Help
Cart
Skip main navigation

Available Issues

April 10, 2013 - May 8, 2026

Available Issues

April 10, 2013 - May 8, 2026

Posted Price Mechanisms and Optimal Threshold Strategies for Random Arrivals

Published Online:11 Mar 2021https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2020.1105

References

  • [1] Abolhassani M, Ehsani S, Esfandiari H, HajiAghayi MT, Kleinberg R, Lucier B (2017) Beating 1-1/e for ordered prophets. Hatami H, McKenzie P, King V, eds. Proc. 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Sympos. Theory Computing (ACM, New York), 61–71.Google Scholar
  • [2] Adamczyk M, Borodin A, Ferraioli D, De Keijzer B, Leonardi S (2017) Sequential posted-price mechanisms with correlated valuations. ACM Trans. Econom. Comput. 5(4):22.Google Scholar
  • [3] Allaart PC (2007) Prophet inequalities for i.i.d. random variables with random arrival times. Sequential Anal. 26(4):403–413.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • [4] Assaf D, Goldstein L, Samuel-Cahn E (2001) Ratio prophet inequalities when the mortal has several choices. Ann. Appl. Probab. 12(3):972–984.Google Scholar
  • [5] Azar Y, Chiplunkar A, Kaplan H (2018) Prophet secretary: Surpassing the 1-1/e barrier. Proc. ACM Conf. Econom. Comput., EC’18 (ACM, New York), 303–318.Google Scholar
  • [6] Besbes O, Lobel I (2015) Intertemporal price discrimination: Structure and computation of optimal policies. Management Sci. 61(1):92–110.Link, Google Scholar
  • [7] Blumrosen L, Holenstein T (2008) Posted prices vs. negotiations: An asymptotic analysis. Proc. ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce, EC’08 (ACM, New York), 49.Google Scholar
  • [8] Bult JR, Wansbeek T (1995) Optimal selection for direct mail. Marketing Sci. 14(4):378–394.Link, Google Scholar
  • [9] Chawla S, Hartline JD, Kleinberg R (2007) Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations. Proc. 8th Ann. Conf. Electronic Commerce, EC’07 (ACM, New York), 243–251.Google Scholar
  • [10] Chawla S, Hartline JD, Malec DL, Sivan B (2010) Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing. Proc. 42nd ACM Sympos. Theory Comput. (ACM, New York), 311–320.Google Scholar
  • [11] Chen Y, Farias VF (2018) Robust dynamic pricing with strategic customers. Math. Oper. Res. 43(4):1119–1142.Link, Google Scholar
  • [12] Choudhary V, Ghose A, Mukhopadhyay T, Rajan U (2005) Personalized pricing and quality differentiation. Management Sci. 51(7):1120–1130.Link, Google Scholar
  • [13] Cominetti R, Correa JR, Rothvoß T, San Martín J (2010) Optimal selection of customers for a last-minute offer. Oper. Res. 58(4):878–888.Link, Google Scholar
  • [14] Correa J, Saona R, Ziliotto B (2019) Prophet secretary through blind strategies. Chan TM, ed. Proc. 30th Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (USA), SODA’19 (SIAM, Philadelphia), 1946–1961.Google Scholar
  • [15] Correa J, Foncea P, Pizarro D, Verdugo V (2019) From pricing to prophets, and back! Oper. Res. Lett. 47(1):25–29.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • [16] Ehsani S, HajiAghayi MT, Kesselheim T, Singla S (2018) Prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids. Czumaj A, ed. Proc. 29th Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (USA), SODA’18 (SIAM, Philadelphia), 700–714.Google Scholar
  • [17] Esfandiari H, HajiAghayi MT, Liaghat V, Monemizadeh M (2015) Prophet secretary. Bansal N, Finocchi I, eds. Algorithms—ESA 2015 (Springer, Berlin), 496–508.Google Scholar
  • [18] Ezra T, Feldman M, Nehama I (2018) Prophets and secretaries with overbooking. Proc. 2018 ACM Conf. Econom. Comput., EC’18 (ACM, New York), 319–320.Google Scholar
  • [19] Feldman M, Svensson O, Zenklusen R (2016) Online contention resolution schemes. Krauthgamer R, ed. Proc. 27th Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (USA), SODA’16 (SIAM, Philadelphia), 1014–1033.Google Scholar
  • [20] Gallien J (2006) Dynamic mechanism design for online commerce. Oper. Res. 54(2):291–310.Link, Google Scholar
  • [21] HajiAghayi MT, Kleinberg R, Sandholm T (2007) Automated online mechanism design and prophet inequalities. Proc. 22nd National Conf. Artificial Intelligence—AAAI’07, vol. 1 (AAAI Press, Palo Alto, CA), 58–65.Google Scholar
