Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies

References

• Allen B. Generic existence of completely revealing equilibria for economies with uncertainty when prices convey information. Econometrica (1981) 49(5):1173–1199Crossref, Google Scholar
• Allen B., Yannelis N. C. Differential information economies: Introduction. Econom. Theory (2001) 18(2):263–273Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson R. M., Durlauff S., Blume L. Core convergence. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2008) 2nd ed.(Macmillan, London) Google Scholar
• Aumann R. J. Markets with a continuum of traders. Econometrica (1964) 32(1-2):39–50Crossref, Google Scholar
• Blouin M., Serrano R. A decentralized market with common values uncertainty: Non-steady states. Rev. Econom. Stud. (2001) 68(2):323–346Crossref, Google Scholar
• Debreu G., Scarf H. A limit theorem on the core of an economy. Internat. Econom. Rev. (1963) 4(3):235–246Crossref, Google Scholar
• de Clippel G. The type-agent core of exchange economies with asymmetric information. J. Econom. Theory (2007) 135(1):144–158Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dubey P., Geanakoplos J., Shubik M. The revelation of information in strategic market games: A critique of rational expectations equilibrium. J. Math. Econom. (1987) 16(2):105–137Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dutta B., Vohra R. Incomplete information, credibility and the core. Math. Soc. Sci. (2005) 50(2):148–165Crossref, Google Scholar
• Einy E., Moreno D., Shitovitz B. On the core of an economy with differential information. J. Econom. Theory (2000) 94(2):262–270Crossref, Google Scholar
• Einy E., Moreno D., Shitovitz B. Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information. J. Math. Econom. (2000) 34(4):527–535Crossref, Google Scholar
• Forges F., Minelli E. Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations. J. Econom. Theory (1997) 75(2):388–406Crossref, Google Scholar
• Forges F., Heifetz A., Minelli E. Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies. Econom. Theory (2001) 18(2):349–365Crossref, Google Scholar
• Forges F., Mertens J.-F., Vohra R. The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects. Econometrica (2002) 70(5):1865–1892Crossref, Google Scholar
• Forges F., Minelli E., Vohra R. Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: A survey. J. Math. Econom. (2002) 38(1-2):1–41Crossref, Google Scholar
• Foster D. F., Viswanathan S. Strategic trading when agents forecast the forecast of others. J. Finance (1996) 51(4):1437–1478Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gottardi P., Serrano R. Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. (2005) 3(6):1279–1317Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gul F., Postlewaite A. Asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information. Econometrica (1992) 60(6):1273–1292Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holden C. W., Subrahmanyam A. Long-lived private information and imperfect competition. J. Finance (1992) 47(1):247–270Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kamishiro Y., Serrano R. Equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies. (2009) . Working Paper 2009-12, Department of Economics, Brown University, http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2009/2009-12_paper.pdfGoogle Scholar
• Kreps D. A note on fulfilled expectations equilibria. J. Econom. Theory (1977) 14(1):32–43Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kyle A. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica (1985) 53(6):1315–1335Crossref, Google Scholar
• Laffont J.-J. On the welfare analysis of rational expectations equilibria with asymmetric information. Econometrica (1985) 53(1):1–29Crossref, Google Scholar
• McLean R. P., Postlewaite A. Informational size and incentive compatibility. Econometrica (2002) 70(6):2421–2453Crossref, Google Scholar
• McLean R. P., Postlewaite A. Core convergence with asymmetric information. Games Econom. Behav. (2005) 50(1):58–78Crossref, Google Scholar
• Milgrom P. Rational expectations, information acquisition, and competitive bidding. Econometrica (1981) 49(4):921–943Crossref, Google Scholar
• Myerson R. B. Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information. J. Econom. Theory (2007) 136(1):260–285Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pesendorfer W., Swinkels J. The loser's curse and information aggregation in common values auctions. Econometrica (1997) 65(6):1247–1281Crossref, Google Scholar
• Peters M., Severinov S. An ascending double auction. Econom. Theory (2008) 37(2):281–306Crossref, Google Scholar
• Radner R. Rational expectations equilibrium: Generic existence and the information revealed by prices. Econometrica (1979) 47(3):655–678Crossref, Google Scholar
• Reny P., Perry M. Toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium. Econometrica (2006) 74(5):1231–1269Crossref, Google Scholar
• Serrano R., Vohra R. Information transmission in coalitional voting games. J. Econom. Theory (2007) 134(1):117–137Crossref, Google Scholar
• Serrano R., Vohra R., Volij O. On the failure of core convergence in economies with asymmetric information. Econometrica (2001) 69(6):1685–1696Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shapley L., Shubik M. Trade using one commodity as means of payment. J. Political Econom. (1977) 85(5):937–968Crossref, Google Scholar
• Vohra R. Incomplete information, incentive compatibility and the core. J. Econom. Theory (1999) 86(5):123–147Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wilson R. Information, efficiency and the core of an economy. Econometrica (1978) 46(4):807–816Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wolinsky A. Information revelation in a market with pairwise meetings. Econometrica (1990) 58(1):1–23Crossref, Google Scholar