Dynamic Pricing for Heterogeneous Time-Sensitive Customers

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2018.0763

References

  • Akan M, Ata B, Dana J (2015) Revenue management by sequential screening. J Econom. Theory 159(part B):728–774.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Alaei S, Fu H, Haghpanah N, Hartline J, Malekian A (2012) Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction. Preprint, submitted March 22, https://arxiv.org/abs/1203.5099.Google Scholar
  • Araman VF, Caldentey R (2009) Dynamic pricing for nonperishable products with demand learning. Oper. Res. 57(5):1169–1188.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Aviv Y, Pazgal A (2008) Optimal pricing of seasonal products in the presence of forward-looking consumers. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 10(3):339–359.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Aviv Y, Wei MM, Zhang F (2019) Responsive pricing of fashion products: The effects of demand learning and strategic consumer behavior. Management Sci. 65(7):2982–3000.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Bansal M, Maglaras C (2009) Dynamic pricing when customers strategically time their purchase: Asymptotic optimality of a two-price policy. J. Revenue Pricing Management 8(1):42–66.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Battaglini M, Lamba R (2012) Optimal dynamic contracting. Working paper, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Bergemann Dirk, Said M (2011) Dynamic auctions. Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science (Wiley, New York).CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Besanko D, Winston WL (1990) Optimal price skimming by a monopolist facing rational consumers. Management Sci. 36(5):555–567.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Besbes O, Lobel I (2015) Intertemporal price discrimination: Structure and computation of optimal policies. Management Sci. 61(1):92–110.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Bitran G, Caldentey R (2003) An overview of pricing models for revenue management. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 5(3):203–229.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Bitran GR, Mondschein SV (1997) Periodic pricing of seasonal products in retailing. Management Sci. 43(1):64–79.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Board S, Skrzypacz A (2016) Revenue management with forward-looking buyers. J. Political Econom. 124(4):1046–1087.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Boleslavsky R, Said M (2013) Progressive screening: Long-term contracting with a privately known stochastic process. Rev. Econom. Stud. 80(1):1–34.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Borgs C, Candogan O, Chayes J, Lobel I, Nazerzadeh H (2014) Optimal multiperiod pricing with service guarantees. Management Sci. 60(7):1792–1811.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Boyd S, Vandenberghe L (2004) Convex Optimization (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Briest P, Chawla S, Kleinberg R, Weinberg SM (2010) Pricing randomized allocations. Proc. 21st Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (SIAM, Philadelphia), 585–597.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Cachon GP, Swinney R (2011) The value of fast fashion: Quick response, enhanced design, and strategic consumer behavior. Management Sci. 57(4):778–795.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Cai Y, Daskalakis C, Weinberg SM (2012) Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization. Proc. 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Sympos. Foundations Comput. Sci. (FOCS) (IEEE, New York), 130–139.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Chan LMA, Shen ZJM, Simchi-Levi D, Swann JL (2004) Coordination of pricing and inventory decisions: A survey and classification. Simchi-Levi D, Wu SD, Shen Z-J(M), eds. Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis: Modeling in the E-Business Era (Springer Science and Business Media, New York), 335–392.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Chawla S, Malec DL, Sivan B (2010) The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design. Proc. 11th ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (ACM, New York), 149–158.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Chen Y, Farias VF (2016) On the efficacy of static prices for revenue management in the face of strategic customers. Proc. 2016 ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (ACM, New York), 811.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Chen Y, Farias VF (2018) Robust dynamic pricing with strategic customers. Math. Oper. Res. 43(4):1119–1142.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Chen Y, Shi C (2016) Joint pricing and inventory management with strategic customers. Working paper, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati.Google Scholar
  • Coase RH (1972) Durability and monopoly. J. Law Econom. 15(1):143–149.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Conlisk J, Gerstner E, Sobel J (1984) Cyclic pricing by a durable goods monopolist. Quart. J. Econom. 99(3):489–505.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Dasu S, Tong C (2010) Dynamic pricing when consumers are strategic: Analysis of posted and contingent pricing schemes. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 204(3):662–671.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Elmaghraby W, Gülcü A, Keskinocak P (2008) Designing optimal preannounced markdowns in the presence of rational customers with multiunit demands. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 10(1):126–148.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Federgruen A, Heching A (1999) Combined pricing and inventory control under uncertainty. Oper. Res. 47(3):454–475.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Feng Y, Gallego G (1995) Optimal starting times for end-of-season sales and optimal stopping times for promotional fares. Management Sci. 41(8):1371–1391.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Gallego G, Van Ryzin G (1994) Optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic demand over finite horizons. Management Sci. 40(8):999–1020.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Garrett D (2011) Durable goods sales with dynamic arrivals and changing values. Unpublished manuscript, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.Google Scholar
  • Gershkov A, Moldovanu B (2012) Dynamic allocation and pricing: A mechanism design approach. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 30(3):283–286.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Golrezaei N, Nazerzadeh H (2016) Auctions with dynamic costly information acquisition. Oper. Res. 65(1):130–144.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Gul F, Sonnenschein H, Wilson R (1986) Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture. J. Econom. Theory 39(1):155–190.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Hart S, Nisan N (2017) Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items. J. Econom. Theory 172:313–347.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Kakade SM, Lobel I, Nazerzadeh H (2013) Optimal dynamic mechanism design and the virtual pivot mechanism. Oper. Res. 61(4):837–854.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Lazear EP (1984) Retail pricing and clearance sales. NBER Working Paper No. 1446, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
  • Levin Y, McGill J, Nediak M (2009) Dynamic pricing in the presence of strategic consumers and oligopolistic competition. Management Sci. 55(1):32–46.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Liu Q, Van Ryzin G (2011) Strategic capacity rationing when customers learn. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 13(1):89–107.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Liu Q, Van Ryzin GJ (2008) Strategic capacity rationing to induce early purchases. Management Sci. 54(6):1115–1131.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Lobel I, Xiao W (2017) Optimal long-term supply contracts with asymmetric demand information. Oper Res. 65(5):1275–1284.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Myerson RB (1981) Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. 6(1):58–73.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Pavan A, Segal I, Toikka J (2014) Dynamic mechanism design: A Myersonian approach. Econometrica 82(2):601–653.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Shen Z-JM, Su X (2007) Customer behavior modeling in revenue management and auctions: A review and new research opportunities. Production Oper. Management 16(6):713–728.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Stokey NL (1979) Intertemporal price discrimination. Quart. J. Econom. 93(3):355–371.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Su X (2007) Intertemporal pricing with strategic customer behavior. Management Sci. 53(5):726–741.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Talluri K, Van Ryzin G (2004) Revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer behavior. Management Sci. 50(1):15–33.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Wang R (1993) Auctions versus posted-price selling. Eur. Econom. Rev. 39(9):1747–1764.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Yu M, Debo L, Kapuscinski R (2015) Strategic waiting for consumer-generated quality information: Dynamic pricing of new experience goods. Management Sci. 62(2):410–435.LinkGoogle Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.