/executive-compensation-data/.Google Scholar
  • Jayaraman S, Milbourn TT, Peters FS, Seo H (2021) Product market peers and relative performance evaluation. Accounting Rev. 96(4):341–366.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Jia Y, Seetharaman A, Sun Y, Wang X (2023) Relative performance goals and management earnings guidance. J. Bus. Ethics 183(4):1045–1071.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • JPMorgan Chase & Co (2021) Proxy statement 2020. Retrieved February 27, 2025, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961721000275/a2021proxystatement.htm.Google Scholar
  • Lambert RA (2001) Contracting theory and accounting. J. Accounting Econom. 32(1–3):3–87.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Noh S, So EC, Weber JP (2019) Voluntary and mandatory disclosures: Do managers view them as substitutes? J. Accounting Econom. 68(1):101243.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Roychowdhury S, Shroff N, Verdi RS (2019) The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review. J. Accounting Econom. 68(2):101246.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Schäfer P (2023) Relative performance evaluation and strategic differentiation. Accounting Rev. 98(2):419–453.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Tice FM (2024) The role of common risk in the effectiveness of explicit relative performance evaluation. Management Sci. 70(3):1635–1655.Link, Google Scholar
  • Timmermans O (2024) Cash versus share payouts in relative performance plans. Accounting Rev. 99(6):451–489.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2010) Assessment of corporation finance’s confidential treatment processes and procedures. Retrieved February 27, 2025, https://www.sec.gov/files/479.pdf.Google Scholar
  • U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2025) Mission. Retrieved February 27, 2025, https://www.sec.gov/about/mission.Google Scholar
  • United Parcel Service Inc (2019) Proxy statement 2018. Retrieved February 27, 2025, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1090727/000120677419000877/ups3448911-def14a.htm.Google Scholar
  • Verrecchia RE, Weber J (2006) Redacted disclosure. J. Accounting Res. 44(4):791–814.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Vrettos D (2013) Are relative performance measures in CEO incentive contracts used for risk reduction and/or for strategic interaction? Accounting Rev. 88(6):2179–2212.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Welker M (1995) Disclosure policy, information asymmetry, and liquidity in equity markets. Contemporary Accounting Res. 11(2):801–827.Crossref, Google Scholar
Previous
Back to Top
Next
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.
Agree