Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms

References

• Ahuja R. K., Magnanti T. L., Orlin J. B.Network Flows: Theory, Algorithms, and Applications (1993) (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ) Google Scholar
• Babaioff M., Walsh W. E. Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation. Decision Support Systems (2005) 39(1):123–149Crossref, Google Scholar
• Babaioff M., Nisan N., Pavlov E. Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market. Fifth ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (2004) (ACM, New York) 9–20Crossref, Google Scholar
• Beil D., Wein L. An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multiattribute RFQ process. Management Sci. (2003) 49(11):1529–1545Link, Google Scholar
• Blackmon D. A. E-commerce (a special report): Revamping the model—Where the money is. The Wall Street J. (2000) Apr. 17):R30Google Scholar
• Bredin J., Parkes D. C. Models for truthful online double auctions. Proc. 21st Conf. Uncertainty Artificial Intelligence (UAI'2005) (2005) Edinburgh, Scotland:50–59Google Scholar
• Chen R. R., Roundy R. O., Zhang R. Q., Janakiraman G. Efficient auction mechanisms for supply chain procurement. Management Sci. (2005) 51(3):467–482Link, Google Scholar
• Chu L. Y., Shen Z. M. Agent competition double auction mechanism. Management Sci. (2006) 52:1215–1222Link, Google Scholar
• Chu L. Y., Shen Z. M. Trade reduction vs. multi-stage: A comparison of double auction design approaches. Eur. J. Oper. Res. (2007) 180(2):677–691Crossref, Google Scholar
• Clarke E. H. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice (1971) 11:17–33Crossref, Google Scholar
• Elmaghraby W. The importance of ordering in sequential auctions. Management Sci. (2003) 49(5):673–682Link, Google Scholar
• Gallien J., Wein L. M. A smart market for industrial procurement with capacity constraints. Management Sci. (2005) 51(1):76–91Link, Google Scholar
• Groves T. Incentives in teams. Econometrica (1973) 41:617–631Crossref, Google Scholar
• Huang P., Scheller-Wolf A., Sycara K. Design of a multi-unit double auction e-market. Computational Intelligence (2002) 18(4):596–617Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hurwicz L., McGuire C. B., Radner R. On informationally decentralized systems. Decision and Organization (1972) (North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) 297–336Google Scholar
• McAfee R. P. A dominant strategy double auction. J. Econom. Theory (1992) 56:434–450Crossref, Google Scholar
• Milgrom P. An economist's vision of the B-to-B marketplace. (2000) . Executive white paper, www.perfect.comGoogle Scholar
• Muálem A., Nisan N. Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions. Proc. 18th National Conf. Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-02) (2002) (AAAI Press, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada) 379–384Google Scholar
• Myerson R. B., Satterthwaite M. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. J. Econom. Theory (1983) 29:265–281Crossref, Google Scholar
• Parkes D. C., Kalagnanam J. Models for iterative multiattribute Vickrey auctions. Management Sci. (2005) 51:435–451Link, Google Scholar
• Satterthwaite M. A., Williams S. R. The rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction as the market becomes large. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1989) 56(4):477–498Crossref, Google Scholar
• Vickrey W. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J. Finance (1961) 16:8–37Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williams S. R. Existence and convergence of equilibria in the buyer's bid double auction. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1991) 58(2):351–374Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wise R., Morrison D. Beyond the exchange: The future of B2B. Harvard Bus. Rev. (2000) 78(6):86–96Google Scholar