Truthfulness of a Network Resource-Sharing Protocol

References

• [1] Adsul B, Babu CS, Garg J, Mehta R, Sohoni M (2010) Nash equilibria in Fisher market. Kontogiannis S, Koutsoupias E, Spirakis PG, eds. Internat. Sympos. Algorithmic Game Theory. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6386 (Springer, Berlin), 30–41.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [2] Andrade N, Santos-Neto E, Brasileiro F, Ripeanu M (2009) Resource demand and supply in BitTorrent content-sharing communities. Comput. Networks 53(4):515–527.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [3] Arrow KJ, Debreu G (1954) Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Econometrica 22(3):265–290.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [4] Aumann RJ (1964) Markets with a continuum of traders. Econometrica 32(1–2):39–50.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [5] Brânzei S, Devanur N, Rabani Y (2021) Proportional dynamics in exchange economies. Biró P, Chawla S, Echenique F, eds. Proc. 22nd ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 180–201.Google Scholar
• [6] Brânzei S, Chen Y, Deng X, Filos-Ratsikas A, Frederiksen SKS, Zhang J (2014) The Fisher market game: Equilibrium and welfare. Brodley CE, Stone P, eds. Proc. 28th Conf. Artificial Intelligence, vol. 28 (AAAI Press), 27–31.Google Scholar
• [7] Chen N, Deng X, Zhang J (2011) How profitable are strategic behaviors in a market? Halldórsson MM, ed. Proc. 19th Annual Eur. Sympos. Algorithms. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6942 (Springer, Berlin), 106–118.Google Scholar
• [8] Cheng Y, Deng X, Pi Y, Yan X (2015) Can bandwidth sharing be truthful? Hoefer M, ed. Internat. Sympos. Algorithmic Game Theory. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9347 (Springer, Berlin), 190–202.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [9] Cheng Y, Deng X, Qi Q, Yan X (2016) Truthfulness of a proportional sharing mechanism in resource exchange. Kambhampati S, ed. Proc. 25th Internat. Joint Conf. Artificial Intelligence (AAAI Press, New York), 187–193.Google Scholar
• [10] Cheung YK, Cole R, Tao Y (2018) Dynamics of distributed updating in Fisher markets. Tardos É, Elkind E, Vohra R, eds. Proc. 2018 ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 351–368.Google Scholar
• [11] Cramer J, Krueger AB (2016) Disruptive change in the taxi business: The case of Uber. Amer. Econom. Rev. 106(5):177–182.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [12] Dalakov G (2006) History of computers and computing, Internet, Internet conquers the world, BitTorrent. Accessed October 11, 2022, https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent.Google Scholar
• [13] Debreu G, Scarf H (1963) A limit theorem on the core of an economy. Internat. Econom. Rev. 4(3):235–264.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [14] Demange G, Gale D (1985) The strategy structure of two-sided matching markets. Econometrica 53(4):873–888.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [15] Deng X, Papadimitriou C, Safra S (2002) On the complexity of equilibria. Reif JH, ed. Proc. 34th Annual ACM Sympos. Theoretical Comput. (ACM), 67–71.Google Scholar
• [16] Duan R, Garg J, Mehlhorn K (2016) An improved combinatorial polynomial algorithm for the linear Arrow–Debreu market. Krauthgamer R, ed. Proc. 27th Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (SIAM), 90–106.Google Scholar
• [17] Fon (2007) Accessed October 11, 2022, http://www.fon.com.Google Scholar
• [18] Georgiadis L, Iosifidis G, Tassiulas L (2015) Exchange of services in networks: Competition, cooperation, and fairness. Performance Evaluation Rev. 43:43–56.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [19] Hurwicz L (1972) On informationally decentralized systems. McGuire CB, Radner R, eds. Decision and Organization (North Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam).Google Scholar
• [20] Isaac E (2015) Innovative clusters & new work: A case study of TaskRabbit. Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (University of California, Berkeley, CA).Google Scholar
• [21] Jackson MO (1992) Incentive compatibility and competitive allocations. Econom. Lett. 40(3):299–302.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [22] Jain K (2007) A polynomial time algorithm for computing an Arrow–Debreu market equilibrium for linear utilities. SIAM J. Comput. 37(1):303–318.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [23] Lan J, Ma Y, Zhu D, Mangalagiu D, Thornton TF (2017) Enabling value co-creation in the sharing economy: The case of Mobike. Sustainability 9(9):1–20.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [24] Misra V, Ioannidis S, Chaintreau A, Massoulié L (2010) Incentivizing peer-assisted services: A fluid Shapley value approach. Performance Evaluation Rev. 38:215–226.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [25] Morimoto S, Serizawa S (2015) Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule. Theoretical Econom. 10(2):445–487.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [26] Nisan N (2007) Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists). Nisan N, Roughgarden T, Tardos E, Vazirani VV, eds. Algorithmic Game Theory (Cambridge University Press, New York), 209–242.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [27] Open Garden (2013) Accessed October 10, 2022, https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Garden.Google Scholar
• [28] Papadimitriou C (2001) Algorithms, games, and the internet. Vitter JS, Spirakis PG, Yannakakis M, eds. Proc. 33rd Annual ACM Sympos. Theoretical Comput. (ACM), 749–753.Google Scholar
• [29] Roberts DJ, Postlewaite A (1976) The incentives for price-taking behavior in large exchange economies. Econometrica 44(1):115–127.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [30] Schollmeier R (2001) A definition of peer-to-peer networking for the classification of peer-to-peer architectures and applications. Graham RL, Shahmehri N, eds. Proc. First Internat. Conf. Peer-to-Peer Comput. (IEEE), 101–102.Google Scholar
• [31] Shapley LS, Shubik M (1971) The assignment game I: The core. Internat. J. Game Theory 1(1):111–130.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [32] Sofia RC, Mendes P (2008) User-provided networks: Consumer as provider. IEEE Comm. Magazine 46(12):86–91.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [33] Vickrey W (1961) Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J. Finance 16(1):8–37.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [34] Wu F, Zhang L (2007) Proportional response dynamics leads to market equilibrium. Johnson DS, Feige U, eds. Proc. 39th Annual ACM Sympos. Theoretical Comput. (ACM), 354–363.Google Scholar
• [35] Ye Y (2008) A path to the Arrow–Debreu competitive market equilibrium. Math. Programming 111(1–2):315–348.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [36] Zervas G, Proserpio D, Byers JW (2017) The rise of the sharing economy: Estimating the impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry. J. Marketing Res. 54(5):687–705.Crossref, Google Scholar
• [37] Zhang L (2011) Proportional response dynamics in the Fisher market. Theoretical Comput. Sci. 412(24):2691–2698.Google Scholar