Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem

References

• Alpern S., Katrantzi I., Reyniers D. Mathematical models of mutual mate choice. Recent Research Developments in Experimental and Theoretical Biology (2005) (Transworld Research Network, Trivandrum, Kerala, India) 177–200Google Scholar
• Chow Y. S., Moriguti S., Robbins H., Samuels S. M. Optimal selection based on relative rank (the “secretary problem”). Israel J. Math. (1964) 2:81–90Crossref, Google Scholar
• Eriksson K., Strimling P. How unstable are matchings from decentralized mate search? (2005) . PreprintGoogle Scholar
• Ferguson T. Who solved the secretary problem? Statist. Sci. (1989) 4:282–296Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lindley D. Dynamic programming and decision theory. Appl. Statist. (1961) 10:39–51Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prestel A., Delzell C. N.Positive Polynomials: From Hilbert's 17th Problem to Real Algebra (2001) (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rittaud B. Quand les assistantes choisissent…leur patron. La Recherche (2005) 382:26-27Google Scholar
• Roth A. E., Sotomayor M. A. O.Two-Sided Matching (1990) (Cambridge University Press, New York) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Selten R. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. Internat. J. Game Theory (1975) 4:25–55Crossref, Google Scholar