Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications

References

• Dubins L.E., Freedman D.A. Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Amer. Math. Monthly (198l) 88:485–494Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gale D., Shapley L.S. College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly (1962) 69:9–15Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gale D., Sotomayor M. Some remarks on the stable matching problem. Discrete Appl. Math. (1985a) 11:223–232Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gale D., Sotomayor M. Ms Machiavelli and the stable matching problem. Amer. Math. Monthly (1985b) 92:261–268Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gardenfors P. Match making: Assignments based on bilateral preferences. Behavioural Sci. (1975) 20:166–173Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gusfield D., Irving R.W.The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (1989) (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
• Irving R.W. Stable marriage and indifference. Discrete App. Math. (1994) 48:261–272Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kara T., Sonmez T. Nash implementation of matching rules. J. Econom. Theory (1996) 68:425–439Crossref, Google Scholar
• Knuth D.E.Marriages Stables (1976) (Les Presses de l'Unversite'de Montreal, Montreal, Canada) Google Scholar
• McVitie D.G., Wilson L.B. Stable marriage assignments for unequal sets. BIT (1970) 10Crossref, Google Scholar
• McVitie D.G., Wilson L.B. The stable marriage problem. Comm. ACM (1971) 10:486–490Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pittel B. The average number of stable matchings. SIAM J. Discrete Math. (1989) 530–549Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A.E. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Math. Oper. Res. (1982) 7:617–628Link, Google Scholar
• Roth A.E. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory. J. Political Econom. (1984a) 92:991–1016Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A.E. Stability and polarization of interests in job matching. Econometrica (1984b) 52:47–57Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A.E. The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem. J. Econom. Theory (1985) 36:277–288Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A.E. New physicians: A natural experiment in market organization. Science (1990) 250:1524–1528Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A.E., Peranson E. The effects of the change in the NRMP matching algorithm. J. Amer. Medical Assoc. (1997) 278:729–732Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A.E., Rothblum U. Truncation strategies in matching markets: In search of advice for participants. Econometrica (1999) 67(01):21–43Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth A.E., Sotomayor M.Two-sided Matching: A Study in Game-theoretic Modeling and Analysis (1991) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
• Sonmez Tayfun. Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets. J. Econom. Theory (1997) 77:197–204Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tadenuma K., Toda M. Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems. Math. Social Sci. (1998) 35(2):121–132Crossref, Google Scholar
• Teo C.P., Sethuraman J. The geometry of fractional stable matching and its applications. Math. Oper. Res. (1998) 23(4):874–891Link, Google Scholar