Delegation vs. Control of Component Procurement Under Asymmetric Cost Information and Simple Contracts

References

• Altintas N, Erhun F, Tayur S. Quantity discounts under demand uncertainty. Management Sci. (2008) 54(4):777–792Link, Google Scholar
• Amaral J, Billington C, Tsay A. Safeguarding the promise of production outsourcing. Interfaces (2006) 36(3):220–233Link, Google Scholar
• Ansley M. Virtual manufacturing. CMA Management (2000) 74(1):31–35Google Scholar
• Bagnoli M, Bergstorm T. Log-concave probability and its applications. Econom. Theory (2005) 26(2):445–469Crossref, Google Scholar
• Carbone J. Hewlett-Packard wins for the 2nd time. Purchasing Magazine (2004) 133(14):34–50Google Scholar
• Carr C, Truesdale T. Lessons from Nissan's British suppliers. Internat. J. Oper. Production Management (1992) 12(2):49–57Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen Y-J, Shum S, Xiao W. Should an OEM retain component procurement when the CM produces competing products? Production Oper. Management (2012) 21(5):907–922Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chin S. EMS, OEMs in procurement tug of war. EE Times (2003) August 26). http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4168988/EMS-OEMs-in-procurement-tug-of-war-item-1Google Scholar
• Clarke P. Sharp, Foxconn form LCD venture, say reports. EE Times (2011) July 18). http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4217931/Sharp-Foxconn-LCD-venture-reportsGoogle Scholar
• CNN World Business GE venture wins Airbus engine deal. (2003) . Press release, December 8, Dubai, United Arab EmiratesGoogle Scholar
• Denend L, Plambeck EL. Wal-Mart's sustainability strategy. (2007) . Case study, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CAGoogle Scholar
• Denend L, Plambeck EL. Wal-Mart's sustainability strategy (B): 2010 Update. (2010) . Case study, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CAGoogle Scholar
• Deshpande V, Schwarz LB, Atallah MJ, Blanton M, Frikken KB. Outsourcing manufacturing: Secure price-masking mechanisms for purchasing component parts. Production Oper. Management (2011) 20(2):165–180Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ellram L, Billington C. Purchasing leverage considerations in the outsourcing decision. Eur. J. Purchasing Supply Management (2001) 7(1):15–27Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fudenberg D, Levine D, Tirole J, Roth A. Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information. Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining (1985) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK) 73–98Chap. 5Crossref, Google Scholar
• GE Aviation Delta Air Lines signs long-term materials agreement with CFM. (2007) . Press release, April 18, http://www.geaviation.com/press/cfm56/cfm56-3/cfm56-3_20070418.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Guo P, Song JS, Wang Y. Outsourcing structures and information flow in a three-tier supply chain. Internat. J. Production Econom. (2010) 128(1):175–187Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kagel JH, Roth AE. The Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995) (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lariviere MA, Porteus EL. Selling to the newsvendor: An analysis of price-only contracts. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management (2001) 3(4):293–305Link, Google Scholar
• Lee HL, Tang CS, Lee HL, Ng SM. Managing supply chains with contract manufacturing. Global Supply Chain and Technology Management (1998) (Production and Operations Management Society, Miami) 141–151Google Scholar
• Martimort D, Stole L. The revelation and delegation principles in common agency games. Econometrica (2002) 70(4):1659–1673Crossref, Google Scholar
• McIvor RT, Humphreys PK, McAleer WE. European car makers and their suppliers: Changes at the interface. Eur. Bus. Rev. (1998) 98(2):87–99Crossref, Google Scholar
• Melumad N, Mookherjee D, Reichelstein S. Contract complexity, incentives, and the value of delegation. J. Econom. Management Strategy (1997) 6(2):257–289Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mookherjee D. Decentralization, hierarchies, and incentives: A mechanism design perspective. J. Econom. Literature (2006) 44(2):367–390Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mookherjee D, Tsumagari M. The organization of supply networks: Effects of delegation and intermediation. Econometrica (2004) 72(4):1179–1219Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nagarajan M, Bassok Y. A bargaining framework in supply chains: The assembly problem. Management Sci. (2008) 54(8):1482–1496Link, Google Scholar
• Poitevin M. Can the theory of incentives explain decentralization? Canadian J. Econom. (2000) 33(4):878–906Crossref, Google Scholar
• Popescu I. A semidefinite programming approach to optimal moment bounds for convex classes of distributions. Math. Oper. Res. (2005) 30(3):632–657Link, Google Scholar
• Riverwood Solutions Q1 2009 OEM key issues survey. (2009) . Retrieved April 2, 2009, http://www.rwsops.com/survey_form.phpGoogle Scholar
• Savitz E. Does Corning's gorilla glass miss hint at Apple iPad issue? Forbes.com (2011) November 30). http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericsavitz/2011/11/30/does-cornings-gorilla-glass-miss-hint-at-apple-ipad-issueGoogle Scholar
• Schuh C, Strohmer M, Zetterqvist S. Raw material strategy—Volatility is here to stay. (2011) . Study, AT Kearney, ChicagoGoogle Scholar
• Shell R. Bargaining for Advantage (1999) (Viking, New York) Google Scholar
• Souza C. Cisco regulates inventory intake. EE Times (2003) February 3). http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4032689/Cisco-regulates-inventory-intakeGoogle Scholar
• Yuksel O. (2011) . Phone interview by authors with Dr. Ozlem Yuksel, director of Corporate Strategy at Hewlett-Packard, September 16Google Scholar