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April 10, 2013 - May 8, 2026

Available Issues

April 10, 2013 - May 8, 2026

Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements

Published Online:26 Oct 2023https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.0199

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