Correlated Equilibrium in Quitting Games
Published Online:1 Aug 2001https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.26.3.601.10579
References
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. J. Math. Econ. (1974) 1:67–96Crossref, Google Scholar
- Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (1995) (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
- Equilibrium in a stochastic n-person game. J. Sci. Hiroshima Univ. (1964) 28:89–93Crossref, Google Scholar
- Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games. Internat. J. Game Theory (1997) 26:303–314Crossref, Google Scholar
- Stochastic games. Internat. J. Game Theory (1981) 10:53–66Crossref, Google Scholar
- Three-person absorbing games. Math. Oper. Res. (1999) 24:669–698Link, Google Scholar
- Correlated equilibrium in stochastic games. (1998a) . D.P. #1226, The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL and Cahiers du CEREMADE #9848Google Scholar
- Quitting games. (1998b) . D.P. #1227, The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL and Cahiers du CEREMADE #9846Google Scholar
- Correlated equilibrium, public signalling and absorbing games. (1999) . D.P. #1272, The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, ILGoogle Scholar
- Equilibrium in 2-person stochastic games I: A reduction. Israel J. Math. (2000a) 119:55–91Crossref, Google Scholar
- Equilibrium in 2-person stochastic games II: The case of recursive games. Israel J. Math. (2000b) 119:93–126Crossref, Google Scholar
- On equilibria in repeated games with absorbing states. Internat. J. Game Theory (1989) 18:293–310Crossref, Google Scholar

