Centralizing Inventory in Supply Chains by Using Shapley Value to Allocate the Profits

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1100.0310

References

  • Anderle K. Cooperation yields mutual cost reduction. Electronics Buyers' News (1997) August 18):62Google Scholar
  • Anupindi R., Bassok Y. Centralization of stocks: Retailers vs. manufacturer. Management Sci. (1999) 45(2):178–191LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Anupindi R., Bassok Y., Zemel E. General framework for the study of decentralized distribution systems. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management (2001) 3(4):349–368LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Atkinson W. Digi-key picks vendor-managed over consignment inventory. Purchasing (2007) 136(14):17–18Google Scholar
  • Barnes E., Dai J., Deng S., Down D., Goh M., Lau H. C., Sharafali M. Electronics manufacturing service industry. (2000) . Technical report, National University of Singapore, Republic of SingaporeGoogle Scholar
  • Bartholdi J. J., Kemahlıoğlu-Ziya E., Geunes J., Pardalos P. Using Shapley value to allocate savings in a supply chain. Supply Chain Optimization (2005) (Springer-Verlag, New York) 169–208CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Cachon G. P., de Kok A. G., Graves S. C. Supply chain coordination with contracts. Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science: Supply Chain Management (2003) (Elsevier B.V., Amsterdam) . Chap. 6CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Cachon G. P., Lariviere M. Capacity choice and allocation: Strategic behavior and supply chain performance. Management Sci. (1999) 45(8):1091–1108LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Cherikh M. On the effect of centralization on expected profits in a multi-location newsboy problem. J. Oper. Res. Soc. (2000) 51(6):755–761Google Scholar
  • Chwe M. Farsighted coalitional stability. J. Econom. Theory (1994) 63(2):259–325CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Deshpande V., Schwarz L. Optimal capacity choice and allocation in decentralized supply chains. (2005) . Technical report, Purdue University, West Lafayette, INGoogle Scholar
  • Dong L., Rudi N. Who benefits from transshipment? Exogenous vs. endogenous wholesale prices. Management Sci. (2004) 50(5):645–657LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Eitelwein O., Wallenburg M. 3rd party logistics providers' role in replenishment: Classic and future models in the high-tech/electronics sector. (2007) . Technical report, Kuehne-Centre for Logistics Management, Vallendar, GermanyGoogle Scholar
  • Eppen G. Effects of centralization on expected costs in multi-location newsboy problem. Management Sci. (1979) 25(5):498–501LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Gerchak Y., Gupta D. On apportioning costs to customers in centralized continuous review systems. J. Oper. Management (1991) 10(4):546–551CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Gerchak Y., Mossman D. On the effect of demand randomness on inventories and costs. Oper. Res. (1992) 40(4):804–807LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Granot D., Sošić G. A three-stage model for a decentralized distribution system of retailers. Oper. Res. (2003) 51(5):771–784LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Granot D., Sošić G. Formation of alliances in Internet-based supply exchanges. Management Sci. (2005) 51(1):92–105LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Hartman B., Dror M. Cost allocation in continuous-review inventory models. Naval Res. Logist. (1996) 43(4):549–561CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Hartman B., Dror M. Optimizing centralized inventory operations in a cooperative game theory setting. IIE Trans. (2003) 35(3):243–257CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Hartman B., Dror M. Allocations of gains from inventory centralization in newsvendor environments. IIE Trans. (2005) 37(2):93–107CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Maschler M., Aumann R. J., Hart S. The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications (1992) 1(North Holland, Amsterdam) 591–667CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • McKeefry H. L. New sourcing strategies are paying off. Electronics Buyers' News (1998) October 5Google Scholar
  • Müller A., Scarsini M., Shaked M. The newsvendor game has a nonempty core. Games Econom. Behav. (2002) 38(1):118–126CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Myerson R. B.Game Theory Analysis of Conflict (1991) (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
  • Nagarajan M., Bassok Y. A bargaining framework in supply chains: The assembly problem. Management Sci. (2008) 54(8):1482–1496LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Özen U., Erkip N., Slikker M. Profit division in newsvendor games with delivery restrictions. (2006a) . Technical report, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The NetherlandsGoogle Scholar
  • Özen U., Norde H., Slikker M. On the convexity of newsvendor games. (2005) . Technical report. Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The NetherlandsGoogle Scholar
  • Özen U., Sošić G., Slikker M. A collaborative decentralized distribution system with updated demand information. (2006b) . Technical report, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The NetherlandsGoogle Scholar
  • Özen U., Fransoo J., Norde H., Slikker M. Cooperation between multiple newsvendors with warehouses. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management (2008) 10(2):311–324LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Plambeck E., Taylor T. Sell the plant? The impact of contract manufacturing on innovation, capacity and profitability. Management Sci. (2005) 51(1):133–150LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Plambeck E., Taylor T. Implications of breach remedy and renegotiation design for innovation and capacity. Management Sci. (2007a) 53(12):1859–1871LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Plambeck E., Taylor T. Implications of renegotiation for optimal contract flexibility and investment. Management Sci. (2007b) 53(12):1872–1886LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Robinson L. W. A comment on Gerchak and Gupta's “On apportioning costs to customers in centralized continuous review systems”. J. Oper. Management (1993) 11(1):99–102CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Rudi N., Kapur S., Pyke D. A two-location inventory model with transshipment and local decision making. Management Sci. (2001) 47(12):1668–1680LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Shaked M., Shanthikumar J. G.Stochastic Orders and Their Applications (2007) (Springer, New York) Google Scholar
  • Shapley L. S. A value for N-person games. Contribution to the Theory of Games (1953) 2(Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) 307–317CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Shapley L. S. Cores of convex games. Internat. J. Game Theory (1971) 1(1):11–26CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Slikker M., Fransoo J., Wouters M. Cooperation between multiple news-vendors with transshipments. Eur. J. Oper. Res. (2005) 167(2):370–380CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Song J.-S. The effect of leadtime uncertainty in a simple stochastic inventory model. Management Sci. (1994) 40(5):603–613LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Sošić G. Transshipment of inventories among the retailers: Myopic vs. farsighted stability. Management Sci. (2006) 52(10):1493–1508LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Sprumont Y. Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility. Games Econom. Behav. (1990) 2(4):378–394CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Suakkaphong N., Dror M. Competition and cooperation in decentralized distribution. (2009) . Technical report, University of Arizona, TucsonGoogle Scholar
  • Yang H., Schrage L. Conditions that cause risk pooling to increase inventory. Eur. J. Oper. Res. (2009) 192(3):837–851CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Young H. P. Monotonic solutions of cooperative games. Internat. J. Game Theory (1985) 14(2):65–72CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Zhang J. Transshipment and its impact on supply chain members' performance. Management Sci. (2005) 51(10):1534–1539LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Zhao H., Deshpande V., Ryan J. Inventory sharing and rationing in decentralized dealer networks. Management Sci. (2005) 51(4):531–547LinkGoogle Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.