Mechanism Design for Decentralized Online Machine Scheduling

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0732

References

  • Anderson E. J., Potts C. N. Online scheduling of a single machine to minimize total weighted completion time. Math. Oper. Res. (2004) 29(3):686–697LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Archer A., Tardos E. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. Proc. 42nd Annual Sympos. Foundations Comput. Sci. (2001) (IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA) 482–491CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Azar Y., Jain K., Mirrokni V. (Almost) Optimal coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling. Proc. Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (SODA'08) (2008) (ACM-SIAM, Philadelphia) 323–332Google Scholar
  • Bein D., Wein L. An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multiattribute RFQ process. Management Sci. (2003) 49(11):1529–1545LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Bikhchandani S., Chatterjee S., Lavi R., Mu'alem A., Nisan N., Sen A. Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant strategy implementation. Econometrica (2006) 74(4):1109–1132CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Christodoulou G., Koutsoupias E., Nanavati A. Coordination mechanisms. Automata, Languages and Programming (2004) 3142(Springer, Berlin) 345–357Lecture Notes in Computer ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Correa J. R., Wagner M. R. LP-based online scheduling: From single to parallel machines. Math. Programming (2009) 119(1):109–136CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Demange G., Gale D., Sotomayor M. Multi-item auctions. J. Political Econom. (1986) 94(4):863–872CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Eastman W. L., Even S., Isaacs I. M. Bounds for the optimal scheduling of n jobs on m processors. Management Sci. (1964) 11:268–279LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Gallien J., Wein L. A smart market for industrial procurement with capacity constraints. Management Sci. (2005) 51(1):76–91LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Goemans M., Queyranne M., Schulz A., Skutella M., Wang Y. Single machine scheduling with release dates. SIAM J. Discrete Math. (2002) 15(2):165–192CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Graham R. L., Lawler E. L., Lenstra J. K., Rinnooy Kan A. H. G. Optimization and approximation in deterministic sequencing and scheduling: A survey. Ann. Discrete Math. (1979) 5:287–326CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Gui H., Müller R., Vohra R. Dominant strategy mechanisms with multidimensional types. (2004) . Discussion Paper 1392, The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Sciences, Northwestern University, Evanston, ILGoogle Scholar
  • Hajiaghayi M., Kleinberg R., Parkes D. Adaptive limited-supply online auctions. Proc. 5th ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (EC'04) (2004) (ACM, New York) 71–80CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Hajiaghayi M., Kleinberg R., Mahdian M., Parkes D. Online auctions with re-usable goods. Proc. 6th ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (EC'05) (2005) (ACM, New York) 165–174CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Heydenreich B., Müller R., Uetz M., Arge L., Freivalds R. Decentralization and mechanism design for online machine scheduling. Algorithm Theory–SWAT 2006 (2006) 4059(Springer, Berlin) 136–147Lecture Notes in Computer ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Hoogeveen J. A., Vestjens A. P. A., Cunningham W. H., McCormick S. T., Queyranne M. Optimal on-line algorithms for single machine scheduling. Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization (1996) 1084(Springer, Berlin) 404–414Lecture Notes in Computer ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Immorlica N., Li L., Mirrokni V. S., Schulz A., Deng X., Ye Y. Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling. Internet and Network Economics (2005) 3828(Springer, Berlin) 55–69Lecture Notes in Computer ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Lavi R., Nisan N., Roughgarden T., Tardos É., Vazirani V. Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms. Algorithmic Game Theory (2007) (Cambridge University Press)301–329CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Lenstra J. K., Rinnooy Kan A. H. G., Brucker P. Complexity of machine scheduling problems. Ann. Discrete Math. (1977) 1:343–362CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Megow N., Schulz A. S. On-line scheduling to minimize average completion time revisited. Oper. Res. Lett. (2004) 32:485–490CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Megow N., Uetz M., Vredeveld T. Models and algorithms for stochastic online scheduling. Math. Oper. Res. (2006) 31(3):513–525LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Nisan N., Nisan N., Roughgarden T., Tardos É., Vazirani V. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists). Algorithmic Game Theory (2007) (Cambridge University Press, New York) 209–241CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Nisan N., Ronen A. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Econom. Behav. (2001) 35:166–196CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Parkes D. C. iBundle: An efficient ascending price bundle auction. Proc. 1st ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (EC'99) (1999) (ACM, New York) 148–157CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Parkes D. C., Nisan N., Roughgarden T., Tardos É., Vazirani V. Online mechanisms. Algorithmic Game Theory (2007) (Cambridge University Press, New York) 411–439CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Parkes D. C., Ungar L. H. Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice. Proc. 17th National Conf. Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00) (2000) 74–81Google Scholar
  • Porter R., Breese J. S., Feigenbaum J., Seltzer M. I. Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling. Proc. 5th ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (EC'04) (2004) (ACM, New York) 61–70CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Smith W. Various optimizers for single stage production. Naval Res. Logist. Quart. (1956) 3:59–66CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Vestjens A. P. A. On-line machine scheduling. (1997) . Ph.D. thesis, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The NetherlandsGoogle Scholar
  • Wellman M. P., Walsh W. E., Wurman P. R., MacKie-Mason J. K. Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling. Games Econom. Behav. (2001) 35(1–2):271–303CrossrefGoogle Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.