Forbidden Transactions and Black Markets

References

• [1] Acemoglu D, Jackson MO (2017) Social norms and the enforcement of laws. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 15(2):245–295.Google Scholar
• [2] Akerlof G, Yellen JL (1994) Gang Behavior, Law Enforcement, and Community Values (Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Washington, DC).Google Scholar
• [3] Alpert A, Powell D, Pacula RL (2018) Supply-side drug policy in the presence of substitutes: Evidence from the introduction of abuse-deterrent opioids. Amer. Econom. J. Econom. Policy 10(4):1–35.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [4] Ambagtsheer F, Haase-Kromwijk B, Dor FJ, Moorlock G, Citterio F, Berney T, Massey EK (2020) Global kidney exchange: Opportunity or exploitation? An ELPAT/ESOT appraisal. Transplant Internat. 33(9):989–998.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [5] Athreya KB (1968) Some results on multitype continuous time Markov branching processes. Ann. Math. Statist. 39(2):347–357.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [6] Athreya KB, Karlin S (1968) Embedding of urn schemes into continuous time Markov branching processes and related limit theorems. Ann. Math. Statist. 39(6):1801–1817.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [7] Athreya KB, Ney PE (2004) Branching Processes (Dover Publications, Inc., Mineola, NY).Google Scholar
• [8] Becker GS (1968) Crime and punishment: An economic approach. The Economic Dimensions of Crime (Palgrave Macmillan, London), 13–68.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [9] Becker GS, Stigler GJ (1974) Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers. J. Legal Stud. 3(1):1–18.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [10] Becker GS, Murphy KM, Grossman M (2006) The market for illegal goods: The case of drugs. J. Political Econom. 114(1):38–60.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [11] Bindler A, Hjalmarsson R (2018) How punishment severity affects jury verdicts: Evidence from two natural experiments. Amer. Econom. J. Econom. Policy 10(4):36–78.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [12] Bozek DN, Dunn TB, Kuhr CS, Marsh CL, Rogers J, Rees SE, Basagoitia L, et al. (2018) Complete chain of the first global kidney exchange transplant and 3-yr follow-up. Eur. Urology Focus 4(2):190–197.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [13] Brolan L, Wilson D, Yardley E (2016) Hitmen and the spaces of contract killing: The doorstep hitman. J. Investigative Psych. Offender Profiling 13(3):220–238.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [14] Calvó-Armengol A, Zenou Y (2004) Social networks and crime decisions: The role of social structure in facilitating delinquent behavior. Internat. Econom. Rev. 45(3):939–958.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [15] Cameron S (2014) Killing for money and the economic theory of crime. Rev. Soc. Econom. 72(1):28–41.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [16] Cunningham S, Kendall TD (2016) Examining the role of client reviews and reputation within online prostitution. The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Prostitution (Oxford University Press). Crossref, Google Scholar
• [17] Cunningham S, Kendall TD (2017) Prostitution, hours, job amenities and education. Rev. Econom. Household 15(4):1055–1080.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [18] Cunningham S, Shah M (2016) The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Prostitution (Oxford University Press).Crossref, Google Scholar
• [19] Cunningham S, Shah M (2018) Decriminalizing indoor prostitution: Implications for sexual violence and public health. Rev. Econom. Stud. 85(3):1683–1715.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [20] Dell M (2015) Trafficking networks and the Mexican drug war. Amer. Econom. Rev. 105(6):1738–1779.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [21] Doob JL (1990) Stochastic Processes, Wiley Classics Library (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York).Google Scholar
• [22] Durrett R (2019) Probability—Theory and Examples, Cambridge Series in Statistical and Probabilistic Mathematics, vol. 49 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).Crossref, Google Scholar
• [23] Eberle A (2009) Markov Processes, Lecture Notes (University of Bonn).Google Scholar
• [24] Eggenberger F, Pólya G (1923) Über die statistik verketteter vorgänge. ZAMM-J. Appl. Math. Mechanics 3(4):279–289.Google Scholar
• [25] Ferrer R (2010) Breaking the law when others do: A model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities. Eur. Econom. Rev. 54(2):163–180.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [26] Finkelstein A, Gentzkow M, Williams H (2018) What drives prescription opioid abuse? Evidence from migration. Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Working Paper 18–028, CA.Google Scholar
