On-Demand Service Sharing via Collective Dynamic Pricing

References

• Abhishek V, Dogan M, Jacquillat A (2021) Strategic timing and dynamic pricing for online resource allocation. Management Sci. 67(8):4880–4907.Google Scholar
• Afeche P (2013) Incentive-compatible revenue management in queueing systems: Optimal strategic delay. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 15(3):423–443.Link, Google Scholar
• Afèche P, Mendelson H (2004) Pricing and priority auctions in queueing systems with a generalized delay cost structure. Management Sci. 50(7):869–882.Link, Google Scholar
• Afèche P, Pavlin M (2016) Optimal price/lead-time menus for queues with customer choice: Segmentation, pooling, and strategic delay. Management Sci. 62(8):2412–2436.Link, Google Scholar
• Akan M, Ata B, Olsen T (2012) Congestion-based lead-time quotation for heterogenous customers with convex-concave delay costs: Optimality of a cost-balancing policy based on convex hull functions. Oper. Res. 60(6):1505–1519.Link, Google Scholar
• Amin S, Jaillet P, Pulyassary H, Wu M (2023) Market design for dynamic pricing and pooling in capacitated networks. Preprint, submitted July 8, https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.03994v1.Google Scholar
• Andreoni J (1990) Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving. Econom. J. 100(401):464–477.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ata B, Olsen TL (2013) Congestion-based leadtime quotation and pricing for revenue maximization with heterogeneous customers. Queueing Systems 73:35–78.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Balseiro SR, Candogan O, Gurkan H (2021) Multistage intermediation in display advertising. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 23(3):714–730.Link, Google Scholar
• Bergstrom T, Blume L, Varian H (1986) On the private provision of public goods. J. Public Econom. 29(1):25–49.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bertsekas D (2012) Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, vol. II, 4th ed. (Athena Scientific, Nashua, NH).Google Scholar
• Besbes O, Lobel I (2015) Intertemporal price discrimination: Structure and computation of optimal policies. Management Sci. 61(1):92–110.Link, Google Scholar
• Bimpikis K, Candogan O, Saban D (2019) Spatial pricing in ride-sharing networks. Oper. Res. 67(3):744–769.Link, Google Scholar
• Board S (2008) Durable-goods monopoly with varying demand. Rev. Econom. Stud. 75(2):391–413.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Braverman A, Dai JG, Liu X, Ying L (2019) Empty-car routing in ridesharing systems. Oper. Res. 67(5):1437–1452.Link, Google Scholar
• Bulow J, Roberts J (1989) The simple economics of optimal auctions. J. Polit. Econom. 97(5):1060–1090.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cachon G, Daniels K, Lobel R (2017) The role of surge pricing on a service platform with self-scheduling capacity. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 19(3):368–384.Link, Google Scholar
• Çelik S, Maglaras C (2008) Dynamic pricing and lead-time quotation for a multiclass make-to-order queue. Management Sci. 54(6):1132–1146.Link, Google Scholar
• Chen Y, Hu M (2020) Pricing and matching with forward-looking buyers and sellers. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 22(4):717–734.Link, Google Scholar
• Drèze JH (1980) Public goods with exclusion. J. Public Econom. 13(1):5–24.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Golrezaei N, Nazerzadeh H, Randhawa R (2020) Dynamic pricing for heterogeneous time-sensitive customers. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 22(3):562–581.Link, Google Scholar
• Hu M, ed. (2019) Sharing Economy: Making Supply Meet Demand (Springer Cham, Cham, Switzerland).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hu M, Zhou Y (2022) Dynamic type matching. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 24(1):125–142.Link, Google Scholar
• Hu M, Wang J, Wen H (2020) Share or solo? Individual and social choices in ride-hailing. Preprint, submitted, October 1, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3675050.Google Scholar
• Jacob J, Roet-Green R (2021) Ride solo or pool: Designing price-service menus for a ride-sharing platform. Eur. J. Oper Res. 295(3):1008–10.24.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Karaenke P, Schiffer M, Waldherr S (2023) On the benefits of ex-post pricing for ride-pooling. Transportation Res. Part C Emerging Tech. 155:104290.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Katta AK, Sethuraman J (2005) Pricing strategies and service differentiation in queues—A profit maximization perspective. Working paper, Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University, New York.Google Scholar
• Ke J, Yang H, Li X, Wang H, Ye J (2020) Pricing and equilibrium in on-demand ride-pooling markets. Transportation Res. Part B Methodological 139:411–431.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lobel I, Martin S (2025) Detours in shared rides. Management Sci. 71(2):1716–1736.Link, Google Scholar
• Maglaras C, Yao J, Zeevi A (2018) Optimal price and delay differentiation in large-scale queueing systems. Management Sci. 64(5):2427–2444.Link, Google Scholar
• Maniquet F, Sprumont Y (2004) Fair production and allocation of an excludable nonrival good. Econometrica 72(2):627–640.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maniquet F, Sprumont Y (2005) Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments. J. Econom. Theory 120(2):155–174.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Martin S, Taylor SJ, Yan J (2021) Trading flexibility for adoption: Dynamic versus static walking in ridesharing. Preprint, submitted December 15, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3984476.Google Scholar
• Moulin H (1994) Serial cost-sharing of excludable public goods. Rev. Econom. Stud. 61(2):305–325.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Myerson R (1981) Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. 6(1):58–73.Link, Google Scholar
• Oh S, Özer Ö (2013) Mechanism design for capacity planning under dynamic evolutions of asymmetric demand forecasts. Management Sci. 59(4):987–1007.Link, Google Scholar
• Samuelson PA (1954) The pure theory of public expenditure. Rev. Econom. Statist. 36(4):387–389.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stokey N (1979) Intertemporal price discrimination. Quart. J. Econom. 93(3):355–371Crossref, Google Scholar
• Taylor T (2018) On-demand service platforms. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 20(4):704–720.Link, Google Scholar
• Taylor TA (2024) Shared-ride efficiency of ride-hailing platforms. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 26(5):1945–1961.Link, Google Scholar
• Wang X, Zhang R (2022) Carpool services for ride-sharing platforms: Price and welfare implications. Naval Res. Logist. 69(4):550–565.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wang S, Sun P, de Véricourt F (2016) Inducing environmental disclosures: A dynamic mechanism design approach. Oper. Res. 64(2):371–389.Link, Google Scholar
• Xu SH, Li Z (2007) Managing a single-product assemble-to-order system with technology innovations. Management Sci. 53(9):1467–1485.Link, Google Scholar
• Yan C, Yan J, Shen Y (2025) Pricing shared rides. Preprint, submitted June 18, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4551405.Google Scholar
• Yan C, Zhu H, Korolko N, Woodard D (2020) Dynamic pricing and matching in ride-hailing platforms. Naval Res. Logist. 67(8):705–724.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yu Y, Deng T, Song JS (2024) Conditional lead-time flexibility in an assemble-to-order system. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 26(6):2194–2211.Link, Google Scholar
• Zhang W, Jacquillat A, Wang K, Wang S (2023) Routing optimization with vehicle–customer coordination. Management Sci. 69(11):6876–6897.Link, Google Scholar