  • [22] Hill TP (1983) Prophet inequalities and order selection in optimal stopping problems. Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 88(1):131–137.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • [23] Hill TP, Kertz RP ( 1982) Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables. Ann. Probab. 10(2):336–345.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • [24] Hill TP, Kertz RP (1992) A survey of prophet inequalities in optimal stopping theory. Contemporary Math. 125(1):191–207.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • [25] Kennedy DP (1987) Prophet-type inequalities for multi-choice optimal stopping. Stochastic Processes Appl. 24(1):77–88.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • [26] Kertz RP (1986) Stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables: A complete comparison by conjugate duality. J. Multivariate Anal. 19(1):88–112.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • [27] Kharif O (2013) Supermarkets offer personalized pricing. Bloomberg (November 15), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-14/2014-outlook-supermarkets-offer-personalized-pricing.Google Scholar
  • [28] Kleinberg J, Kleinberg R (2018) Delegated search approximates efficient search. Proc. 2018 ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. EC’18 (ACM, New York), 287–302.Google Scholar
  • [29] Krengel U, Sucheston L (1977) Semiamarts and finite values. Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 83(4):745–747.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • [30] Krengel U, Sucheston L (1978) On semiamarts, amarts, and processes with finite value. Kuelbs J, ed. Probability on Banach Spaces (Dekker, New York), 4:197–266.Google Scholar
  • [31] Lindelöf E (1894) Sur l’application de la méthode des approximations successives aux équations différentielles ordinaires du premier ordre. Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires des Séances Acad. Sci. 118(9):454–457.Google Scholar
  • [32] Lucier B (2017) An economic view of prophet inequalities. SIGecom Exchanges 16(1):24–47.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • [33] Mattioli D (2012) On Orbitz, Mac users steered to pricier hotels. Wall Street Journal (August 23), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304458604577488822667325882.Google Scholar
  • [34] Motwani R, Raghavan P (1995) Randomized Algorithms (Cambridge University Press, New York).Crossref, Google Scholar
  • [35] Myerson RB (1981) Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. 6(1):58–73.Link, Google Scholar
  • [36] Council of the European Union (2017) Geo-blocking: EU ambassadors confirm agreement on removing barriers to e-commerce. Press release, November 29, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/11/29/geo-blocking-eu-ambassadors-confirm-agreement-on-removing-barriers-to-e-commerce.Google Scholar
  • [37] Saint-Mont U (2002) A simple derivation of a complicated prophet region. J. Multivariate Anal. 80(1):67–72.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • [38] Samuel-Cahn E (1984) Comparisons of threshold stop rule and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables. Ann. Probab. 12(4):1213–1216.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • [39] Samuel-Cahn E (1991) Prophet inequalities for bounded negatively dependent random variables. Statist. Probab. Lett. 12(3):213–216.Crossref, Google Scholar
  • [40] Shapiro C, Varian HR (1999) Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (Harvard Business School Press, Boston).Google Scholar
  • [41] Singla S (2018) Combinatorial optimization under uncertainty: Probing and stopping-time algorithms. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Carnegie Mellon University.Google Scholar
  • [42] Yan Q (2011) Mechanism design via correlation gap. Randall D, ed. Proc. 22nd Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms, SODA’11 (SIAM, Philadelphia).Google Scholar
Previous
Back to Top
Next
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.
Agree