The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities
Published Online:25 Mar 2025https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2024.0684
References
- [1] (2017) Beating 1-1/e for ordered prophets. Proc. 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Sympos. Theory Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 61–71.Google Scholar
- [2] (2011) Bayesian combinatorial auctions: Expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers. 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Sympos. Foundations Comput. Sci. (IEEE, Piscataway, NJ), 512–521.Google Scholar
- [3] (2022) Tight guarantees for static threshold policies in the prophet secretary problem. Oper. Res. 71(5):1777–1788.Link, Google Scholar
- [4] (2020) Bulow-Klemperer-style results for welfare maximization in two-sided markets. Proc. 2020 ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (SODA) (SIAM, Philadelphia), 2452–2471.Google Scholar
- [5] (2019) Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items. Proc. 51st Annual ACM SIGACT Sympos. Theory Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 686–696.Google Scholar
- [6] (2023) The competition complexity of dynamic pricing. Math. Oper. Res. 49(3):1986–2008.Link, Google Scholar
- [7] (1996) Auctions versus negotiations. Amer. Econom. Rev. 86(1):180–194.Google Scholar
- [8] (2010) Multiparameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing. Proc. Forty-Second ACM Sympos. Theory Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 311–320.Google Scholar
- [9] (2023) A constant-factor prophet inequality for online combinatorial auctions. Proc. 55th Annual ACM Sympos. Theory Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 686–697.Google Scholar
- [10] (2019) From pricing to prophets, and back! Oper. Res. Lett. 47(1):25–29.Crossref, Google Scholar
- [11] (2021) Posted price mechanisms and optimal threshold strategies for random arrivals. Math. Oper. Res. 46(4):1452–1478.Link, Google Scholar
- [12] (2000) Resource augmentation for online bounded space bin packing. Automata Languages Programming. ICALP 2000 (Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg), 296–304.Google Scholar
- [13] (2020) An O(log log m) prophet inequality for subadditive combinatorial auctions. 2020 IEEE 61st Annual Sympos. Foundations Comput. Sci. (FOCS) (IEEE, Piscataway, NJ), 306–317.Google Scholar
- [14] (2017) Prophet inequalities made easy: Stochastic optimization by pricing non-stochastic inputs. 2017 IEEE 58th Annual Sympos. Foundations Comput. Sci. (FOCS) (IEEE, Piscataway, NJ), 540–551.Google Scholar
- [15] (2017) The competition complexity of auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders. Proc. 2017 ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 343.Google Scholar
- [16] (2024) The competition complexity of prophet inequalities with correlations. Preprint, submitted September 10, https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.06868.Google Scholar
- [17] (2024) The competition complexity of prophet secretary. Preprint, submitted November 16, https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.10892.Google Scholar
- [18] (2022) Prophet matching with general arrivals. Math. Oper. Res. 47(2):878–898.Link, Google Scholar
- [19] (2020) Pricing multi-unit markets. ACM Trans. Econom. Comput. 7(4):1–29.Google Scholar
- [20] (2015) Combinatorial auctions via posted prices. Proc. Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia), 123–135.Google Scholar
- [21] (2016) Online contention resolution schemes. Krauthgamer R, ed. Proc. Twenty-Seventh Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia), 1014–1033.Google Scholar
- [22] (2019) Prophet inequality for bipartite matching: Merits of being simple and non adaptive. Proc. 2019 ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 93–109.Google Scholar
- [23] (2007) Automated mechanism design and prophet inequalities. Proc. 22nd Natl. Conf. Artificial Intelligence - Volume 1 (AAAI Press, Palo Alto, CA), 58–65.Google Scholar
- [24] (2000) Speed is as powerful as clairvoyance. J. ACM 47(4):617–643.Crossref, Google Scholar
- [25] (2012) Matroid prophet inequalities. Proc. Forty-Fourth Annual ACM Sympos. Theory Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 123–136.Google Scholar
- [26] (1977) Semiamarts and finite values. Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 83:745–747.Crossref, Google Scholar
- [27] (1978) On semiamarts, amarts, and processes with finite value. Adv. Probab. Related Topics 4:197–266.Google Scholar
- [28] (2006) Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities. Games Econom. Behav. 55(2):270–296.Crossref, Google Scholar
- [29] (2021) Variable decomposition for prophet inequalities and optimal ordering. Proc. 22nd ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 692.Google Scholar
- [30] (1997) Optimal time-critical scheduling via resource augmentation (extended abstract). Proc. Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM Sympos. Theory Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 140–149.Google Scholar
- [31] (2002) How bad is selfish routing? J. ACM 49(2):236–259.Crossref, Google Scholar
- [32] (2017) Combinatorial prophet inequalities. Proc. Twenty-Eighth Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia), 1671–1687.Google Scholar
- [33] (1984) Comparison of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables. Ann. Probab. 12(4):1213–1216.Crossref, Google Scholar
- [34] (1984) Amortized efficiency of list update rules. Proc. Sixteenth Annual ACM Sympos. Theory Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 488–492.Google Scholar