• [27] Friedman B (1949) A simple urn model. Comm. Pure Appl. Math. 2(1):59–70.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [28] Gallager RG (2012) Discrete Stochastic Processes, vol. 321 (Springer Science & Business Media, Boston-Dordrecht-London).Google Scholar
• [29] Glaeser EL, Sacerdote B, Scheinkman JA (1996) Crime and social interactions. Quart. J. Econom. 111(2):507–548.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [30] Grimmett GR, Stirzaker DR (2020) Probability and Random Processes, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK).Google Scholar
• [31] Hay JR, Shleifer A (1998) Private enforcement of public laws: A theory of legal reform. Amer. Econom. Rev. 88(2):398–403.Google Scholar
• [32] Hill BM, Lane D, Sudderth W (1980) A strong law for some generalized urn processes. Ann. Probab. 8(2):214–226.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [33] Keefer P, Loayza N (2010) Innocent Bystanders: Developing Countries and the War on Drugs (World Bank Publications).Crossref, Google Scholar
• [34] Krawiec KD, Rees MA (2014) Reverse transplant tourism. Law Contemporary Problems 77(3):145–173.Google Scholar
• [35] Le Gall JF (2013) Mouvement Brownien, Martingales et Calcul Stochastique, Mathematics & Applications, vol. 71 (Springer, Heidelberg, Germany).Crossref, Google Scholar
• [36] Marino IR, Roth AE, Rees MA, Doria C (2017) Open dialogue between professionals with different opinions builds the best policy. Amer. J. Transplantation 17(10):2749.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [37] Minerva F, Savulescu J, Singer P (2019) The ethics of the global kidney exchange programme. Lancet 394(10210):1775–1778.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [38] Mouzos J, Venditto J (2003) Contract Killings in Australia, vol. 53 (Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, Australia).Google Scholar
• [39] Onishi N, Gebrekidan S (2018) Hit men and power: South Africa’s leaders are killing one another. The New York Times (September 30), A1.Google Scholar
• [40] Pemantle R (1990) Nonconvergence to unstable points in urn models and stochastic approximations. Ann. Probab. 18(2):698–712.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [41] Pemantle R (2007) A survey of random processes with reinforcement. Probab. Surveys 4:1–79.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [42] Pitt AL, Humphreys K, Brandeau ML (2018) Modeling health benefits and harms of public policy responses to the US opioid epidemic. Amer. J. Public Health 108(10):1394–1400.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [43] Pólya G (1930) Sur quelques points de la théorie des probabilités. Annales de l'institut Henri Poincaré. 1(2):117–161.Google Scholar
• [44] Rees MA, Dunn TB, Kuhr CS, Marsh CL, Rogers J, Rees SE, Cicero A, et al. (2017) Kidney exchange to overcome financial barriers to kidney transplantation. Amer. J. Transplantation 17(3):782–790.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [45] Revuz D, Yor M (1999) Continuous Martingales and Brownian Motion, Fundamental Principles of Mathematical Sciences, vol. 293 (Springer-Verlag, Berlin).Crossref, Google Scholar
• [46] Robbins H, Monro S (1951) A stochastic approximation method. Ann. Math. Statist. 22(3):400–407.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [47] Rosenstein RJ (2018) Fight drug abuse, don’t subsidize it. The New York Times (August 27).Google Scholar
• [48] Roth AE (2007) Repugnance as a constraint on markets. J. Econom. Perspect. 21(3):37–58.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [49] Roth AE, Wang SW (2020) Popular repugnance contrasts with legal bans on controversial markets. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 117(33):19792–19798.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [50] Roth AE, Marino IR, Ekwenna O, Dunn TB, Paloyo SR, Tan M, Correa-Rotter R, et al. (2020) Global kidney exchange should expand wisely. Transplant Internat. 33(9):985–988.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [51] Scheper-Hughes N (2000) The global traffic in human organs. Current Anthropology 41(2):191–224.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [52] Schlesinger LB (2001) The contract murderer: Patterns, characteristics, and dynamics. J. Forensic Sci. 46(5):1119–1123.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [53] Shavell S (2009) Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press).Crossref, Google Scholar
• [54] Shaw M, Skywalker LL (2016) The hammermen: Life and death as a gang hitman in Cape Town. Howard J. Crime Justice 55(4):377–395.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [55] Shirk DA (2010) Drug violence in Mexico: Data and analysis from 2001–2009. Trends Organized Crime 13(2–3):167–174.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [56] Telford T (2018) A veteran pulled over to help a stuck truck: Its driver was a hit man hired to kill him. Washington Post (September 7).Google Scholar
• [57] Wald A (1944) On cumulative sums of random variables. Ann. Math. Statist. 15(3):283–296.Crossref, Google Scholar